(An overly simplified, probably overly opinionated overview of the “Special Relationship”)
Britain’s position in the post-WWII Europe was always envisaged by the Americans as the middle-man. They liked the idea of a united Europe after having (albeit belatedly) found themselves embroiled in two rather unpleasant wars on the continent, and saw a unified western European democracy – of a similar size to the continental United States – as a potential handy buffer against the potential threat of Stalin’s Russia.
Winston Churchill, meanwhile, while formulating post-war possibilities with his American counterparts (it was the half-American Churchill who coined the phrase “Special Relationship”, after all), reckoned Britain’s role to be not so much middle-man, as the kindly – yet firm – uncle, standing on the sidelines of a Europe (excluding Britain) that he hoped would become ever more unified, occasionally barking orders when the continental lot stepped out of line. It was primarily thanks to this vision, based on a pre-war understanding of Britain’s global power (and certainly before the loss of India, something Churchill would never have countenanced) that led Churchill and then his lieutenant and successor, Anthony Eden, to ignore all the initial talks and refuse to participate in the Treaty of Rome back in 1957, that formed what has become the European Union.
Britain’s refusal to take the leading role in Europe that the US wanted her to take straight after the Second World War has been the cause of a lot of problems: