Another small hurdle for the much-beleaguered treaty to overcome:

the Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in European Union Matters (Gesetz über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union) infringes Article 38.1 in conjunction with Article 23.1 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG) insofar as the Bundestag and the Bundesrat have not been accorded sufficient rights of participation in European lawmaking procedures and treaty amendment procedures. The Federal Republic of Germany’s instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon may not be deposited as long as the constitutionally required legal elaboration of the parliamentary rights of participation has not entered into force.

And so the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is to be yet further delayed while Germany rejigs a few bits and pieces of its own constitution to accommodate it. Which, depending on how long Germany takes to sort this out, could mean that the treaty is delayed long enough for there to be a Conservative government in the UK before Lisbon has been fully ratified, which would mean a UK referendum, which would mean Lisbon’s rejection by Britain and yet another crisis for the EU. Fun fun fun.

There’s lots more in this genuinely fascinating ruling that is pretty much guaranteed to be seized upon by those of an anti-EU persuasion – even though the real issue here is as much Germany’s strict constitution as any problems with the expansion of EU powers. The ruling also helps clarify a number of issues, as well as point to more issues of the EU’s structure and identity that really need to be clarified by the EU itself.

First up, the EU’s crisis of identity and purpose – as I’ve noted many times, the EU itself doesn’t know what it is for, so little wonder it’s got a rather confused structure:

The structural problem of the European Union is at the centre of the review of constitutionality. The extent of the Union’s freedom of action has steadily and considerably increased, not least by the Treaty of Lisbon, so that meanwhile in some fields of policy, the European Union has a shape that corresponds to that of a federal state, i.e. is analogous to that of a state. In contrast, the internal decision-making and appointment procedures remain predominantly committed to the pattern of an international organisation, i.e. are analogous to international law; as before, the structure of the European Union essentially follows the principle of the equality of states.

Note, dear eurosceptic friends, that “analogous to a state” does not mean “is a state” – and note also that “a shape that corresponds to that of a federal state” does also not mean “is a state” (and also that federal states can take many forms – their defining characteristic being the importance placed on devolved, state/regional levels of governance over that of a central authority).

Indeed, this ruling seems to utterly preclude the creation of a European superstate – at least, not without a fundamental change to the German constitution, ratified by referendum (that’s how I read this, anyway):

As long as, consequently, no uniform European people, as the subject of legitimisation, can express its majority will in a politically effective manner that takes due account of equality in the context of the foundation of a European federal state, the peoples of the European Union, which are constituted in their Member States, remain the decisive holders of public authority, including Union authority. In Germany, accession to a European federal state would require the creation of a new constitution, which would go along with the declared waiver of the sovereign statehood safeguarded by the Basic Law.

…The peoples of the Member States are the holders of the constituent power. The Basic Law does not permit the special bodies of the legislative, executive and judicial power to dispose of the essential elements of the constitution.

…The authorisation to transfer sovereign powers to the European Union pursuant to Article 23.1 GG is, however, granted under the condition that the sovereign statehood of a constitutional state is maintained on the basis of a responsible integration programme according to the principle of conferral and respecting the Member States’ constitutional identity, and that at the same time the Federal Republic of Germany does not lose its ability to politically and socially shape the living conditions on its own responsibility.

That, to me, pretty much categorically rules out any EU superstate – while allowing for further integration, up to an indeterminate level (yet to be defined, but before the stage at which Germany’s ability to “politically and socially shape the living conditions” of its people is lost) at which a popular vote and alteration of the German Constitution would become necessary. Later, the EU’s current nature is more clearly defined:

With the present status of integration, the European Union does, even upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, not yet attain a shape that corresponds to the level of legitimisation of a democracy constituted as a state. It is not a federal state but remains an association of sovereign states to which the principle of conferral applies…

With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Federal Republic of Germany will remain a sovereign state. In particular, the substance of German state authority is protected.

There we have it – fairly categorical, that. And if anti-EU types are happy to use German politicians to claim that 84% of laws stem from the EU, I think it’s only fair for those of us of a less vehemently anti-EU persuasion be allowed to quote these German judges repeatedly when countering claims that the EU is becoming a superstate.

Moving on, the European Parliament also comes in for some stick, largely for still being ineffective, under-developed, and uninfluential – though this is seen as a good thing, as too powerful a European Parliament, runs the logic, could claim greater democratic legitimacy within the EU decision-making process than the governments of the member states working together behind the scenes via the Council and Commission, and thus reduce their freedom of action (the EU’s “democratic deficit”, in other words, is actually preserving the sovereignty of the member states…):

Neither as regards its composition nor its position in the European competence structure is the European Parliament sufficiently prepared to take representative and assignable majority decisions as uniform decisions on political direction. Measured against requirements placed on democracy in states, its election does not take due account of equality, and it is not competent to take authoritative decisions on political direction in the context of the supranational balancing of interest between the states. It therefore cannot support a parliamentary government and organise itself with regard to party politics in the system of government and opposition in such a way that a decision on political direction taken by the European electorate could have a politically decisive effect. Due to this structural democratic deficit, which cannot be resolved in a Staatenverbund, further steps of integration that go beyond the status quo may undermine neither the States’ political power of action nor the principle of conferral.

And, just to underline yet further how an EU superstate is not on the cards:

The European Union must comply with democratic principles as regards its nature and extent and also as regards its own organisational and procedural elaboration (Article 23.1, Article 20.1 and 20.2 in conjunction with Article 79.3 of the Basic Law). This means firstly that European integration may not result in the system of democratic rule in Germany being undermined. This does not mean that a number of sovereign powers which can be determined from the outset or specific types of sovereign powers must remain in the hands of the state. European unification on the basis of a union of sovereign states under the Treaties may, however, not be realised in such a way that the Member States do not retain sufficient room for the political formation of the economic, cultural and social circumstances of life. This applies in particular to areas which shape the citizens’ circumstances of life, in particular the private space of their own responsibility and of political and social security, which is protected by the fundamental rights, and to political decisions that particularly depend on previous understanding as regards culture, history and language and which unfold in discourses in the space of a political public that is organised by party politics and Parliament. To the extent
that in these areas, which are of particular importance for democracy, a transfer of sovereign powers is permitted at all, a narrow interpretation is required. This concerns in particular the administration of criminal law, the civil and the military monopoly on the use of force, fundamental fiscal decisions on revenue and expenditure, the shaping of the circumstances of life by social policy and important decisions on cultural issues such as the school and education system, the provisions governing the media, and dealing with religious communities.

Oh, and we’ve also got a categorical rejection of that myth that the Lisbon Treaty has the potential to become a self-amending enabling act – for this would be against German constitutional law:

The Basic Law does not grant the German state bodies powers to transfer sovereign powers in such a way that their exercise can independently establish other competences for the European Union. It prohibits the transfer of competence to decide on its own competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz). The act approving a treaty amending a European Treaty and the national accompanying laws must therefore be such that European integration continues to take place according to the principle of conferral without the possibility for the European Union of taking possession of Kompetenz-Kompetenz or to violate the Member States’ constitutional identity.

There’s lots more of interest there – though precise interpretations of the significance of many of the details are a tad tricky for me to provide with my, *ahem*, less than perfect knowledge of German constitutional law. Nonetheless, it’s a bit of EU geek heaven – and, I’m sure you’ll agree, a lot of those definitions of what the EU’s competences are and should be (as well as the implicit restrictions made on certain aspects of future European integration) are likely to prove invaluable in the years to come as the EU continues to try and work out its purpose and direction.

Because, lest we forget, Lisbon actually is really little more than the tidying-up exercise that it has been claimed as. Yes, it introduces a few new aspects that some may see as worrying – but it still hasn’t solved the fundamental problems of EU governance and the relationships between the member states that have arisen since the expansion to 25 (now 27 – and soon likely to be 29). Almost as soon as Lisbon is ratified, work will have to begin on its successor – and these rulings by the German Constituional Court will, with any luck, provide useful guidelines for the next batch of EU reformers.

The European Union emerged, as we all know, as a response to the Second World War. One of the earliest aims of the founding fathers was to prevent France and Germany from ever going to war again by integrating their economies so closely that to do so would become impossible.

As a result – as well as, arguably, thanks to prolonged feelings of guilt about what the country got up to during the 30s and 40s – Germany has long been at the forefront of European integration. Germany remains one of the most enthusiastic EU member states – despite also having the strongest economy in the EU, formerly having one of the strongest currencies, paying the most into the EU budget, getting the least back, and being by far the most under-represented (by population) in the European Parliament.

It’s long been the case – albeit usually unacknowledged – that if Germany got fed up with the EU the entire project would be in danger of tumbling down. The EU could survive largely unchanged if almost any other member state decided that enough was enough (hell, if France pulled out it would arguably be improved, as the vast chunk of Common Agricultural Policy money that gets syphoned off by Paris could be redirected to more needy countries – and many more enthusiastic europhiles argue that if Britain jumped ship then the brakes the UK keeps putting on closer integration would finally be lifted, and the EU could reach new heights). If Germany gives up on the EU, all kinds of problems would kick off – not least because the European Central Bank runs out of Frankfurt.

Well, Germany hasn’t yet got the hump, and doesn’t show any signs of doing so just yet – but it could still throw a spanner in the works. Because oddly for a country in which nationalism and national self-interest have been so deliberately, systematically repressed (unsurprisingly, considering…), its constitutional court could yet rule that the Lisbon Treaty – and, by extension, many of the principles of the way the EU currently works – is illegal for providing ways for the German national parliament to be overruled.

And so it is one of the few remaining areas of German law that looks to the German national interest could end up being the brake on the current mode of EU integration, which itself originally started to prevent Germans looking too much to their own national interest.* Whoops!

As much as the anti-Lisbon Treaty crowd have got a bad reputation in certain quarters of the Brussels beltway – not helped by the lunatic fringes to right and left (as so often) being the ones who have shouted the loudest, and the recent announcement of anti-Lisbon party Libertas’ proposed candidates for the EU elections (mostly hard-right and nationalists, making a mockery of the “broad coalition for democratic reform” claims) – the German politicians who have brought this case before the constitutional court do have a point.

After all, if a national parliament (especially one from a country with a population the size of Germany’s) – elected by the people based on long-standing principles of representative democracy – can be overruled by the EU, an organisation whose democratic legitimacy is disputed to say the least, then what place for democracy in Europe?

And so, where the last time German nationalism reared its head to threaten the peace of mind of European states it was in the form of fascist dictatorship, this time German nationalism could well be rising up in the name of democracy. Democracy based around the principle of the nation state (something I can’t profess to be overly happy with), but democracy nonetheless.

The very fact that such a case merits the constitutional court’s attention shows that the legitimacy of EU decisions and powers has not yet been universally – or even legally – acknowledged. The argument that the EU is a method of overruling democracy, meanwhile, will continue to be made as long as the European Parliament remains the weakest of the EU’s principle institutions. (Will the upcoming EU elections reverse the trend for successively declining turnouts and so strengthen the case for the EP to be given more powers? I very much doubt it. It’s a catch-22 – the EP is perceived as being weak, so people don’t bother voting, so its claims to be the people’s voice diminishes along with its ability to assert influence. Such is the joy of EU democracy.)

So I ask yet again – when is the EU going to go for the kind of radical, democratic reform that is so vital for it to maintain support, and stop tinkering about with unsatisfactory compromises like Lisbon and Nice? Without the people behind it, the EU is doomed to fail. If the people were behind it – and had a sufficiently large voice in its decisions – then cases like this German one could never be brought, and complaints about the EU’s democratic deficit would become the preserve of nutters alone.

Two interesting – and thematically related – pieces look at past conflicts in relation the the Georgia / Russia spat over the last couple of days have prompted some thoughts along the old comparative history line (always an interesting intellectual exercise, as long as you don’t take it too seriously or literally).

First, over at Fistful, Douglas Muir looks at the Second Balkan War of 1912, and the impact Bulgaria’s failure to win had on that nation’s subsequent history (short version: bitter resentment, paramilitary reprisals, fighting on the losing side in both World Wars, more bitter resentment). Georgia’s failure to reassert her dominance over South Ossetia, Douglas posits, is decidedly comparible to Bulgaria’s failure to retake Macedonia and other “Bulgarian” territories in the Balkans. Or, as Douglas puts it,

“losses of national territory are hard for any nation to accept”.

Then, on BlogActiv, Stanley Crossick looks at the post-Fukuyama return of history and the possibilities of Cold War Mk.II:

“Cold War II may soon be with us – indeed will be with us – if we have still to learn the cost of humiliating the Russian Bear… Vladimir Putin has stated that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the worst geopolitical disaster of the 20th century: he means it.”

Russia was on the losing side in the Cold War – hell, Russia WAS the losing side in the Cold War. Russia is now weak, with a shaky economy that relies largely on the money of her erstwhile enemies. She has lost large chunks of her former territory, and has to see ethnic Russians and Russian speakers scattered throughout the lands of near neighbours where once those lands belonged to her. Meanwhile, her old enemies in NATO are pushing ever closer to her borders, sucking in former allies and making new treaties with countries that used to be Russia’s friends.

For any country, such post-defeat humiliation would be hard to bear, and breed ever more resentment of the victors – both among the politicians and the people. For a country like Russia, with a long macho culture, such humiliation is even more unbearable. But have we learned our lesson? For we have made this mistake before: Continue Reading

Hunting around for a handy overview of just what’s been happening at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, depending on who you read you’ll get some wildly different ideas. I’ve been confused for much of the morning. Here’s a brief indication of why:

Der Spiegel‘s “Germany Puts the Brakes on US Expansion Plans” is countered by the International Herald Tribune‘s “NATO backs U.S. missile defense plan for Europe”

EU Referendum‘s claim that “NATO has thrown Ukraine and Georgia to the bear. President Bush’s attempts to put them on track to future and very distant membership of NATO has failed” is then contradicted by Radio Free Europe‘s report that “pro-NATO forces in Ukraine and Georgia celebrated the announcement, which offered stronger-than-expected support for their entry bids”

Repeat for pretty much every issue under discussion at the summit (for which, see this very handy round-up).

People always like to look for tangible, obvious outcomes from these things. But this is international diplomacy. Worse than that, it’s strategic military international diplomacy where all but one of the permanent members of the UN’s Security Council are involved (and we know how infrequently that lot manage to get along). Making compromises left, right and centre – leading to a stalemate in which, well, the status quo has largely been maintained – was the only sensible course of action. The thing was always going to end up a waste of time and money.

But the real fun is that despite the fact that NATO is now overseeing operations in Afghanistan (that well-known North Atlantic power) and looking to a more global role, this summit has made one thing increasingly apparent: the Cold War may have ended, but NATO’s principal opponent remains Russia.

Pretty much every compromise on the European front, every bit of backing down, appears to have been done to placate the Kremlin – because the principle areas to which NATO is looking to expand its influence (largely under the prompting of the US) lie in former communist countries, be it Ukraine and Georgia or Croatia and Albania.

As you’ve no doubt noticed, there’s been a growing tension between Russia and the West in recent years – from ex-FSB men assassinated in London to the resumption of patrols by Russian nuclear bombers through the vendetta against the British Council in Moscow. Then there’s the war of words with Belarus, Europe’s oft-forgotten fanatically pro-Moscow wildcard (a country that misses the USSR so much its secret police are still called the KGB and there are constant rumours that it is planning to formally merge with Russia), cyber-warfare against Estonia, and the ongoing standoff over Kosovo’s independence. Even the EU’s (and NATO’s) difficult relationship with Turkey is getting caught up with the Russian situation thanks to the Russo-Turkish partnership in the Bluestream and Nabucco pipelines, both of which are helping to make Europe increasingly reliant on Russian energy supplies.

The relationship with Russia, in other words, increasingly seems to dominate all European diplomacy. Where during the Cold War the presence of the USSR may have ensured that western Europe and the EU was operating under the constant fear of nuclear attack, Moscow’s then lack of engagement in western European affairs allowed everyone to get on much as they pleased. Since the end of the Cold War – and especially since Putin came to power – Moscow’s long-sought-after engagement with the West has if anything caused even more problems.

During the Cold War it was America who stood guard and kept watch, now Europe (both the EU and non-EU countries) has to be constantly on the alert for far more subtle Russian encroachments than columns of Red Army troops or falling H-bombs – encroachments largely economic, and mostly achieved through that strange form of diplomacy at which Putin so excels: smiling with fangs.

With such a large, unpredictable neighbour to the east – especially one with the ability to shut down a sizable chunk of the European economy on a whim (as has already happened to Ukraine) – little wonder there seem to have been few major advances at this latest NATO summit. In fact, I can barely see the point of holding these things until Russian attitudes to the West shift further in the direction of friendly cooperation (no signs of that any time soon) – because Russia’s never going to accept public humiliation, which is how the current regime seems to see any kind of outside involvement in what remains of the bear’s sphere of influence.

So the real points of interest after such standoffs between Russia and the West are never going to be the big issues. We’re not suddenly going to have a Kremlin change of heart on any of the major issues any time soon. And if and when such a change of heart comes, it’s certainly not going to come at one of these big public summits – far too humiliating. Where such shifts in Russian attitudes – either pro-engagement or heading towards hostility – are first going to be seen is in the details. The precise wording, the precise terms of any diplomatic agreement between Russia and the EU, US, NATO or individual European countries – the small print that the journalists rarely have time to scan in their rush to hit deadlines and get an angle that gives the subs a good shot at an interesting headline – that’s where we’ll first spot the changes when they come.

These summits are, in other words, little better than MacGuffins. The real diplomacy is going on off the radar, with lots of little standoffs in places like Armenia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

NATO may well be starting to look globally – but Europe needs to do the same to keep tabs on just what its unpredictable neighbour is up to, because Russia has more ability than any other state to screw Europe over. If Russia’s got its fingers in a lot of pies, we need to be keeping an eye on all of them, and not get distracted by the occasional fuss over the more obvious ones like Ukraine and Georgia (both of which have had high-profile popular pro-democracy uprisings in recent years, which are always of appeal to the press). To do so would be to fall for the oldest trick in the book.

After the news that non-EU European country Iceland has been looking in to the possibility of joining the Eurozone, another example of how just because you’re not a member of the EU it’s still likely to have a major impact, courtesy of Liechtenstein.

This particular example, however, is somewhat more timely, following Kosovo’s independence. Because Liechtenstein is one of Europe’s smallest countries, with a population of just 35,000 (compared to Kosovo’s 2 million) – yet has a very healthy economy indeed. For why? Well, like any sensible mini-state (see, for example, Monaco, Andorra and semi-states the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands), it’s become a tax haven – one of the best possible ways for a tiny country to lure in vast amounts of cash. (Supposedly Liechtenstein has more registered companies than people.)

But wait – hold up Kosovo! Before you get all excited about the possibility of becoming the Liechtenstein of the Balkans, be warned…

Because tax havens occasionally end up having problems – such as the current German financial scandal. Here, Germany has gained access – through some well-placed payments to known criminals, it would seem – to Liechtenstein’s records in order to hunt down a bunch of German citizens it wants to prosecute for tax evasion.

Liechtenstein is, naturally, not best pleased that the German state has deliberately accessed its confidential commercial and financial files. It’s hard, really, not to sympathise with Crown Prince Alois when he berates Germany for acting illegally (even if he does slip into hyperbole from time to time). Their country, their rules – and their sovereignty should be respected, right?

Well, not if you’re the EU, it would seem – because the European Union is not only backing Germany’s actions, but is now joining in the anti-Liechtenstein rhetoric:

Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker said in Berlin Tuesday that Germany’s controversial tax dragnet is likely to put tax evasion on the agenda of the next meeting of the European Union finance ministers.

Juncker, head of the Eurogroup of 15 countries sharing the euro currency, called on Liechtenstein to “plug its existing tax loop holes.”

…German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck says Germany will now push for a pan-European solution to tax evasion…

The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, a policy forum for industrialized countries, weighed in to identify European tax havens Leichtenstein, Andorra and Monaco as effectively providing a basis for illegal tax evasion.

And so the pressure mounts. Are we about to see a concerted EU-backed effort to force even more sovereign states to abide by EU rules? It rather looks like it – and it’s really nothing new.

Because if you want to trade with the EU, you pretty much have to abide by the EU’s rules and regulations – something to which both Switzerland and Norway can attest, in case you’re thinking that this could only happen to smaller countries. For European countries, with external trade fairly naturally dominated by their near neighbours, doing what the EU says is pretty much the only option – unless you follow the Belarus route and suck up to Russia instead.

Is the EU using its dominance of the European market to bully its non-member neighbours into doing what it wants? Yep – of course it is. It’s acting as would any sensible economic power – it’s trying to ensure that everything runs to its own best advantage. And it will continue to do so, it it’s got any sense.

Which is precisely why the UK is far better off in.

What with the ongoing spat with Russia (hyped out of all proportion, I reckon, and hope I’m not proved wrong), the fact that our dear new Prime Minister has made his first overseas jaunt while in office seems to have been largely forgotten. The fact that Brown managed a solid three weeks in the UK before nipping off abroad – approximately 400% longer than Tony Blair ever managed during his ten years in office* – has likewise received little comment. (Blair’s first overseas visit, by the way, was to the US, which could be significant…)

But why, with so much to do in Europe, Germany? Why suck up to Angela Merkel, with her relatively unstable coalition and two weeks after she passed the EU presidency on to Portugal? Why not follow the EU presidency itself? Why not head to Brussels and meet Commission head Barroso? Why not try to form a good relationship with Europe’s most secure and powerful politician, Nicholas Sarkozy (who he’s due to meet on Friday)? Why not Sarkozy and Merkel at the same time, in an EU big three spitroast?
Continue Reading

In the UK, for the last couple of weeks it’s been all but impossible to avoid discussing the brain-dead actions of a small group of social outcasts locked in a garish TV studio that’s been converted into a televised zoo. You don’t need to have watched the thing to have an opinion, and mine has largely been to rivise my previous dislike of clusterbombing unarmed civilians

In Germany, meanwhile, they’ve been getting all excited about a dog who can balance a glass of water on its head. Again, there’s no need to see it to know that that’s bloody brilliant.

But as I’m so nice, I done gone tracked it down on You Tube for your delectation. Watch this, and tell me the world wouldn’t be a better place if Channel 4 was forced to replace Big Brother with rolling footage of abnormally trained animals.

Hideous screeching harpies launching entirely unjustified attacks on their betters, or dogs with low-key party tricks? No contest, is there? Germany here I come – to take the talented mutt across the border and buy that pooch a pint.

Despite some people making useful suggestions, elsewhere in the EU it seems all but impossible to shake of the spectre of that damned [tag]EU constitution[/tag]. Current European Union president Angela Merkel keeps on bringing the bloody thing up, repeating the same thing that has been said ever since the thing was rejected by the French and Dutch referendums back in the summer of 2005:

“The reflection pause is over. By June, we must reach a decision on what to do with the constitution”

Ignoring, of course, the fact that “we” (by which I mean the people of Europe, via the French and Dutch referendums) already have. If just one country rejected the constitution, it was to be thrown out and re-thought. That was the understanding. For the last year and a half, though, all the talk has been on how to get around this inconvenience, not on how to tackle the underlying problem: that the constitution was simply not what was needed.

However, rather than use her EU presidency to launch a fresh debate, Merkel instead has made clear that

“Broad general debate [on the constitution] is behind us”

She will, instead, launch a series of confidential talks with her counterparts amongst the political elites of the various member states to determine what they (the people generally least in touch with the real world and with public opinion) think is the problem – precisely what got us into this mess in the first place, in other words.

She has also stated fairly bluntly that she doesn’t think that more referendums are the way forward. So once again, the people will be refused a vote, and resentment will be allowed to build. Step forward French presidential hopeful [tag]Segolene Royal[/tag], who may have a few things to say about this:

“I want the French people to be consulted once again in a referendum in 2009″

Ah, how lovely. Another impass. Royal’s rival, [tag]Nicholas Sarkozy[/tag], may be on record as wanting to revive the constitution – but really it’s “a”, rather than “the” constitution that he’s after. He reckons (fairly sensibly, considering the current chaos and stagnation) that

“We should resort to a mini-treaty to achieve the most urgent institutional reforms”

So, with both of the candidates for the French presidency seemingly at odds with the German Chancellor, what hope progress?

It looks like the EU is heading once again into a period of stagnation, as those in favour of the existing constitutional treaty try to press ahead despite its rejection and multiple flaws, while those who are opposed to the present text – yet see the need for introducing some of the (in many cases, much-needed) reforms it was designed to bring in – try to put a halt to plans to revive the thing which, no matter how ill-advised in terms of the constitution’s own inability to do what it was supposed to do, will also be taken as yet another indication that Europe’s politicians couldn’t give a monkey’s for the opinions of the “citizens of Europe”. That way lies further alienation and resentment which, if not placated, could prove disastrous.

For a decent overview of the issues – and how these proposed discussions may impact on Britain (which seems to be keeping well clear of any of any constitutional negotiations, despite the potential for them to have a massive impact on the country) – check out today’s Q&A in the Independent (or, via Erkan, a slightly shorter one from the Financial Times a couple of weeks back).

Saturday update: Jerome has a roundup of UK reactions over at European Tribune. He has an interesting theory…

Sixty years ago today, Germany declared war on the United States. To mark the occasion, check out the Carnival of German American Relations – lots of interesting stuff.

Alternatively, check out Britblog Roundup 43, over at DK’s place. (Although amongst his 10,000 words per hour blogging output it’s very easy to miss it – prolific or obsessive compulsive I have yet to decide with that one…)

German elections: Well, that’s it then – Germany has its first female Chancellor, elected by MPs this morning, and a vastly changed political landscape. What can Merkel achieve and what is she inheriting?

In case you missed it, they (again) finally seem to have sorted out a compromise cabinet, plus a few policy agreements which many are predicting are likely to lead to the coalition’s (and perhaps the country’s) imminet collapse – largely thanks to the guaranteed popularity-winners of a 3% VAT hike, raising the retirement age and cutting public spending all at the same time. Nice.

As such, Anatole Kaletsky of The Times (about whom I keep hearing good things, though will admit to rarely reading) is also predicting disaster (via) -

“Germany�s plan to cure its self-confessed economic failure by doing exactly the opposite to what modern economics would suggest is certainly a bold and novel idea. Jim O�Neill, the chief international economist of Goldman Sachs, remarked on television last week that German politicians are acting as if they had never seen an economics textbook, much less understood one…

“the Merkel tax hike will probably condemn Germany to depression for the rest of this decade and quite likely trigger an Asian-style financial crisis in much of Eastern Europe some time in the next year or two.”

Hurrah!

Looks like the balance of power in europe has shifted – Angela Merkel to take over the German Chancellorship.

So, the left(ish) anti-war, pro-France leader of Europe’s largest economy is replaced with a right-wing, pro-war, pro-Busher who has hinted at trying to break up the old Franco-German axis within the EU – quite possibly by looking to the new member states to the east, what with Merkel’s East German origins and recent attempts to befriend Putin and all. This could alter things significantly. Or it could all just collapse as soon as the cobbled-together coalition falls apart and leave Germany impotent and unstable for a while – a tad early to say… especially as under the terms of the deal four of the major ministries – foreign, finance, justice and labour – will remain under the control of the SPD. All very interesting…

German elections: Controversial Dutch EU Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes (who caused a bit of fuss a year ago during the confirmation hearings for Barroso’s Commission thanks to her links to umpteen business interests and unproven allegations of shady dealings) has arguably broken Commission guidelines by publicly declaring her support for Angela Merkel in Sunday’s elections.

It is, however, a bit of a grey area, what with it not being the politics of her own nation in which she has become embroiled. Especially as the new codes of conduct for Commissioners state that it is even permissible to “be active members of political parties or trade unions, provided that this does not compromise their availability for service in the Commission”.

Nonetheless, it is also a – perhaps contradictory – general rule that EU Commissioners should remain “completely independent” (hence the fuss over Kroes’ business links in a role which involves a vast amount of interaction with business). And in any case, her assertion that “The election of this excellent politician would be wonderful for the whole of Europe” is far from certainly the case, and demonstrates – in the eyes of some – a lack of judgement which is somewhat concerning for somebody holding such an important post. But then again, Peter Mandelson is also a Commissioner…

Kroes claims that her support for Merkel is because, basically, it would be good for women’s lib and stuff for a woman to hold high office in Germany. Unsurprisingly, however, this hasn’t gone down too well, Schr�der ally and leader of the European Parliament’s Socialist group Martin Schulz (unsurprisingly not a fan of the conservative Merkel) stating that “This is an unacceptable interference in the internal affairs of a member state, regardless of Ms Kroes�s motivation. As we know, Ms Kroes stands for ultra market-liberalism, so it is not surprising that she supports Ms Merkel who shares the same values.”

Even so, this could spark a few interesting questions about the extent to which Commissioners should be allowed to express personal views. Remember the US presidential elections? Practically no world leader expressed any opinion as to who they would prefer in charge – Japan’s Junichiro Koizumi even going as far as to publicly deny that he backed Bush after rumours circulated that he had given George his backing.

I doubt there are many who would argue against introducing a hard and fast rule about EU Commissioners stating categorically that they should shut the hell up when it comes to their personal preferences for national governments within the EU. After all, how could Kroes work impartially and without any ill-feeling with a Schr�der government, should the near-incredible happen and he manage to hang on to power?

They really do themselves no favours, this lot…

If you know nothing about what’s going on in Germany or why it’s important, you could do worse than start with Sign and Sight’s handy and succinct overview.

First up, is Merkel going to push for an extra round? She’s been dropping in the polls of late (which may be worrying the markets, plus getting into trouble over her flat tax proposals, recently so popular in the UK blogosphere – with more in-depth looks at her economic policy woes at Der Spiegel.

Meanwhile, the Guardian (or is it theguardian?) looks at what went wrong in Germany and why “Everyone is afraid”, even though the Financial Times reckons that Schr�der’s legacy will be a good one and Der Spiegel reckons Germany’s a lot better off than it thinks it is in a nice comparison of Merkel and Maggie (as in Thatcher, natch).

(As an odd aside – largely for the eurosceptics to get heated up – the eurosceptic Times wonders if the Turkish vote will save the pro-Turkish entry Schr�der, while Newropeans magazine bemoans the inability of non-German EU citizens to vote on Sunday, and in national elections full stop.)

Over at Fistful, Alex gives an overview of the squabbles over potential coalitions following Edward’s look at the implications of Merkel missing an overall majority and Tobias’ top-notch look at the problems with her campaign. It’s one of the better places to keep up with what’s going on.

As I finish up I also notice North Sea Diaries also has an election roundup with much good stuff – a bit of overlap, naturally, but certainly worth a look.