Tag Archives: Ukraine

Welcome to 2009

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Nothing changes, it seems. Just like 2008, 2009 promises to bring yet more Russian sabre-rattling and European fears about the continent’s long-term energy security.

Also time to welcome in the Czech EU presidency. With the Czech Republic currently being run by the neoliberal, eurosceptic Civic Democratic Party of President Václav Klaus and Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek – a party that’s already begun to align itself with Declan Ganley’s new anti-Lisbon Treaty Libertas movement – it could prove an interesting six months.

With the EU still stuck in a deadlock until the Irish question is sorted, will Klaus – increasingly a hero of the eurosceptic right EU-wide thanks to his repeated anti-EU pronouncements (even calling for the EU to be scrapped altogether back in 2005) – be able to use his elevated position over the next six months to advance the eurosceptic cause?

Substantive posts soon, honest. I’ve got a real-world deadline for the 5th, though, so need to prioritise.

Sorry, you’re just not European enough

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Better luck next time, Ukraine.

One of these days the EU powers that be are going to realise that when you’ve got countries torn between a European and non-European identity, to keep on telling them “sorry, you’re not European enough yet” is just going to drive them into the other camp.

How much longer are the likes of Ukraine and Turkey going to put up with these repeated, very public rejections before heading off to the waiting embrace of Moscow or non-secular Islamism?

If I were a westwards-looking Ukrainian, I’d be getting very pissed off about now:

Ukraine will have to make do with an “association agreement” with the EU, a pact that for Balkan countries such as Albania, Macedonia and Serbia represents the first step on the path to membership, but for Ukraine carries no such implications

So Ukraine’s less welcome than tiny Albania and Macedonia? Less welcome than Serbia, a country built on a genocidal civil war and still in dispute with much of the EU over the status of Kosovo?

Yeah, cheers for that. Really encouraging. Nice one.

The promise of future EU membership can be a force for good, inspiring positive shifts towards greater democratic freedoms. But the promise has to be made. Taking a carrot and stick approach is a tried-and-tested method for getting people to do what you want – and that goes for countries too. Yet in the case of Ukraine, the EU’s carrot would appear to be largely imaginary – while at the same time, Ukrainians know that Russia has both stick and carrot, and isn’t afraid to use either.

Ukraine between East and West

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UkraineUkraine’s Orange Revolution was always painted (in the western media, at least) as a conflict between western-looking Yushchenko and the eastern-looking former Prime Minister Yanukovich, the man whose suspect election to the presidency sparked popular protests and an eventual turnaround back in November 2004. Yushchenko was, it is alleged, the target of an assassination plot backed by Moscow, while Yanukovich was merely backed by Moscow. When the Revolution got its way and Yushchenko came to power, it seemed the West had won.

But it was never going to be that simple, or that easy. After countless disputes between Ukraine’s various political factions over the last four years, another post-Orange Revolution government is nearing collapse thanks to yet another spat between former Orange allies President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko – and all as the aftermath of the Georgia crisis continues to rumble with the US handing Saakashvili a tidy $1 billion in reconstruction money (otherwise known as a fiscal two fingers to Moscow), and Russia announces a review of its global trade relations. Although the EU may account for 31% of Ukraine’s export market, Russia makes up 21% – and after the various spats over gas supplies over the last couple of years, you can be sure that Ukrainians are somewhat worried about just what Moscow may have planned to reassert the influence she lost with the fall of former President Kuchma back in 2004.

And so it would appear that the spread of the Georgia standoff does indeed seem likely to spread to Ukraine.

The thing is, though, that even without the squabbles between the various political leaders, the position of Ukraine was never going to be resolved by a simple election. Did Yanukovich try to steal the election back in 2004? Quite possibly. But that still doesn’t alter the fact that the country’s vote was split almost exactly down the middle.

Of course, it’s easy to label this an East vs West thing, and that’s part of it. But the actual reason is cultural and linguistic. Ukraine’s just like Belgium, in fact. The parallels are painfully evident:

Belgium and Ukraine by politics and language

You see, just as Belgium has a north/south split between Flemish and French speakers, so too it has a north/south political divide. And in Ukraine, there’s a northwest/southeast split between majority Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers, echoed in political support for the “west-leaning” Yushchenko/Orange Revolution in the northwest and “pro-Russia” Yanukovich in the southeast.

So, why does Ukraine have the borders that she does? They’re a fairly recent creation, after all – with the origins of Ukraine lying in the medieval Kievan Rus’, which stretched north from Kiev through modern Belarus and Poland to the Baltic, not south and east to the Black Sea. It went on to be absorbed into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (covering much the same area – but again missing out the south and east of modern Ukraine, which was part of the Crimean Khanate, before being sucked into the similarly vast Kingdom of Poland via the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Check the maps below (very rough, I know) charting Ukraine’s geographical history up to the 19th century (when it was absorbed by the Russian Empire) – notice something?

Historical geography of Ukraine

Yep – that’s right. The Russian-speaking, Yanukovich-voting part of modern Ukraine was not, historically, part of Ukraine – it’s a later addition tacked on during the Russian Empire. During the chaotic times following the Russian revolution and around the Ukrainian War of Independence of 1919, the northwest that tried to break away as a Ukrainian state (actually, several Ukrainian states, after repeated failures to consolidate their position), while the southeast (briefly) went its own way as the Crimean People’s Republic. It was really only under the Soviets – who took the Tsars’ attempts to crush the Crimean Tatars and put down Ukranian nationalism (especially after the Second World War, where Ukrainian nationalists fought both the Russians and the Germans, depending on who was occupying the area at the time, in a campaign that lasted until 1956) to the usual near-genocidal extremes – that Ukraine’s current borders began to be fixed. In fact, you can even put a precise date on it – 19th February 1954, the day the Crimean Oblast was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

So here’s the question. If northwestern Ukraine is the linguistic, cultural and historical hub of the Ukrainian people, and southwestern Ukraine has only been spliced on within living memory, why persist with the pretense that the current borders of the modern Ukrainian state are actually meaningful? They were created by the Soviet Union as a handy administrative division, not based on any of the usual factors that go into the creation of a coherent state. Artificial borders have, time and again, led to conflict and division – be it via European colonialism in Africa or the carving up of the Middle East after the First World War.

If Ukraine really is torn between east and west, in other words – and it is – and if its artificial makeup keeps leading to political stalemate and unrest – and it does – isn’t the logical thing to do to follow the Belgian example and consider splitting the country down the middle? (This would also, one hopes, have the added benefit of shutting Russia up for a while as she regains part of her old sphere of influence – and enable the EU to focus on the more “European” northwest for development and eventual integration.)

Am I serious about this as a suggestion? It’s about 50/50 at the moment. But the longer Ukraine goes without forming a stable government, the more likely an outcome this will be…

Europe’s Russia strategy / Russia’s Europe strategy

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NATO, the EU, the former Soviet Union and the new Russian Federation, with Europe caught in the middleSo, what is it going to be, exactly? A military response isn’t an option, and Moscow knows it – though quite how far they can push before getting shoved back in return we don’t yet know (Georgia may be strategically important, but isn’t yet a member of NATO; the same goes for Ukraine; but what about Estonia, with it’s sizable population of ethnic Russians and history of tensions with its larger neighbour? We’re all meant to fight for EU and NATO member Estonia – but if push did come to shove, would we?) Economic sanctions are unlikely to have much impact when Russia has such a tight grip of the European energy market and can hurt us far more than we can hurt them. We also can’t risk ceasing to trade with Moscow as winter approaches and Russian gas supplies become ever more vital – whereas they can do without European markets, if necessary.

But one thing is clear – if Europe’s strategy remains unclear, Russia’s seems to have failed. If the aim of the Georgia expedition was, as many have assumed, to reintroduce Moscow’s will to the Western periphery of the Russian Federation, then finally pushing Poland into the arms of the Americans was certainly not the desired result. Especially when Ukraine – that other nascent nation with a history of troubles and a sizeable Russian population on the Eurasian border that some have pointed to as “Russia’s next target” swiftly follows suit.

But still, I’m not sure I buy this whole “extending influence” thing. Not only does Russia seem to have hardened the anti-Moscow attitudes of the old Warsaw Pact EU member states (including among the people, many of whom have, in ex-Soviet countries, had a tendency for rosy nostalgia for the days of communism), but also pushed Ukraine further westwards, and potentially gained Georgia the NATO seat she wanted even though Tbilisi’s recent actions show that the country’s really not ready yet.

But that’s not all. Russia’s also singularly failed to maintain control over Chechnya despite years of fighting, and has even found the conflict spreading into neighbouring parts of the Caucasus – as well as to the Russian capital itself. In Georgia, rather than a disciplined and efficient military manoeuvre, we’ve seen poor targeting, poor discipline, and a seeming lack of ability to decide what the hell to do – having pushed in to Georgian territory and taken Gori, the Russians seem largely to have been milling around trying to look macho for the last week or two, while seemingly ignoring presidential orders. This is, it seems, what you get from a conscript army.

So, when we come to look back on this in a few months’ time, what will Moscow have achieved? Well, she may be able to gain a bit more influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but those two regions hold little of any strategic value (bar Abkhazia’s apparently rather beautiful stretches of Black Sea coastline). Georgia will continue to be the non-Russian route of choice for Central Asian oil and gas to Europe – only now, undoubtedly, with a far stronger western military presence to guard the infrastructure. Georgia’s chances of NATO membership will have been greatly increased, as will those of Ukraine. The significance of energy dependence on Russia will also have become far more apparent to a far wider group of people (the reason we need to develop alternate energy sources is not global warming, folks, it’s Gazprom…) The threat of Russian instability – long largely ignored by many in the West, desperately hoping that Putin was one of us despite his authoritarian ways – will have become clear. But it should also have become clear that Russia’s army really isn’t much of a threat. A few ill-trained teenagers with battered equipment can cause some short-term chaos, certainly – they can maim and kill and loot and burn as well as anyone. But even supported with tanks, I’m not convinced of the threat of the Russian army any more – or of the minds coming up with Russian strategy. It’s still early days, but as NATO plans its longer-term response this whole escapade is beginning to look like it’s backfired on Moscow.

So, what’s the next step? Well, having been slow to act to the initial violence, the best bet for Europe/NATO is probably to sit back and wait to see what the next move from Moscow is going to be, because they’ve probably already started to realise their mistake. For NATO or the EU to suddenly come out with some hasty, highly public punitive measures is likely to spark further escalation as Moscow seeks to save face.

Location of BelarusI can’t see too much direct Russian intervention in Ukraine – bar the usual behind-the-scenes funding – as long as Ukraine’s politicians continue their ridiculous infighting (that’s been going on ever since the damp squib that was the Orange Revolution back in November 2004), as a divided Ukraine is very much in Russia’s interests, something that can be exploited while the West sits back and waits for them to resolve their differences. The most likely option is a revival of the old plan to merge Belarus with Russia – a project that’s been on-off, on-off for years now, and which Russia has previously been the reluctant party to – not worth much to Moscow in real terms (Belarus has little to offer economically), but psychologically important, almost completely cutting off the Baltic states, and giving Russia a border only 150 kilometres from Warsaw.

But how do you second-guess Russia? Moscow doesn’t think like governments in the West. At least, we don’t think they do. Because no one really seems to know what Russia’s up to. We can’t even tell who the next head of state is going to be until they tell us, after all. There are countless conspiracy theories about what Russia’s plan is – from shadowy groups of ex-KGB men plotting a global takeover to shadowy groups of ultracapitalist gangsters trying to wring as much money out of everyone as possible – and none of them are entirely convincing.

The old question “cock-up or conspiracy” should always be met with the answer “cock-up” until you’re presented with some very compelling evidence to the contrary. Russia’s Georgia escapade looks rather like it was designed to be a conspiracy, but it’s one they so far appear to have cocked up. A plan designed to show Russia as strong, powerful, and capable of decisive action has, instead, shown her to be incapable and pushed those she was wooing even further into the opposing camp. This Georgia episode has shown that Putin’s old tough guy act is just that. Russia’s prepared to bully those littler than her, but wouldn’t be able to hack it in a real fight. (Not that I’m advocating getting into a real fight with Russia, obviously – in this case, the best response to the bully is probably to pretend to ignore her while sniggering a bit to make sure she knows we didn’t miss her failure… The embarrassment may just be enough to stop her from trying it again – because image does seem to be everything to this lot.)

NATO, Russia and Europe

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Hunting around for a handy overview of just what’s been happening at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, depending on who you read you’ll get some wildly different ideas. I’ve been confused for much of the morning. Here’s a brief indication of why:

Der Spiegel‘s “Germany Puts the Brakes on US Expansion Plans” is countered by the International Herald Tribune‘s “NATO backs U.S. missile defense plan for Europe”

EU Referendum‘s claim that “NATO has thrown Ukraine and Georgia to the bear. President Bush’s attempts to put them on track to future and very distant membership of NATO has failed” is then contradicted by Radio Free Europe‘s report that “pro-NATO forces in Ukraine and Georgia celebrated the announcement, which offered stronger-than-expected support for their entry bids”

Repeat for pretty much every issue under discussion at the summit (for which, see this very handy round-up).

People always like to look for tangible, obvious outcomes from these things. But this is international diplomacy. Worse than that, it’s strategic military international diplomacy where all but one of the permanent members of the UN’s Security Council are involved (and we know how infrequently that lot manage to get along). Making compromises left, right and centre – leading to a stalemate in which, well, the status quo has largely been maintained – was the only sensible course of action. The thing was always going to end up a waste of time and money.

NATO flagBut the real fun is that despite the fact that NATO is now overseeing operations in Afghanistan (that well-known North Atlantic power) and looking to a more global role, this summit has made one thing increasingly apparent: the Cold War may have ended, but NATO’s principal opponent remains Russia.

Pretty much every compromise on the European front, every bit of backing down, appears to have been done to placate the Kremlin – because the principle areas to which NATO is looking to expand its influence (largely under the prompting of the US) lie in former communist countries, be it Ukraine and Georgia or Croatia and Albania.

As you’ve no doubt noticed, there’s been a growing tension between Russia and the West in recent years – from ex-FSB men assassinated in London to the resumption of patrols by Russian nuclear bombers through the vendetta against the British Council in Moscow. Then there’s the war of words with Belarus, Europe’s oft-forgotten fanatically pro-Moscow wildcard (a country that misses the USSR so much its secret police are still called the KGB and there are constant rumours that it is planning to formally merge with Russia), cyber-warfare against Estonia, and the ongoing standoff over Kosovo’s independence. Even the EU’s (and NATO’s) difficult relationship with Turkey is getting caught up with the Russian situation thanks to the Russo-Turkish partnership in the Bluestream and Nabucco pipelines, both of which are helping to make Europe increasingly reliant on Russian energy supplies.

The relationship with Russia, in other words, increasingly seems to dominate all European diplomacy. Where during the Cold War the presence of the USSR may have ensured that western Europe and the EU was operating under the constant fear of nuclear attack, Moscow’s then lack of engagement in western European affairs allowed everyone to get on much as they pleased. Since the end of the Cold War – and especially since Putin came to power – Moscow’s long-sought-after engagement with the West has if anything caused even more problems.

During the Cold War it was America who stood guard and kept watch, now Europe (both the EU and non-EU countries) has to be constantly on the alert for far more subtle Russian encroachments than columns of Red Army troops or falling H-bombs – encroachments largely economic, and mostly achieved through that strange form of diplomacy at which Putin so excels: smiling with fangs.

With such a large, unpredictable neighbour to the east – especially one with the ability to shut down a sizable chunk of the European economy on a whim (as has already happened to Ukraine) – little wonder there seem to have been few major advances at this latest NATO summit. In fact, I can barely see the point of holding these things until Russian attitudes to the West shift further in the direction of friendly cooperation (no signs of that any time soon) – because Russia’s never going to accept public humiliation, which is how the current regime seems to see any kind of outside involvement in what remains of the bear’s sphere of influence.

So the real points of interest after such standoffs between Russia and the West are never going to be the big issues. We’re not suddenly going to have a Kremlin change of heart on any of the major issues any time soon. And if and when such a change of heart comes, it’s certainly not going to come at one of these big public summits – far too humiliating. Where such shifts in Russian attitudes – either pro-engagement or heading towards hostility – are first going to be seen is in the details. The precise wording, the precise terms of any diplomatic agreement between Russia and the EU, US, NATO or individual European countries – the small print that the journalists rarely have time to scan in their rush to hit deadlines and get an angle that gives the subs a good shot at an interesting headline – that’s where we’ll first spot the changes when they come.

These summits are, in other words, little better than MacGuffins. The real diplomacy is going on off the radar, with lots of little standoffs in places like Armenia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

NATO may well be starting to look globally – but Europe needs to do the same to keep tabs on just what its unpredictable neighbour is up to, because Russia has more ability than any other state to screw Europe over. If Russia’s got its fingers in a lot of pies, we need to be keeping an eye on all of them, and not get distracted by the occasional fuss over the more obvious ones like Ukraine and Georgia (both of which have had high-profile popular pro-democracy uprisings in recent years, which are always of appeal to the press). To do so would be to fall for the oldest trick in the book.

“The new stage… the stage of totalitarianism”

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Shutting down an entire university due to breaches of fire regulations would sound a little harsh at the best of times.

When the university in question is St Petersburg’s European University, however, suspicions are naturally raised – not least thanks to numerous EU-funded courses, including one on election monitoring. We are, lest we forget, just a few short weeks before Russia’s controversial presidential elections.

Little wonder, then, that some among Russia’s isolated opposition are digging out the colourful rhetoric:

Maxim Reznik, the head of the St. Petersburg branch of Russia’s liberal Yabloko faction, said the real reason for the order was an election monitoring course funded by the European Union.

“No doubt, it’s about politics,” Reznik said. “Fire inspections is just an excuse. It’s another example that the authoritarian regime is going to the new stage, to the stage of totalitarianism.”

The suspension of the university’s activities comes amid tensions between Moscow and the West over Russia’s March 2 presidential elections. An election monitoring arm of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has refused to send observers to the vote because of restrictions on their activities — an announcement likely to strengthen Western concerns about democracy in Russia.

When the university’s closure comes the very same day that Moscow announces it will maintain favourable gas prices for the pro-Russian dictatorship in Belarus while threatening to cut off supplies to the EU-leaning Ukraine, it’s very hard not to see the university’s closure as part of a coordinated campaign designed to tell Ukraine to look east, not west if it knows what’s good for it…

Update: Ahem… BBC News – Russia in Ukraine missile threat

Ukraine: time for the EU to act (again)

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Supporters of Yulia Tymoshenko protest this weekend

We all remember the Orange Revolution of late 2004. Regular readers will know that since liveblogging the thing, I’ve occasionally returned to the complex and heated world of Ukranian politics to try and work out just what the hell’s going on over there – and more often than not, what’s been going on is petty squabbling, infighting, broken alliances, team-ups with former enemies, disillusionment and political stalemate. Wikipedia has a good round-up of the events of the last few months.

The latest development? Only the banning of the main opposition party. It’s just the newest madness after months of political stagnation caused by the fracturing of the old Orange alliance of President Yushchenko and his “revolutionary” partner Yulia Tymoshenko (his erstwhile Prime Minister), and the return of Viktor Yanukovich to the office of Prime Minister.
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Ukraine gas crisis quickie

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You can be fairly sure that Russian claims that Ukraine is “stealing Europe’s gas” are bollocks, and that this is indeed “the Putin regime’s answer to the Orange Revolution”. This little spat could, however, severely affect large chunks of Europe – not to mention the outcome of the Ukranian parliamentary elections in March.

For background and word from Kiev, you could do far worse than start with this summary at Foreign Notes as well as some interesting speculation (including the general consensus line “I think it’s clear that when it comes to Ukraine the Kremlin has lost its mind.”) Hell- just keep an eye on Foreign Notes for all your Ukraine goodness – lots of good links and analysis, and currently being updated more regularly than the other Ukraine blogs in the “Regional Expertise” section to the right.

Tuesday update: Interesting, detailed post and lots of discussion on European Tribune as it looks like the crisis is passing. There’s also a good short intro at Fistful, and it’s also worth checking out Neeka and LEvko.

Ukraine-EU relations

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Well, after Turkey and Croatia, now it looks like Brussels is turning its attention to Ukraine, with Orange Revolution head Victor Yuschenko’s Prime Minister (no, not the fit one, she’s gone – the new one…) heading off for talks in Belgium today.

However, despite some friendly talks between Ukraine and Finland over the last few days with Finnish PM Matti Vanhanen’s trip to Kiev (including hints that Finland’s EU presidency could see the start of discussions about an EU-Ukraine free trade zone), plus positive Commission comments about a new visa agreement, not all’s well.

After all, considering the on-going EU/Iran nuclear standoff, and especially considering yesterday’s somewhat idiotic public announcement from Britain blaming Iran for British troop losses in Iraq (way to heighten tension there, whichever moron decided to make these claims public), the idea of opening negotiations with another country with a less than tranquil past is going to be made somewhat less fun by the news that Ukraine’s just been involved in talks with Iran to set up energy and aircraft manufacture co-operation…

Either way, Ukraine still has some way to go before it can meet the standards required. It’s a complex, unstable mess over there: a slowly recovering post-Soviet new state torn between Russia and Europe, riddled with petty corruption and powerful politico-industrial factions working behind the scenes. While Yuschenko may be a decided improvement on his predecessors, there are still doubts, and whether the crisis has been resolved is, as yet, uncertain.

Either way, I think we can probably – no matter our views on the EU – all agree it will be better for the people of Ukraine if the country shifts westwards to Brussels, high ideals and human rights rather than back eastwards to Moscow, Putin and political repression. Yet another case where the promise of possible EU membership could do much good. That’s the thing, guys – the EU is as important for its aspirational, ideological, symbolic value as it is for what it actually achieves. Ukraine may currently have only the first foot on the path to revival, but these early talks with the EU could help ensure that the next steps are taken in the right direction – and the EU is in by far the best position to do this.

Russian revolts – March madness?

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It’s all going a bit mental in the former Soviet Union, in case you hadn’t noticed. Siberian Light’s weekly news roundup has some concerning and potentially important stories which the western media certainly doesn’t seem to have picked up on much. Some highlights:

After the surprise events in Kyrgyzstan, which not a single “expert” on the region managed to predict the outcome of, any of these could turn out to be something major…

However, the one from Siberian Light’s excellent roundup that is most likely to make the news: Moscow has invited North Korean maniac Kim Jong Il to celebrate the 60th anniversary of VE Day in Moscow. US President George W Bush has already confirmed he will be attending. This could turn out to be a nice diplomatic incident…

Ukrainian implications

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Berlin Sprouts has a nice overview of some potential post-Orange Revolution developments on Europe’s easternmost fringe, three and a bit months after it all kicked off in Kiev, which nicely complements this Washington Times piece.

Ultima Thule, meanwhile, has some worrying rumours about possible Russian reactions to the apparent push for greater democracy in these former Soviet states, including a translation of a Russian article about the threat posed to Putin by the GUUAM states (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan). Transitions Online, meanwhile, suggests that Putin must now look to Kazakhstan to maintain the Russian dream of an ex-Soviet economic alliance.

Others are also suggesting that Yushchenko’s victory is having ramifications even further afield, and that Lebanon is consciously modelling its current attempts to shake off foreign dominance on Ukraine’s peaceful revolution. Others are asking questions about the possible outcomes in Lebanon which sound eerily familiar to those of us who were following Ukrainian events back in November.

Orange Ukraine, meanwhile, provides a comparison between events in Ukraine in February 2005 with those of February 2004, which shows that although some things have improved, the mere installation of Victor Yushchenko as president has not been enough to sort out the country’s problems.

Dan at Orange Ukraine also mentions – and dismisses – those allegations of Yushchenko having fascist connections. Suggestions he was anti-Semitic cropped up back in November – but it wasn’t clear to what extent these were merely propaganda. It also wasn’t clear whether the propaganda was put out by his enemies or his friends, as by all accounts in some parts of Ukraine being hostile to Jews could well be a vote winner…

Over at Neeka’s Backlog, Veronica Khokhlova also mentions this worrying neofascist undercurrent in Ukraine – notably the news of the beating of an African-American diplomat in an apparently racist attack in Kiev.

In Ukraine – as in other parts of the world which have recently seen a more democratic system of government introduced, there are some improvements, but still a lot of work to be done. It’s all very well getting rid of the “wrong” government, but a lot of hard graft is required to make lasting changes. The glamour of the revolutionary period may now be a fading memory, but the EU should keep an eye on events in the GUUAM states – this could be the start of something big, or it could be the herald of yet more chaos. Either way, it will have important implications for the EU’s relations with Russia and its other neighbours to the east.

Yuschenko inauguration confirmed for Sunday

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Announced on the day Bush’s second term officially begins – how rare! Russia’s Vladimir Putin also seems to be trying to patch up relations, releasing a congratulatory message to the guy he was opposing to the extent of sending in the troops…

Also, an unrelated interesting tidbit via Geopolitical Review which may be of interest: a blog to which anyone and everyone can contribute – a nice way to test the blogging water without setting one up for yourself, or good for five minutes until the spambots find it? Who can say? Worth a look at any rate.

Busy, sorry… Why not have a look at a new pro-EU blog?