The EU’s Caucasion lessons

So, despite the apparent truce following Moscow’s insanely over-the-top response to Georgia’s silly South Ossetian venture, it sounds like Russia’s still “peacekeeping” in Georgian territory. This is otherwise known as “invading a sovereign nation just for the hell of it”.

Here’s a handy solution to all our problems: Georgia – stop playing the victim, you brought it on yourself; Russia – stop acting like a dick.

Meanwhile, the possibility of a common EU foreign policy becomes more remote by the hour. Which idiot was it who thought that an EU Foreign Minister and diplomatic service was a good idea again? If we can’t agree among ourselves, how the hell are we going to convince other world powers?

Eastern Europe used to be the Soviet Union’s buffer zone against the West; it’s now become the West’s buffer-zone against Russia. Unsurprisingly, those countries that make up said buffer-zone aren’t best pleased – especially when they see so little constructive action from the West when a country they consider one of their own is being bullied by the Russians. Because now the ex-Warsaw Pact EU member states are firmly supporting Georgia while many Western European states, keen not to piss off Moscow, are treading more carefully. The fault-lines within the EU – that have been there ever since 2004′s expansion thanks to the continued failure to come up with new post-enlargement rules and regulations – are becoming painfully apparent.

I’ve long been saying that EU relations with Russia are one of the Union’s most pressing concerns. They seem to be becoming more so. If the EU can’t agree a solution to this – or at least a unified approach – then the potential for disaster is immense. Russia will be pissed off. Georgia will be pissed off. The former Warsaw Pact EU member states will be pissed off. Europe’s only non-Russian energy supply route will be jeopardised. And the EU’s impotence on the world stage will be painfully apparent to all.

And, while the EU dithers on the sidelines, the people of Georgia and South Ossetia are still hiding from tanks, ducking from jets, and picking through the rubble to recover their shattered belongings and their dead. A situation that requires quick action has been allowed to continue unchecked in part thanks to the wasted time of trying to find a common European solution. Nice one, guys.

This is why the EU needs to decide – collectively and decisively – what it is for. Episodes like this one – following so closely on the heels of the disunited front put up over Kosovo’s independence – show that one thing the EU is definitely not for is collective foreign diplomacy. So let’s give up on the idea already. It’s getting embarrassing.

Update: Yup. This pretty much sums it up:

“at every level, Europe appears to be in the thick of events, doing its best to stop the bloodshed. But, on closer inspection, this is the traditional sort of European activity: grand proposals, the clocking of plenty of frequent flyer air miles, yet little of substance.”

South Ossetia: Still simmering

Convoy of Russian tanks in South OssetiaSo it seems that Georgia just doesn’t know when she’s beat – although quite what the real situation is there nobody seems to know, as there’s so much disinformation around. Who’s at fault here – Russia or Georgia? The answer’s simple – it’s both.

What’s likely to be most instructive now is not how Russia acts, nor Georgia, but how the West (and especially the European Union, supposedly so keen to act more decisively in the international arena on issues just such as this) responds to those actions. So far, it’s hard not to agree with anti-EU blog EU Referendum on the EU’s slowness.

Because the EU, lest we forget, has its own former Soviet states as members these days. For EU citizens in the likes of Latvia, Lithuania and – espcially – Estonia (as well as throughout the rest of the former Warsaw Pact countries that are now within the European fold), the situation in Georgia is likely to seem all too familiar. Yes, Georgia struck first – but so did the Hungarian revolutionaries in ’56, the Czechs in ’68…

No, the comparison’s not perfect – it’s deeply flawed and obscured by ideology and the memories of the last couple of generations’ attempts to shake off rule from Moscow (plus it’s still not entirely clear just what it was that provoked Georgia into acting – was it actually Russian agents, or simply pissed-off Ossetians, fed up with still being a part of a country they’ve been trying to leave for a decade and a half?). But such concerns are going to be there nonetheless – and the longer the West goes without some kind of decisive action to bring the conflict to an end, the more those concerns are going to grow.

If Russia truly is invading Georgia proper (as some reports have begun to suggest), then the EU and the rest of the West are faced with their toughest call in an age. As far as I can tell, NATO has no jurisdiction in Georgia while she’s not a member – and a physical stand-off between NATO peace-keeping troops and Russian forces would only further underscore the “New Cold War” rhetoric that’s being spouted on both sides of the divide (remember Russia’s displeasure over the proposed US missile shield?), making for a potentially disastrous PR move. The UN is also obviously a no-go, what with Russia being on the Security Council. Which means, in terms of a Western military response to prevent further escalation, that the only option is another Kosovo/Iraq-style operation that will, in terms of international law, be illegal. And so further piss Russia off.

At the moment, it’s hard not to see the West being played expertly by both sides: Russia’s so far managing to act with impunity within its traditional sphere of influence (just like the good old days), while Georgia’s getting to play the martyr and ratchet up Western guilt, knowing that any country that Russia’s attacking is pretty much guaranteed to have the West on its side. (Der Spiegel goes further, arguing that the current situation also serves the purposes of the EU and US. The US? Maybe, as a belligerent Russia may increase eastern European support for its missile shield. But the EU? I don’t see how this can end well for the EU… Too much potential for pissing off Russia on one side and showing the ex-communist EU member states and wannabe member states that, when it comes to the crunch, Brussels simply hasn’t got the balls to stand up to Moscow.)

And so the only relatively safe route I can see at the moment – if we’re to avoid the Georgia situation bubbling over and causing problems in other regions along the Russian fringe – is to get China to mediate. China’s got very little interest in the Caucasus, is just as coldly cordial to Russia as to the West, and is desperate to put on a good show while the Olympics are on. She’s also pretty much the only country big and powerful enough for both Russia and the West to bother listening to.

So, come on, China…

Georgia: Why?

So, now that Georgia seems to have withdrawn from South Ossetia in the face of the overwhelming force of Russia’s displeasure, the question has to be asked: how on earth did they think they were going to be able to get away with it?

As has been frequently mentioned over the last few days, Georgia has been trying to join NATO of late – and had it done so already, NATO may well have had to come to her aid when Russia started launching airstrikes. But why would NATO want such a small, impoverished country with a track record of more or less continuous political corruption since independence, even since the Rose Revolution supposedly ushered in a new age of democratic accountability back in 2003?

Georgia pipelinesThe map to the left may indicate why. And yes this is all part of my slowly developing geopolitics of European energy supply theory of relations between Russia and the west (see also theories about Armenia and Serbia – and a denial from Gazprom executive Alexander Medvedev (no relation)). Because, you see, the proposed Nabucco pipeline – designed pretty much exclusively to bypass Russian control over European natural gas supplies by providing an alternate, non-Russian route from the gas fields of Central Asia – is, in part, intended to be supplied by pipelines that run right through Georgia.

Proposed Nabucco pipeline routeThe recent military action has already caused alarm about existing oil and gas supplies (with a nice overview of the current situation from Reuters). But check the map to the left – the proposed route of the Nabucco pipeline, designed pretty much exclusively to prevent Russia from being able to play politics with European energy supply, as has already happened in Ukraine and elsewhere – including, ahem… Georgia (and again).

Nabucco - the missing linkFor more on Nabucco’s significance, check out this handy report (warning, PDF), which contains the handy graphic to the left, demonstrating how Nabucco is intended to be “the missing link” between the giant gas sources of Central Asia and the dwindling gas supplies/rising demand of Europe (all numbers in billions of cubic metres).

Gas supply routes into EuropeAnd so it should all begin to come clear. The West wants Georgia for its strategic value as one of the links in the Caucasian energy chain – the only route from Central Asia to Europe that doesn’t involve passing through less than reliable countries like Russia or Iran. The only supply route for non-European natural gas that will not be under Russian control (as can be seen in the map to the left) – and a direct competitor to Russia’s own planned Blue Stream pipeline.

Georgia, meanwhile, knowing her own strategic importance, seems merely to have overplayed her hand and acted too soon – perhaps assuming that her new Western partners (most of whom have funded the country’s existing pipelines via the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) would be quicker to protect their investment, perhaps assuming that Russia under Medvedev would be slower to act about such things than Russia under Putin. This despite Medvedev being the former chairman of Russian state energy giant Gazprom, the owner of a third of the world’s gas supplies, and the man responsible for the 2006 price hike on Georgian energy supplies.

It’s hard, then, not to think that Georgia’s been rather stupid about this whole affair. Most NATO member states, so keen on the concept of self-determination, are hardly going to look too favourably on forcing a breakaway region to step in line – especially after so many of them have so recently backed Kosovo’s independence. Plus, of course, South Ossetia is largely just rocks and mountains with very little in the way of value. Why not just let them go their own way? They’ve been causing trouble ever since the fall of the USSR – if they want independence so much, then it’s good riddance to bad rubbish, surely?

So, has anyone managed to come up with a reasonable explanation for Georgia getting involved in such a stupid fight? Fistful has had a couple of stabs, but I still can’t see how the Georgian government was this dumb…

Update: See also the map below, which provides a broader regional context along with greater detail – click for (very) big:

Black and Caspian Sea oil and gas pipelines

South Ossetia: The bear strikes back

An apartment on fire in the Georgian town of Gori, supposedly hit by a Russian air strike

The South Ossetia crisis really is kicking off – is this going to become another Chechnya? Russia’s now apparently launching airstrikes on targets inside Georgia itself (the photo to the left being of Gori, the town where Stalin was born, fact fans) and is sending more troops. Although Russian President Medvedev is still referring to this as a “peace enforcement operation”, it’s now one with a death toll of 1,500 so far (plus 30,000 refugees fleeing the region – from a South Ossetian population of only 75,000 or so…).

Georgian President Saakashvili, meanwhile, is under no illusions that his country’s at war – and nor, it would seem, is former Russian President (and current Prime Minister, lest we forget) Putin: “War has started after a well-planned invasion”

Georgia by now must be starting to realise that it’s really very silly to get into a fight with the weak little kid in the class when he’s got a very large, very angry bear of a cousin standing next to him.

And so the panic that was in South Ossetia yesterday is moving into Georgia proper today, as hasty plans are made to evacuate, while a flick through the archives at Georgia on my Mind (written by a Norwegian, decidedly sympathetic to Georgia, who left the country yesterday) will give a speedy indication of just how long this conflict’s been brewing for.

Elsewhere, more handy blogs for updates and insight: The Caucasian Knot (superb stuff, combining press reviews with separate analysis and rumours from the ground), while Global Voices Online has a translated roundup of cyrillic blog reactions, including one from someone hiding in a basement in the South Ossetian capital as the mortars rain down, and a handy look at who’s to blame for the crisis (written by the author of The Caucasian Knot).

The Economist’s Edward Lucas also has some handy analysis (following his earlier warning piece about the dangers of tensions escalating, published the very day before they did), while Paul Noble of WindowOnEurasia (and the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy) warns of a background of growing radicalisation among Caucasian minorities in recent years that could see the current conflict spread wider than just Georgia/South Ossetia.

Sadly, this may well just be the start.

16:15 (UK time) update: Oh… From Reuters: Abkhaz separatists strike disputed Georgia gorge

Abkhazia said on Saturday it has launched an operation to drive Georgia out of a disputed gorge, possibly opening a “second front” in Tbilisi’s battle to retain fractious breakaway regions.

The separatist foreign minister Sergei Shamba said Abkhazian artillery and warplanes struck Georgian forces in Kodori, a narrow gorge which cuts deep into the Abkhazian territory and is an ideal route for any invasion in the region.

There are also reports – TV only so far – that Putin has flown back from the Olympics in Beijing (where he apparently told President Bush that there would only be a ceasefire when there are no Georgian troops left in South Ossetia), and is currently in North Ossetia, over the Russian border, for purposes unknown. (Though considering his status as a living embodiment of Russian nationalism, it’s hard not to see it as a morale-booster for both the Russian troops and South Ossetians…) A combined EU, US and NATO delegation is also apparently being mobilised to try and negotiate a ceasefire.

South Ossetia’s kicking off: An overview

Map of South Ossetia, shamelessly stolen from the IndependentI was going to write about this yesterday, because in these days of vastly diminished foreign news staff on national newspapers, the fact that a story about the breakaway Georgian wannabe state made the notoriously understaffed Independent yesterday should indicate that this ongoing standoff was beginning to get more heated. Overnight, sure enough, Georgian forces have moved into place and surrounded the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, with a number of people killed in shelling and airstrikes that started up only a few hours after Russia had negotiated a ceasefire.

For background you could do far worse than Fistful’s handy introduction to South Ossetia from back in March, alongside (as ever) Wikipedia on the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, before noting this New York Times article from April, putting Russia’s renewed interest in the Georgian situation firmly in the context of the aftermath of Kosovo’s independence.

You may also want to have a gander at this map of the ethnic makeup of the Caucasus region, which may also indicate why Russia’s so interested. Yep – the Ossetians are slap-bang on the same frontier as Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, all of which have spent most of the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union more or less in conflict with both the Kremlin and each other, either directly or thanks to fallout from the decidedly unpleasant Chechen wars.

This could, as with all conflicts in the Caucasus, get nasty. Wikipedia seems to have good coverage, EurasiaNet is good on the recent tensions, while this blog seems to be being written by a British energy policy consultant in Georgian capital Tblisi, noting that army reservists are being called up and provides some analysis, while also pointing to this handy UN-funded English-language Georgian news site, which is providing more regular and detailed coverage than anywhere else I’ve found so far.

The Russian Ozymandias

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (image leeched from Wikipedia)Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn is dead, another of the giants of 20th century literature gone, his works already diminished from handy anti-Soviet conversation pieces for the dinner party set to dusty history source books.

The Gulag Archipelago remains his best-known book, though most people will only have read the expurgated version rather than as three chunky volumes. They may have tinkered with Cancer Ward. But, let’s face it, most people who’ve read any Solzhenitsyn will only have read One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich – an easy hundred or so pages of Soviet horror. Quick to read, quick to be forgotten.

While The Gulag Archipelago will be foisted on reluctant history students for decades, if not centuries to come, its catalogue of horrors becomes so vast as to be overwhelming, desensitising. This is why Ivan Denisovich is more familiar – the crimes committed by the likes of Stalin were just too vast to comprehend other than through the stories of individuals. Yes, all those mentioned in The Gulag Archipelago were individuals too, but by their sheer number they become faceless. Statistics. They blur into one, the easier to forget – as Robert Conquest noted in his (400+ page) The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-famine, “We may perhaps put this in perspective… by saying that in the actions here recorded about twenty human lives were lost for, not every word, but every letter, in this book.”

It’s something Martin Amis tried to get across in his stab at writing about the crimes of the Soviets in Koba the Dread (worth a read even if you don’t like Amis or his hectoring tone), having opened with the above quote from Conquest: “We cannot understand it… It takes a significant effort of imagination…”

The Soviet gulags, like their cousins the Nazi concentration camps, are indeed all but impossible to comprehend. Without Solzhenitsyn, we couldn’t have the first chance of even trying to imagine what they were like, let alone of understanding. And yet what he tried to describe in The Gulag Archipelago still remains impossible to comprehend – the sheer vastness and hostility of Siberia, for one, remains a struggle for me to grasp even now that I’ve endured the long flight gazing down on its featureless whiteness on several trips to Japan.

Meanwhile, his best book, the work that best shows off his literary genius – August 1914 – languishes largely unread, currently up for grabs on Amazon.co.uk for just 1p. Yes, that’s one English penny. It is at once the best book about the First World War I’ve ever read and the real perfect symbol of Solzhenitsyn – vast in size, detailed in its research, beautiful in its language, able somehow to bring to life events impossible to imagine in that first month of the war, yet also marred by early censorship (pick up Lenin in Zurich – also currently going for a penny – for some of the missing bits), more known of than read, and somehow incomplete. For August 1914, all 600+ pages of it (1000+ with the restoration of the missing bits) was but the first in an intended series – The Red Wheel – covering Russia’s road to revolution and its subsequent repression.

Of this series, he completed just four books over a twenty-year period, of which I believe only August 1914 and November 1916 has so far been translated into English. It’s a masterpiece, but a difficult and ultimately disappointing one – because now he is dead and it will never be completed, destined to become, in the memorable phrase of Nina Khrushcheva (writing in The Nation on Solzhenitsyn’s 80th birthday back in 1999),

“little more than a crank’s mausoleum within which his Nobel Prize-worthy talent has been interred.”

And so, thanks in part to the sheer length of time it took him to write them, in part thanks to his unshakable public image as the guy who writes about gulags, these works that Solzhenitsyn himself seemingly hoped to make his true literary legacy languish mostly unread and, in some cases, unpublished outside his native tongue. Where his books were once unread through censorship, they now gather dust through lack of interest – and with his death, Solzhenitsyn himself is doubtless destined to join Ozymandias – a symbol of something great, yet increasingly forgotten.

We cannot comprehend the horrors of the 20th century – not the slow march into death of the Somme, not the cattle-truck convoys to the gas chambers of Belsen, and not the icy nothingness of Siberian exile – but we also cannot forget them. Even if Solzhenitsyn did, in the last decades of his life, become obsolete with the fall of Communism – a symbol of rebellion and independence so powerful that he was quickly moulded by the canny Putin to be wheeled out as a propaganda tool – and even though his works may increasingly be unread these days, he is one of the few twentieth century writers whose works we already know are important enough to be taught as history.

Yet few want to read “important” books. Better, then, to remember Solzhenitsyn the man as something separate from his actual works. The Gulag Archipelago was “important” when it first came out – since the fall of the Soviet Union it is no longer, yet it remains a truly great work of history and of literature. August 1914 was overshadowed by the earlier, “important” works on life under the Soviets when it came out. Now, finally, it can perhaps emerge from the shadows. Solzhenitsyn himself will forever be associated with the Soviet era, but perhaps now we can finally start to read his books not just for their insight into incomprehensible times, but for the beauty of their language, the knife-edge sharpness of their descriptions, and the all-pervading feeling of muffled hope amid hopelessness that is, above all, the true legacy of the twentieth century. That his final masterpiece, the Red Wheel series, will now remain unfinished seems strangely apt for a man who has come to symbolise a period in which all too many lives were ended too soon.

And still, his books remain to remind us of the horrors of war and repression, hopefully to prevent future leaders making the same mistakes, though we all know such lessons are rarely learned:

I met a traveller from an antique land
Who said: Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert. Near them on the sand,
Half sunk, a shatter’d visage lies, whose frown
And wrinkled lip and sneer of cold command
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamp’d on these lifeless things,
The hand that mock’d them and the heart that fed.
And on the pedestal these words appear:
“My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!”
Nothing beside remains: round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare,
The lone and level sands stretch far away.

Solzhenitsyn, I hope, would be in agreement:

SPIEGEL: Are you afraid of death?

Solzhenitsyn: No, I am not afraid of death any more. When I was young the early death of my father cast a shadow over me — he died at the age of 27 — and I was afraid to die before all my literary plans came true. But between 30 and 40 years of age my attitude to death became quite calm and balanced. I feel it is a natural, but no means the final, milestone of one’s existence.

SPIEGEL: Anyhow, we wish you many years of creative life.

Solzhenitsyn: No, no. Don’t. It’s enough.

Tories and the EU, trade talks, Russian threats

Three things that have caught my eye this morning, in ascending order of importance:

1) Following a fun article on the impact a Tory victory in the next UK general election may have on the EU in this week’s Economist, there’s an interesting round-up of Conservative European election posters from the last couple of decades over at the Open Europe blog – a perfect illustration of the fundamental shift in Tory thinking on the EEC/EU that’s taken place over the last 30 years or so.

2) As EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson issues a stark warning about the need for unity over WTO talks, I stumble across EU Trade Policy: Approaching a Crossroads – a handy (mercifully short) briefing paper from Chatham House on the continued lack of a breakthrough in EU trade negotiations as we rumble towards the end of the Cotonou agreement and squabbles with the likes of Russia and China continue. Short version: it doesn’t look promising.

3) Medvedev Criticizes West in Tough Foreign Policy Speech – the usual Russian posturing, or the start of something new? Either way, “The EU and US have been warned”, apparently. Thanks for that, Dmitry! Meanwhile, the Financial Times urges standing up to Russia over Georgia – a much-ignored new Caucasian crisis that’s hardly getting any better, and Europe’s World has an article (promising-looking, but I haven’t had a chance to read in full just yet) on The EU, Russia and the crisis of the post-Cold War European order. From what I’ve seen so far, this looks like essential reading:

“The EU today cannot be described anymore as federalist state in the making – it is something much more complex and undefined. It resembles something closer to post-colonial India, with its mixture of languages, legal regimes, traditions and sensitivities, than it does post-War Germany or France. In the powerful metaphor of Jan Zielonka the post-enlargement EU is not a kind of Westphalia federation; it is more a kind of neo-medieval empire. There is no European demos and there probably never will be – but there is kind of European public. There are no final borders but moving borders and variable geometries. And it was Count Sergei Witte, Prime Minister under Nicholas II, who said there was no such thing as Russia, but only a Russian empire.”

More Russian energy blackmail

I told you that Ukraine was just a warning shot… Looks like the Czech Republic’s decision to host that US missile shield has really ticked off the Kremlin. Because now the flow of oil from Russia appears to be slowing down.

This is one to which a great deal of attention should be paid (but which will almost certainly be almost entirely overlooked, just as with the various Russian pipeline machinations in Serbia over the last couple of years have been largely ignored by the mainstream press). With energy prices rocketing and Europe’s own supplies of fossil fuels almost spent, how Russia chooses to use its dominance of the European energy market is cause for grave concern. Sod the Lisbon Treaty – the threat from Russia is by far the biggest problem facing the EU, both in the short and long terms. Loss of sovereignty via transferring power to Brussels? How about loss of sovereignty thanks to Moscow increasingly being able to pull the plug on our national economies on a whim?

NATO, Russia and Europe

Hunting around for a handy overview of just what’s been happening at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, depending on who you read you’ll get some wildly different ideas. I’ve been confused for much of the morning. Here’s a brief indication of why:

Der Spiegel‘s “Germany Puts the Brakes on US Expansion Plans” is countered by the International Herald Tribune‘s “NATO backs U.S. missile defense plan for Europe”

EU Referendum‘s claim that “NATO has thrown Ukraine and Georgia to the bear. President Bush’s attempts to put them on track to future and very distant membership of NATO has failed” is then contradicted by Radio Free Europe‘s report that “pro-NATO forces in Ukraine and Georgia celebrated the announcement, which offered stronger-than-expected support for their entry bids”

Repeat for pretty much every issue under discussion at the summit (for which, see this very handy round-up).

People always like to look for tangible, obvious outcomes from these things. But this is international diplomacy. Worse than that, it’s strategic military international diplomacy where all but one of the permanent members of the UN’s Security Council are involved (and we know how infrequently that lot manage to get along). Making compromises left, right and centre – leading to a stalemate in which, well, the status quo has largely been maintained – was the only sensible course of action. The thing was always going to end up a waste of time and money.

NATO flagBut the real fun is that despite the fact that NATO is now overseeing operations in Afghanistan (that well-known North Atlantic power) and looking to a more global role, this summit has made one thing increasingly apparent: the Cold War may have ended, but NATO’s principal opponent remains Russia.

Pretty much every compromise on the European front, every bit of backing down, appears to have been done to placate the Kremlin – because the principle areas to which NATO is looking to expand its influence (largely under the prompting of the US) lie in former communist countries, be it Ukraine and Georgia or Croatia and Albania.

As you’ve no doubt noticed, there’s been a growing tension between Russia and the West in recent years – from ex-FSB men assassinated in London to the resumption of patrols by Russian nuclear bombers through the vendetta against the British Council in Moscow. Then there’s the war of words with Belarus, Europe’s oft-forgotten fanatically pro-Moscow wildcard (a country that misses the USSR so much its secret police are still called the KGB and there are constant rumours that it is planning to formally merge with Russia), cyber-warfare against Estonia, and the ongoing standoff over Kosovo’s independence. Even the EU’s (and NATO’s) difficult relationship with Turkey is getting caught up with the Russian situation thanks to the Russo-Turkish partnership in the Bluestream and Nabucco pipelines, both of which are helping to make Europe increasingly reliant on Russian energy supplies.

The relationship with Russia, in other words, increasingly seems to dominate all European diplomacy. Where during the Cold War the presence of the USSR may have ensured that western Europe and the EU was operating under the constant fear of nuclear attack, Moscow’s then lack of engagement in western European affairs allowed everyone to get on much as they pleased. Since the end of the Cold War – and especially since Putin came to power – Moscow’s long-sought-after engagement with the West has if anything caused even more problems.

During the Cold War it was America who stood guard and kept watch, now Europe (both the EU and non-EU countries) has to be constantly on the alert for far more subtle Russian encroachments than columns of Red Army troops or falling H-bombs – encroachments largely economic, and mostly achieved through that strange form of diplomacy at which Putin so excels: smiling with fangs.

With such a large, unpredictable neighbour to the east – especially one with the ability to shut down a sizable chunk of the European economy on a whim (as has already happened to Ukraine) – little wonder there seem to have been few major advances at this latest NATO summit. In fact, I can barely see the point of holding these things until Russian attitudes to the West shift further in the direction of friendly cooperation (no signs of that any time soon) – because Russia’s never going to accept public humiliation, which is how the current regime seems to see any kind of outside involvement in what remains of the bear’s sphere of influence.

So the real points of interest after such standoffs between Russia and the West are never going to be the big issues. We’re not suddenly going to have a Kremlin change of heart on any of the major issues any time soon. And if and when such a change of heart comes, it’s certainly not going to come at one of these big public summits – far too humiliating. Where such shifts in Russian attitudes – either pro-engagement or heading towards hostility – are first going to be seen is in the details. The precise wording, the precise terms of any diplomatic agreement between Russia and the EU, US, NATO or individual European countries – the small print that the journalists rarely have time to scan in their rush to hit deadlines and get an angle that gives the subs a good shot at an interesting headline – that’s where we’ll first spot the changes when they come.

These summits are, in other words, little better than MacGuffins. The real diplomacy is going on off the radar, with lots of little standoffs in places like Armenia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

NATO may well be starting to look globally – but Europe needs to do the same to keep tabs on just what its unpredictable neighbour is up to, because Russia has more ability than any other state to screw Europe over. If Russia’s got its fingers in a lot of pies, we need to be keeping an eye on all of them, and not get distracted by the occasional fuss over the more obvious ones like Ukraine and Georgia (both of which have had high-profile popular pro-democracy uprisings in recent years, which are always of appeal to the press). To do so would be to fall for the oldest trick in the book.

links for 2008-02-28: Russian election special

“The new stage… the stage of totalitarianism”

Shutting down an entire university due to breaches of fire regulations would sound a little harsh at the best of times.

When the university in question is St Petersburg’s European University, however, suspicions are naturally raised – not least thanks to numerous EU-funded courses, including one on election monitoring. We are, lest we forget, just a few short weeks before Russia’s controversial presidential elections.

Little wonder, then, that some among Russia’s isolated opposition are digging out the colourful rhetoric:

Maxim Reznik, the head of the St. Petersburg branch of Russia’s liberal Yabloko faction, said the real reason for the order was an election monitoring course funded by the European Union.

“No doubt, it’s about politics,” Reznik said. “Fire inspections is just an excuse. It’s another example that the authoritarian regime is going to the new stage, to the stage of totalitarianism.”

The suspension of the university’s activities comes amid tensions between Moscow and the West over Russia’s March 2 presidential elections. An election monitoring arm of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has refused to send observers to the vote because of restrictions on their activities — an announcement likely to strengthen Western concerns about democracy in Russia.

When the university’s closure comes the very same day that Moscow announces it will maintain favourable gas prices for the pro-Russian dictatorship in Belarus while threatening to cut off supplies to the EU-leaning Ukraine, it’s very hard not to see the university’s closure as part of a coordinated campaign designed to tell Ukraine to look east, not west if it knows what’s good for it…

Update: Ahem… BBC News – Russia in Ukraine missile threat