Ukraine between East and West

UkraineUkraine’s Orange Revolution was always painted (in the western media, at least) as a conflict between western-looking Yushchenko and the eastern-looking former Prime Minister Yanukovich, the man whose suspect election to the presidency sparked popular protests and an eventual turnaround back in November 2004. Yushchenko was, it is alleged, the target of an assassination plot backed by Moscow, while Yanukovich was merely backed by Moscow. When the Revolution got its way and Yushchenko came to power, it seemed the West had won.

But it was never going to be that simple, or that easy. After countless disputes between Ukraine’s various political factions over the last four years, another post-Orange Revolution government is nearing collapse thanks to yet another spat between former Orange allies President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko – and all as the aftermath of the Georgia crisis continues to rumble with the US handing Saakashvili a tidy $1 billion in reconstruction money (otherwise known as a fiscal two fingers to Moscow), and Russia announces a review of its global trade relations. Although the EU may account for 31% of Ukraine’s export market, Russia makes up 21% – and after the various spats over gas supplies over the last couple of years, you can be sure that Ukrainians are somewhat worried about just what Moscow may have planned to reassert the influence she lost with the fall of former President Kuchma back in 2004.

And so it would appear that the spread of the Georgia standoff does indeed seem likely to spread to Ukraine.

The thing is, though, that even without the squabbles between the various political leaders, the position of Ukraine was never going to be resolved by a simple election. Did Yanukovich try to steal the election back in 2004? Quite possibly. But that still doesn’t alter the fact that the country’s vote was split almost exactly down the middle.

Of course, it’s easy to label this an East vs West thing, and that’s part of it. But the actual reason is cultural and linguistic. Ukraine’s just like Belgium, in fact. The parallels are painfully evident:

Belgium and Ukraine by politics and language

You see, just as Belgium has a north/south split between Flemish and French speakers, so too it has a north/south political divide. And in Ukraine, there’s a northwest/southeast split between majority Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers, echoed in political support for the “west-leaning” Yushchenko/Orange Revolution in the northwest and “pro-Russia” Yanukovich in the southeast.

So, why does Ukraine have the borders that she does? They’re a fairly recent creation, after all – with the origins of Ukraine lying in the medieval Kievan Rus’, which stretched north from Kiev through modern Belarus and Poland to the Baltic, not south and east to the Black Sea. It went on to be absorbed into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (covering much the same area – but again missing out the south and east of modern Ukraine, which was part of the Crimean Khanate, before being sucked into the similarly vast Kingdom of Poland via the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Check the maps below (very rough, I know) charting Ukraine’s geographical history up to the 19th century (when it was absorbed by the Russian Empire) – notice something?

Historical geography of Ukraine

Yep – that’s right. The Russian-speaking, Yanukovich-voting part of modern Ukraine was not, historically, part of Ukraine – it’s a later addition tacked on during the Russian Empire. During the chaotic times following the Russian revolution and around the Ukrainian War of Independence of 1919, the northwest that tried to break away as a Ukrainian state (actually, several Ukrainian states, after repeated failures to consolidate their position), while the southeast (briefly) went its own way as the Crimean People’s Republic. It was really only under the Soviets – who took the Tsars’ attempts to crush the Crimean Tatars and put down Ukranian nationalism (especially after the Second World War, where Ukrainian nationalists fought both the Russians and the Germans, depending on who was occupying the area at the time, in a campaign that lasted until 1956) to the usual near-genocidal extremes – that Ukraine’s current borders began to be fixed. In fact, you can even put a precise date on it – 19th February 1954, the day the Crimean Oblast was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

So here’s the question. If northwestern Ukraine is the linguistic, cultural and historical hub of the Ukrainian people, and southwestern Ukraine has only been spliced on within living memory, why persist with the pretense that the current borders of the modern Ukrainian state are actually meaningful? They were created by the Soviet Union as a handy administrative division, not based on any of the usual factors that go into the creation of a coherent state. Artificial borders have, time and again, led to conflict and division – be it via European colonialism in Africa or the carving up of the Middle East after the First World War.

If Ukraine really is torn between east and west, in other words – and it is – and if its artificial makeup keeps leading to political stalemate and unrest – and it does – isn’t the logical thing to do to follow the Belgian example and consider splitting the country down the middle? (This would also, one hopes, have the added benefit of shutting Russia up for a while as she regains part of her old sphere of influence – and enable the EU to focus on the more “European” northwest for development and eventual integration.)

Am I serious about this as a suggestion? It’s about 50/50 at the moment. But the longer Ukraine goes without forming a stable government, the more likely an outcome this will be…

Russia, Georgia, the former USSR and fear

Yes, OK. We get it. You guys have a big, powerful army and you aren’t afraid to use it.

Nicholas II, Lenin, Stalin, Putin and MedvedevThat’s meant to discourage eastern European countries – all of whom have less then pleasant memories of armies from Russia invading, looting, raping, pillaging and occupying them for the last several centuries – from looking to NATO for help and signing up to the proposed US missile defence shield how, exactly?

Sure enough, Poland’s now signed up to the American scheme.

But the thing is, by now surely it must be obvious to Moscow that the West is not a military threat? We can’t take down a bunch of beardy religious fanatics with AK-47s – what hope do we have against a million-man army that seems to like to test out its equipment at random every few years to stop it getting rusty? All the West’s managed to do in the last few days (and this goes for the US and NATO as much as the EU) is express mild disapproval while disagreeing on precisely what form the ineffective slap on the wrist should take.

So I’m beginning to think that Russia simply doesn’t care any more. The Georgian escapade was a classic bit of imperialist aggression dressed up as humanitarian intervention, and they’ve completely got away with it. Yes, it looks as though they may well have begun to withdraw from Georgian territory now, but the message to Russia’s neighbours (well, bar China, perhaps) is clear: if we want to, we can fuck you up – there’s nothing you can do about it, and your new buddies in the West aren’t going to be any help either.

Russia’s effectively declared herself rogue – not necessarily hostile rogue, but unpredictable rogue. Riggs to the West’s Murtaugh. She’s not prepared to follow the rules, barely bothers paying lip-service to them, and has an agenda all her own. The thing is, just like poor old Danny Glover as Murtaugh, we’ve really got no choice but to be partners with her, and hope that she mellows with time. Because something we’ve all known for years is becoming increasingly obvious – there’s not a lot we can do to change Russia’s course.

A related aside – worth developing further sometime – is the idea that Russia (much like the EU, in fact) is still trying to work out what it is for in a post-Cold War world. The old federation that was the Soviet Union has already splintered. The Russian Federation is similarly vast, similarly packed with diverse peoples and cultures – with 27 officially-recognised languages within its borders. But why?

Simple ethnic map of the USSR in 1974, leeched from the University of Texas (click for full size)What purpose does “Russia” serve? Why shouldn’t the Chechens follow the Khazaks, Estonians and Ukrainians to independence? Why shouldn’t the Chuckchis, Yakuts, Buryats, Adyghes, Kalmyks, Chuvash, Karachays, Balkars, Ingush, Khakas, Komi, Udmurts, Nenets, Khants, Tatars, Mari, Mansi or any of the other federalised subgroups?

Just as I’ve long been asking what the EU’s for now that the original idea seems obsolete, Russia has been asking itself the same question. Without the binding ideology of communism for the elites (and fear for those beneath), what has been holding what remains of the Soviet Union together? As the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia begin to thrive as part of the EU, as former Soviet territories like Georgia and Ukraine look to NATO membership and cozy up to the West – not to mention the old Russian Imperial territory of Finland (sitting pretty with the 12th highest GDP per capita in the world), what’s to prevent other parts of the Russian empire deciding that they’ve had enough?

Well, where the EU’s going for aspiration, after the brutally over-the-top actions of the Russian military in Georgia over the last week (and even more so in the Chechen wars – the second of which has technically been running for nearly a decade now), it’s hard not to see a return to federalism by fear. It’s a fine Russian tradition. Indeed, fear and repression are pretty much the only reason the old Russian Empire managed to hold itself together for so many years. Democracy in Russia has not been enough – opposition parties are still so under-supported as to be laughable. Authoritarian-seeming Putin, unafraid to act and act fast – remains Russia’s most popular leader since, erm… Stalin.

And so, it seems, we may be entering a new phase of Russian Imperialism:

“”It is clear that we need the kind of idea for which one will not be sorry to give one’s life. And the building of civil society, of the rule of law, of a prosperous society we find uninteresting. Indeed, we would rather squander everything and end our lives with suicide, than scrupulously count the credit and the debit, invest, corporatize, organize on cooperative lines, and so on. We find that tedious. We would rather try to absorb the enormous spaces of Siberia and the Far East, so that the islands of the Pacific Ocean become indigenously ours, we will fight for centuries with Europe for the Baltic States, and with Turkey for the Dardanelles – that is our way.”

(Original here, for those who can read Estonian…)