Berlin Sprouts has a nice overview of some potential post-Orange Revolution developments on Europe’s easternmost fringe, three and a bit months after it all kicked off in Kiev, which nicely complements this Washington Times piece.

Ultima Thule, meanwhile, has some worrying rumours about possible Russian reactions to the apparent push for greater democracy in these former Soviet states, including a translation of a Russian article about the threat posed to Putin by the GUUAM states (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan). Transitions Online, meanwhile, suggests that Putin must now look to Kazakhstan to maintain the Russian dream of an ex-Soviet economic alliance.

Others are also suggesting that Yushchenko’s victory is having ramifications even further afield, and that Lebanon is consciously modelling its current attempts to shake off foreign dominance on Ukraine’s peaceful revolution. Others are asking questions about the possible outcomes in Lebanon which sound eerily familiar to those of us who were following Ukrainian events back in November.

Orange Ukraine, meanwhile, provides a comparison between events in Ukraine in February 2005 with those of February 2004, which shows that although some things have improved, the mere installation of Victor Yushchenko as president has not been enough to sort out the country’s problems.

Dan at Orange Ukraine also mentions – and dismisses – those allegations of Yushchenko having fascist connections. Suggestions he was anti-Semitic cropped up back in November – but it wasn’t clear to what extent these were merely propaganda. It also wasn’t clear whether the propaganda was put out by his enemies or his friends, as by all accounts in some parts of Ukraine being hostile to Jews could well be a vote winner…

Over at Neeka’s Backlog, Veronica Khokhlova also mentions this worrying neofascist undercurrent in Ukraine – notably the news of the beating of an African-American diplomat in an apparently racist attack in Kiev.

In Ukraine – as in other parts of the world which have recently seen a more democratic system of government introduced, there are some improvements, but still a lot of work to be done. It’s all very well getting rid of the “wrong” government, but a lot of hard graft is required to make lasting changes. The glamour of the revolutionary period may now be a fading memory, but the EU should keep an eye on events in the GUUAM states – this could be the start of something big, or it could be the herald of yet more chaos. Either way, it will have important implications for the EU’s relations with Russia and its other neighbours to the east.

Ukraine is planning on shifting its “philosophy of co-operation with the European Union”, hinting that membership is the country’s final aim following Yushchenko’s victory in the re-run presidential elections.

Could all that noise about a Yushchenko victory meaning a shift to the West actually be true after all? Well, considering the election results haven’t been confirmed yet (or even published – they will be appearing in Ukrainian papers tomorrow), it’s a bit early to say.

It may depend on who is chosen as Prime Minister: “The contest has narrowed to three main candidates: Yulia Tymoshenko, the charming but fiery former “gas princess” who helped lead the Orange Revolution protests in November and December; Petro Poroshenko, the softly-spoken “chocolate prince” whose television channel brought the protests into the homes of millions of Ukrainians; and Olexander Zinchenko, Mr Yushchenko’s campaign manager.” (In case of Financial Times Subscriptions kicking in, I’ll post the whole article in a comment – interesting stuff.)

However, the byword for freedom and truth that is Pravda today has a nice big headline: “Russian politician Grigori Yavlinsky to become Ukrainian prime minister”. Not to worry, though, if you read the article this turns out to be largely spin, based on a report in The Russian Courier yesterday: “Yavlinsky, the newspaper wrote, has good chances to take the position because he is equally alienated from all political and economic clans of Ukraine.”

In fact, despite being Russian Yavlinsky may not be too bad – he may even be an ideal choice to placate Putin. If he believes all the stuff he claims in this interview, the Russian could well work: “Freedom, human rights, and dignity. We will advocate independence of courts and legislative authorities, reduction of administrative clout with elections on all levels. We will speak against the merger of powers-that-be and businesses. It is this merger that resulted in the conflict between YUKOS and the regime. We will also advocate a political agreement but in the form of a law, not an accord. On the one hand, we will advocate an amnesty to capitals and fortunes made in the course of privatization in the 1990′s. On the other, we want transparency of funding of political parties, establishment of a transparent political process, adoption of the law on lobbying within the framework of participation of major businesses in politics.”

Either way, it seems as though Yushchenko and Putin will have a chance to chat in a week’s time, so maybe they can get all friendly again. Although after this week’s humiliating forced climb-down over pensions (which, though not significant in terms of cash for the old dears nonetheless shows Putin can be beat on home turf), Putin may not be in the mood to be friendly – he just ripped off Kazakhstan fairly effectively, pinching some prime gas fields in exchange for a bit of spare land.

So then – which way is Ukraine going to go – EU or Russia? Or will Yushchenko live up to expectations and manage to balance gracefully in between the two powers, getting the best of both worlds?

Once again, we’ll have to wait and see…

Fascinating blow-by-blow account in the NY Times of the role of the SBU (successor to the Soviet-era KGB) in Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution”. This is far from being my area of expertise, but it casts an interesting new light on the events of last November. Specifically it accounts for a crucial factor in any successful revolution, support (whether tacit or active) of at least an element of the military and security services.

Discoshaman provides a roundup of recent developments, including the news that “Yanukovych has brought a fifth complaint to the Supreme Court, hoping to overturn the elections. Even his own spokesman doesn’t sound hopeful. The Court will consider his complaint tomorrow. The Central Election Commission head has decided not to certify the results until hearing from the Court.”

Over at Yorkshire Ranter, Alex has an interesting piece dissecting some of the more stupid commentaries on the Ukrainian election crisis. Specifically, the opinions of Jonathan Steele in the Guardian. He does, it must be admitted, have a tendency to spout nonsense – the Ranter’s piece, however, is a great dismissal of Steele’s take on events, and well worth a read for anyone who has been following the Ukrainian situation.

Meanwhile, Foreign Notes has a good piece on Ukraine’s blossoming economy, although how this will be affected by the new natural gas deal with Turkmenistan (necessitated after the Turkmens cut off the vital supply to Ukraine on New Year’s Eve to force a new contract) remains to be seen.

And two of the major outside influences on the election now have to ponder what to learn from the experience, as Russia wonders what went wrong, and some in the US wonder whether America’s alliance with Russia is more important than helping democracy in former soviet states.

The Ukraine crisis will likely have major repercussions – it remains too early to tell what form they may take, but it seems likely that the major changes will be seen not within the country’s borders, but in the attitudes of other states with a stake in the region.

Whether these changes will be for the benefit of the inhabitants or of outside influences I have no idea, but I can’t say I’m too hopeful that the wishes of the Ukrainian people will remain on the minds of observers from further afield for too much longer… I’ll try and keep intermittently on the case, but it seems most people’s interests have shifted elsewhere – natural disasters have a tendency of drawing attention to themselves, after all.

So, Yuschenko and Yanukovych are going to slug it out on TV, are they?

I’m desperately trying to work out the point, as the whole rhetoric of the last few weeks seems to be made up almost exclusively of personal attacks, threats and accusations. Are these two bitterly opposed candidates really going to debate policy issues in the midst of ongoing mass protests, while desperate efforts are still going on to ready the country for the unprecedented re-run elections on Boxing Day?

I can’t see it myself. If they stick to policy it’ll only looked forced – unless the entire debate is about foreign policy, but then each candidate risks looking like a tool of either Moscow or Washington/Brussels. I can’t see any way that Yushchenko’s poisoning or the threats of certain regions in the east to split off from the rest of the country – let alone the on-going protests and the scenes of the tent city – could not be raised in a properly free discussion, so I can’t see that it’s in either candidate’s interest to have a completely free debate. The events and accusations of the last few weeks are bound to dominate, not the things that should truly matter.

Especially at this late stage, what is the point of dialogue? The country is so polarised I really can’t see there being any swing voters left. The thing to do is simply get the elections out the way as quickly and cleanly as possible and then set about rebuilding stability, not start more slanging matches.

A good summary of recent Ukrainian developments is here.

(Note: Blogging on Europhobia may be intermittent over the next couple of weeks – as I imagine is the same with many bloggers, what with this whole Christmas business and all. We’ll try to get something up every day, but it may be tricky…)