Tag Archives: NATO

Europe’s Russia strategy / Russia’s Europe strategy

Posted on by

NATO, the EU, the former Soviet Union and the new Russian Federation, with Europe caught in the middleSo, what is it going to be, exactly? A military response isn’t an option, and Moscow knows it – though quite how far they can push before getting shoved back in return we don’t yet know (Georgia may be strategically important, but isn’t yet a member of NATO; the same goes for Ukraine; but what about Estonia, with it’s sizable population of ethnic Russians and history of tensions with its larger neighbour? We’re all meant to fight for EU and NATO member Estonia – but if push did come to shove, would we?) Economic sanctions are unlikely to have much impact when Russia has such a tight grip of the European energy market and can hurt us far more than we can hurt them. We also can’t risk ceasing to trade with Moscow as winter approaches and Russian gas supplies become ever more vital – whereas they can do without European markets, if necessary.

But one thing is clear – if Europe’s strategy remains unclear, Russia’s seems to have failed. If the aim of the Georgia expedition was, as many have assumed, to reintroduce Moscow’s will to the Western periphery of the Russian Federation, then finally pushing Poland into the arms of the Americans was certainly not the desired result. Especially when Ukraine – that other nascent nation with a history of troubles and a sizeable Russian population on the Eurasian border that some have pointed to as “Russia’s next target” swiftly follows suit.

But still, I’m not sure I buy this whole “extending influence” thing. Not only does Russia seem to have hardened the anti-Moscow attitudes of the old Warsaw Pact EU member states (including among the people, many of whom have, in ex-Soviet countries, had a tendency for rosy nostalgia for the days of communism), but also pushed Ukraine further westwards, and potentially gained Georgia the NATO seat she wanted even though Tbilisi’s recent actions show that the country’s really not ready yet.

But that’s not all. Russia’s also singularly failed to maintain control over Chechnya despite years of fighting, and has even found the conflict spreading into neighbouring parts of the Caucasus – as well as to the Russian capital itself. In Georgia, rather than a disciplined and efficient military manoeuvre, we’ve seen poor targeting, poor discipline, and a seeming lack of ability to decide what the hell to do – having pushed in to Georgian territory and taken Gori, the Russians seem largely to have been milling around trying to look macho for the last week or two, while seemingly ignoring presidential orders. This is, it seems, what you get from a conscript army.

So, when we come to look back on this in a few months’ time, what will Moscow have achieved? Well, she may be able to gain a bit more influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but those two regions hold little of any strategic value (bar Abkhazia’s apparently rather beautiful stretches of Black Sea coastline). Georgia will continue to be the non-Russian route of choice for Central Asian oil and gas to Europe – only now, undoubtedly, with a far stronger western military presence to guard the infrastructure. Georgia’s chances of NATO membership will have been greatly increased, as will those of Ukraine. The significance of energy dependence on Russia will also have become far more apparent to a far wider group of people (the reason we need to develop alternate energy sources is not global warming, folks, it’s Gazprom…) The threat of Russian instability – long largely ignored by many in the West, desperately hoping that Putin was one of us despite his authoritarian ways – will have become clear. But it should also have become clear that Russia’s army really isn’t much of a threat. A few ill-trained teenagers with battered equipment can cause some short-term chaos, certainly – they can maim and kill and loot and burn as well as anyone. But even supported with tanks, I’m not convinced of the threat of the Russian army any more – or of the minds coming up with Russian strategy. It’s still early days, but as NATO plans its longer-term response this whole escapade is beginning to look like it’s backfired on Moscow.

So, what’s the next step? Well, having been slow to act to the initial violence, the best bet for Europe/NATO is probably to sit back and wait to see what the next move from Moscow is going to be, because they’ve probably already started to realise their mistake. For NATO or the EU to suddenly come out with some hasty, highly public punitive measures is likely to spark further escalation as Moscow seeks to save face.

Location of BelarusI can’t see too much direct Russian intervention in Ukraine – bar the usual behind-the-scenes funding – as long as Ukraine’s politicians continue their ridiculous infighting (that’s been going on ever since the damp squib that was the Orange Revolution back in November 2004), as a divided Ukraine is very much in Russia’s interests, something that can be exploited while the West sits back and waits for them to resolve their differences. The most likely option is a revival of the old plan to merge Belarus with Russia – a project that’s been on-off, on-off for years now, and which Russia has previously been the reluctant party to – not worth much to Moscow in real terms (Belarus has little to offer economically), but psychologically important, almost completely cutting off the Baltic states, and giving Russia a border only 150 kilometres from Warsaw.

But how do you second-guess Russia? Moscow doesn’t think like governments in the West. At least, we don’t think they do. Because no one really seems to know what Russia’s up to. We can’t even tell who the next head of state is going to be until they tell us, after all. There are countless conspiracy theories about what Russia’s plan is – from shadowy groups of ex-KGB men plotting a global takeover to shadowy groups of ultracapitalist gangsters trying to wring as much money out of everyone as possible – and none of them are entirely convincing.

The old question “cock-up or conspiracy” should always be met with the answer “cock-up” until you’re presented with some very compelling evidence to the contrary. Russia’s Georgia escapade looks rather like it was designed to be a conspiracy, but it’s one they so far appear to have cocked up. A plan designed to show Russia as strong, powerful, and capable of decisive action has, instead, shown her to be incapable and pushed those she was wooing even further into the opposing camp. This Georgia episode has shown that Putin’s old tough guy act is just that. Russia’s prepared to bully those littler than her, but wouldn’t be able to hack it in a real fight. (Not that I’m advocating getting into a real fight with Russia, obviously – in this case, the best response to the bully is probably to pretend to ignore her while sniggering a bit to make sure she knows we didn’t miss her failure… The embarrassment may just be enough to stop her from trying it again – because image does seem to be everything to this lot.)

Strong words from the US, but it’s up to the EU – for now

Posted on by

From the press conference held by Condoleezza Rice this afternoon on the South Ossetia situation:

“the way that Russia has brutally pushed this military operation well beyond the bounds of anything that might have related to South Ossetia calls into question Russia’s suitability for all kinds of activities that it has said that it wants to be a part of…

I’m going to France because we support very strongly the European presidency, which is France, in its mediation efforts. I think it’s best that those mediation efforts now be in the hands of the French. We’ll continue to support those…

I am not going to sit here and judge each Russian military operation. I am going to say that when you start bombing ports and threatening to bomb airfields and bombing a city like Gori and bringing troops in a flanking maneuver on the western flank of Georgia and tying up the main roads between Georgia – between Tbilisi and Gori, that’s well beyond anything that is needed to protect Russian peacekeepers. And that is why Russia is starting to face international condemnation for what it is doing.

This is not 1968 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, where Russia can threaten its neighbors, occupy a capital, overthrow a government, and get away with it. Things have changed…

if you now look across Central and Eastern Europe, one thing that is also very different from just a few decades ago is that the countries that were liberated after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Baltic states and the aspirants – Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and others are now – have made the transition and are making the transition into transatlantic institutions. That allows them both to resolve their differences and to have a reason, a spur, for internal reform and further democratization, the appropriate relationship between civilian and military leaders and so forth and so on. That is why Membership Action Plan has been so valuable, and it’s why the United States continues to stand for Membership Action Plan for Georgia and Ukraine….

Now, I’m not going to try to speculate on Russian motives, but let me just say the following. To the degree that there was intended to be some message beyond the frozen conflicts of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the message is not that Russia can use its military power in a brutal way against a small neighboring state. The message is that Russia has perhaps not accepted that it is time to move on from the Cold War and it is time to move to a new era in which relations between states are on the basis of equality and sovereignty and economic integration.

Now, Russia has said that that is the future that it wishes, that that is the future it wishes with the EU, that is the future it wishes with the United States and with any number of international organizations. So the message, unfortunately, that is being sent is that it is important to think again about whether, in fact, Russia will be committed to the kind of behavior that would make its involvement in those institutions appropriate.”

Now, what to make of that? The US administration has made its position very clear – complete and utter disapproval, couched in strong terms evoking Russia’s past unilateral belligerence during the Cold War (though not mentioning the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, you’ll note – *ahem*).

But these are the words of an outgoing presidency, with only a few months left to go. Does the disapproval of Bush and co really matter to Moscow? And will Sarkozy – as EU president – take up the mantle and continue the tough talk? Can the EU risk being as bombastic in its rhetoric when cordial relations with Russia are so important for Europe’s ongoing prosperity – and when the EU itself is split between those who take the American line and those, like Germany and Italy, more inclined to the softly-softly approach?

The diplomatic fall-out of this one promises to be very interesting indeed. How the West responds could be vital – but tough words may not be enough. The US is in one of its constitutionally-prescribed periods of impotence; with a member of the Security Council one of the parties involved, the UN is not an option; NATO has no jurisdiction, and is seen by some as one of the catalysts; Europe is currently divided. And yet it is to the EU that the world seems to be looking for leadership and mediation – albeit without much expectation of success.

This really is interesting. For advocates of a single EU foreign policy, and of greater EU involvement on the world stage, this is an ideal opportunity to prove that Brussels has got what it takes. I’m pessimistic of the chances so far, but if the US is content to take a back seat on this one (which means less of the public Cold War rhetoric cranking up the tensions, more behind the scenes support) – and considering Sarkozy’s apparently passable relationship with Putin and the Kremlin – they may just be able to pull something off.

Russia, Georgia, the former USSR and fear

Posted on by

Yes, OK. We get it. You guys have a big, powerful army and you aren’t afraid to use it.

Nicholas II, Lenin, Stalin, Putin and MedvedevThat’s meant to discourage eastern European countries – all of whom have less then pleasant memories of armies from Russia invading, looting, raping, pillaging and occupying them for the last several centuries – from looking to NATO for help and signing up to the proposed US missile defence shield how, exactly?

Sure enough, Poland’s now signed up to the American scheme.

But the thing is, by now surely it must be obvious to Moscow that the West is not a military threat? We can’t take down a bunch of beardy religious fanatics with AK-47s – what hope do we have against a million-man army that seems to like to test out its equipment at random every few years to stop it getting rusty? All the West’s managed to do in the last few days (and this goes for the US and NATO as much as the EU) is express mild disapproval while disagreeing on precisely what form the ineffective slap on the wrist should take.

So I’m beginning to think that Russia simply doesn’t care any more. The Georgian escapade was a classic bit of imperialist aggression dressed up as humanitarian intervention, and they’ve completely got away with it. Yes, it looks as though they may well have begun to withdraw from Georgian territory now, but the message to Russia’s neighbours (well, bar China, perhaps) is clear: if we want to, we can fuck you up – there’s nothing you can do about it, and your new buddies in the West aren’t going to be any help either.

Russia’s effectively declared herself rogue – not necessarily hostile rogue, but unpredictable rogue. Riggs to the West’s Murtaugh. She’s not prepared to follow the rules, barely bothers paying lip-service to them, and has an agenda all her own. The thing is, just like poor old Danny Glover as Murtaugh, we’ve really got no choice but to be partners with her, and hope that she mellows with time. Because something we’ve all known for years is becoming increasingly obvious – there’s not a lot we can do to change Russia’s course.

—

A related aside – worth developing further sometime – is the idea that Russia (much like the EU, in fact) is still trying to work out what it is for in a post-Cold War world. The old federation that was the Soviet Union has already splintered. The Russian Federation is similarly vast, similarly packed with diverse peoples and cultures – with 27 officially-recognised languages within its borders. But why?

Simple ethnic map of the USSR in 1974, leeched from the University of Texas (click for full size)What purpose does “Russia” serve? Why shouldn’t the Chechens follow the Khazaks, Estonians and Ukrainians to independence? Why shouldn’t the Chuckchis, Yakuts, Buryats, Adyghes, Kalmyks, Chuvash, Karachays, Balkars, Ingush, Khakas, Komi, Udmurts, Nenets, Khants, Tatars, Mari, Mansi or any of the other federalised subgroups?

Just as I’ve long been asking what the EU’s for now that the original idea seems obsolete, Russia has been asking itself the same question. Without the binding ideology of communism for the elites (and fear for those beneath), what has been holding what remains of the Soviet Union together? As the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia begin to thrive as part of the EU, as former Soviet territories like Georgia and Ukraine look to NATO membership and cozy up to the West – not to mention the old Russian Imperial territory of Finland (sitting pretty with the 12th highest GDP per capita in the world), what’s to prevent other parts of the Russian empire deciding that they’ve had enough?

Well, where the EU’s going for aspiration, after the brutally over-the-top actions of the Russian military in Georgia over the last week (and even more so in the Chechen wars – the second of which has technically been running for nearly a decade now), it’s hard not to see a return to federalism by fear. It’s a fine Russian tradition. Indeed, fear and repression are pretty much the only reason the old Russian Empire managed to hold itself together for so many years. Democracy in Russia has not been enough – opposition parties are still so under-supported as to be laughable. Authoritarian-seeming Putin, unafraid to act and act fast – remains Russia’s most popular leader since, erm… Stalin.

And so, it seems, we may be entering a new phase of Russian Imperialism:

“”It is clear that we need the kind of idea for which one will not be sorry to give one’s life. And the building of civil society, of the rule of law, of a prosperous society we find uninteresting. Indeed, we would rather squander everything and end our lives with suicide, than scrupulously count the credit and the debit, invest, corporatize, organize on cooperative lines, and so on. We find that tedious. We would rather try to absorb the enormous spaces of Siberia and the Far East, so that the islands of the Pacific Ocean become indigenously ours, we will fight for centuries with Europe for the Baltic States, and with Turkey for the Dardanelles – that is our way.”

(Original here, for those who can read Estonian…)

South Ossetia: Still simmering

Posted on by

Convoy of Russian tanks in South OssetiaSo it seems that Georgia just doesn’t know when she’s beat – although quite what the real situation is there nobody seems to know, as there’s so much disinformation around. Who’s at fault here – Russia or Georgia? The answer’s simple – it’s both.

What’s likely to be most instructive now is not how Russia acts, nor Georgia, but how the West (and especially the European Union, supposedly so keen to act more decisively in the international arena on issues just such as this) responds to those actions. So far, it’s hard not to agree with anti-EU blog EU Referendum on the EU’s slowness.

Because the EU, lest we forget, has its own former Soviet states as members these days. For EU citizens in the likes of Latvia, Lithuania and – espcially – Estonia (as well as throughout the rest of the former Warsaw Pact countries that are now within the European fold), the situation in Georgia is likely to seem all too familiar. Yes, Georgia struck first – but so did the Hungarian revolutionaries in ’56, the Czechs in ’68…

No, the comparison’s not perfect – it’s deeply flawed and obscured by ideology and the memories of the last couple of generations’ attempts to shake off rule from Moscow (plus it’s still not entirely clear just what it was that provoked Georgia into acting – was it actually Russian agents, or simply pissed-off Ossetians, fed up with still being a part of a country they’ve been trying to leave for a decade and a half?). But such concerns are going to be there nonetheless – and the longer the West goes without some kind of decisive action to bring the conflict to an end, the more those concerns are going to grow.

If Russia truly is invading Georgia proper (as some reports have begun to suggest), then the EU and the rest of the West are faced with their toughest call in an age. As far as I can tell, NATO has no jurisdiction in Georgia while she’s not a member – and a physical stand-off between NATO peace-keeping troops and Russian forces would only further underscore the “New Cold War” rhetoric that’s being spouted on both sides of the divide (remember Russia’s displeasure over the proposed US missile shield?), making for a potentially disastrous PR move. The UN is also obviously a no-go, what with Russia being on the Security Council. Which means, in terms of a Western military response to prevent further escalation, that the only option is another Kosovo/Iraq-style operation that will, in terms of international law, be illegal. And so further piss Russia off.

At the moment, it’s hard not to see the West being played expertly by both sides: Russia’s so far managing to act with impunity within its traditional sphere of influence (just like the good old days), while Georgia’s getting to play the martyr and ratchet up Western guilt, knowing that any country that Russia’s attacking is pretty much guaranteed to have the West on its side. (Der Spiegel goes further, arguing that the current situation also serves the purposes of the EU and US. The US? Maybe, as a belligerent Russia may increase eastern European support for its missile shield. But the EU? I don’t see how this can end well for the EU… Too much potential for pissing off Russia on one side and showing the ex-communist EU member states and wannabe member states that, when it comes to the crunch, Brussels simply hasn’t got the balls to stand up to Moscow.)

And so the only relatively safe route I can see at the moment – if we’re to avoid the Georgia situation bubbling over and causing problems in other regions along the Russian fringe – is to get China to mediate. China’s got very little interest in the Caucasus, is just as coldly cordial to Russia as to the West, and is desperate to put on a good show while the Olympics are on. She’s also pretty much the only country big and powerful enough for both Russia and the West to bother listening to.

So, come on, China…

NATO, Russia and Europe

Posted on by

Hunting around for a handy overview of just what’s been happening at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, depending on who you read you’ll get some wildly different ideas. I’ve been confused for much of the morning. Here’s a brief indication of why:

Der Spiegel‘s “Germany Puts the Brakes on US Expansion Plans” is countered by the International Herald Tribune‘s “NATO backs U.S. missile defense plan for Europe”

EU Referendum‘s claim that “NATO has thrown Ukraine and Georgia to the bear. President Bush’s attempts to put them on track to future and very distant membership of NATO has failed” is then contradicted by Radio Free Europe‘s report that “pro-NATO forces in Ukraine and Georgia celebrated the announcement, which offered stronger-than-expected support for their entry bids”

Repeat for pretty much every issue under discussion at the summit (for which, see this very handy round-up).

People always like to look for tangible, obvious outcomes from these things. But this is international diplomacy. Worse than that, it’s strategic military international diplomacy where all but one of the permanent members of the UN’s Security Council are involved (and we know how infrequently that lot manage to get along). Making compromises left, right and centre – leading to a stalemate in which, well, the status quo has largely been maintained – was the only sensible course of action. The thing was always going to end up a waste of time and money.

NATO flagBut the real fun is that despite the fact that NATO is now overseeing operations in Afghanistan (that well-known North Atlantic power) and looking to a more global role, this summit has made one thing increasingly apparent: the Cold War may have ended, but NATO’s principal opponent remains Russia.

Pretty much every compromise on the European front, every bit of backing down, appears to have been done to placate the Kremlin – because the principle areas to which NATO is looking to expand its influence (largely under the prompting of the US) lie in former communist countries, be it Ukraine and Georgia or Croatia and Albania.

As you’ve no doubt noticed, there’s been a growing tension between Russia and the West in recent years – from ex-FSB men assassinated in London to the resumption of patrols by Russian nuclear bombers through the vendetta against the British Council in Moscow. Then there’s the war of words with Belarus, Europe’s oft-forgotten fanatically pro-Moscow wildcard (a country that misses the USSR so much its secret police are still called the KGB and there are constant rumours that it is planning to formally merge with Russia), cyber-warfare against Estonia, and the ongoing standoff over Kosovo’s independence. Even the EU’s (and NATO’s) difficult relationship with Turkey is getting caught up with the Russian situation thanks to the Russo-Turkish partnership in the Bluestream and Nabucco pipelines, both of which are helping to make Europe increasingly reliant on Russian energy supplies.

The relationship with Russia, in other words, increasingly seems to dominate all European diplomacy. Where during the Cold War the presence of the USSR may have ensured that western Europe and the EU was operating under the constant fear of nuclear attack, Moscow’s then lack of engagement in western European affairs allowed everyone to get on much as they pleased. Since the end of the Cold War – and especially since Putin came to power – Moscow’s long-sought-after engagement with the West has if anything caused even more problems.

During the Cold War it was America who stood guard and kept watch, now Europe (both the EU and non-EU countries) has to be constantly on the alert for far more subtle Russian encroachments than columns of Red Army troops or falling H-bombs – encroachments largely economic, and mostly achieved through that strange form of diplomacy at which Putin so excels: smiling with fangs.

With such a large, unpredictable neighbour to the east – especially one with the ability to shut down a sizable chunk of the European economy on a whim (as has already happened to Ukraine) – little wonder there seem to have been few major advances at this latest NATO summit. In fact, I can barely see the point of holding these things until Russian attitudes to the West shift further in the direction of friendly cooperation (no signs of that any time soon) – because Russia’s never going to accept public humiliation, which is how the current regime seems to see any kind of outside involvement in what remains of the bear’s sphere of influence.

So the real points of interest after such standoffs between Russia and the West are never going to be the big issues. We’re not suddenly going to have a Kremlin change of heart on any of the major issues any time soon. And if and when such a change of heart comes, it’s certainly not going to come at one of these big public summits – far too humiliating. Where such shifts in Russian attitudes – either pro-engagement or heading towards hostility – are first going to be seen is in the details. The precise wording, the precise terms of any diplomatic agreement between Russia and the EU, US, NATO or individual European countries – the small print that the journalists rarely have time to scan in their rush to hit deadlines and get an angle that gives the subs a good shot at an interesting headline – that’s where we’ll first spot the changes when they come.

These summits are, in other words, little better than MacGuffins. The real diplomacy is going on off the radar, with lots of little standoffs in places like Armenia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

NATO may well be starting to look globally – but Europe needs to do the same to keep tabs on just what its unpredictable neighbour is up to, because Russia has more ability than any other state to screw Europe over. If Russia’s got its fingers in a lot of pies, we need to be keeping an eye on all of them, and not get distracted by the occasional fuss over the more obvious ones like Ukraine and Georgia (both of which have had high-profile popular pro-democracy uprisings in recent years, which are always of appeal to the press). To do so would be to fall for the oldest trick in the book.