Category Archives: New Europe

More Russian energy blackmail

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I told you that Ukraine was just a warning shot… Looks like the Czech Republic’s decision to host that US missile shield has really ticked off the Kremlin. Because now the flow of oil from Russia appears to be slowing down.

This is one to which a great deal of attention should be paid (but which will almost certainly be almost entirely overlooked, just as with the various Russian pipeline machinations in Serbia over the last couple of years have been largely ignored by the mainstream press). With energy prices rocketing and Europe’s own supplies of fossil fuels almost spent, how Russia chooses to use its dominance of the European energy market is cause for grave concern. Sod the Lisbon Treaty – the threat from Russia is by far the biggest problem facing the EU, both in the short and long terms. Loss of sovereignty via transferring power to Brussels? How about loss of sovereignty thanks to Moscow increasingly being able to pull the plug on our national economies on a whim?

Vaclav Havel for EU president?

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In amongst some otherwise predictable poll findings, Cold War hero and former Czech president Vaclav Havel gets a brief mention. It’s the first time I can recall his name cropping up in relation to the job – but God damn, he could be ideal.

Yes, being a 72-year-old two-time cancer sufferer he’s not in the peak of health, but he’s done more to help eastern Europe integrate with the west than pretty much any other post-Cold War European politician – primarily through his efforts to scrap the Warsaw Pact, but also through the continuing power of Charter 77 to inspire drives for positive change.

The symbolic value of having an eastern European (well, central European, but you know what I mean) as the first permanent president of the EU could be ideal as Europe continues to try to get over the divisions of the 20th century – and ending such divides was, the primary motivation for starting the European project in the first place.

Plus, Havel has much experience of battling against a clunky bureaucratic system, a strong track record in bringing about meaningful reform, and the kind of personal understanding of the promise of the EU that many in western Europe seem to be forgetting. With his playwright’s mastery of words and strong international reputation, he could be both the kind of politician non-EU heads of state would be pleased to deal with, and exactly the kind of convincing, passionate spokesman the European Union has desperately needed for so long to keep its people focussed on what the EU is really all about.

Plus, of course, as anyone who has ever seen any of his plays or read any interviews with him can attest, he is also a philosopher of unusual subtlety and humanism – and, most importantly as far as I’m concerned, entered politics only reluctantly. Who better than a philosopher king to lead Europe?

Seriously, have a quick gander at the page devoted to Havel on WikiQuote, and tell me this isn’t the sort of person we should have running things. Even just read this one short extract from his 1 January 1990 address to the nation, and tell me this isn’t what the EU should be:

You may ask what kind of republic I dream of. Let me reply: I dream of a republic independent, free, and democratic, of a republic economically prosperous and yet socially just; in short, of a humane republic that serves the individual and that therefore holds the hope that the individual will serve it in turn

Or this, from a 1994 speech that seems to have more relevance now than ever:

Our civilization has essentially globalized only the surfaces of our lives. But our inner self continues to have a life of its own. And the fewer answers the era of rational knowledge provides to the basic questions of human Being, the more deeply it would seem that people, behind its back as it were, cling to the ancient certainties of their tribe…

It is clearly necessary to invent organizational structures appropriate to the present multicultural age. But such efforts are doomed to failure if they do not grow out of something deeper, out of generally held values.

I am referring to respect for the unique human being and his or her liberties and inalienable rights and to the principle that all power derives from the people.

This is the kind of guy the EU needs.

NATO, Russia and Europe

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Hunting around for a handy overview of just what’s been happening at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, depending on who you read you’ll get some wildly different ideas. I’ve been confused for much of the morning. Here’s a brief indication of why:

Der Spiegel‘s “Germany Puts the Brakes on US Expansion Plans” is countered by the International Herald Tribune‘s “NATO backs U.S. missile defense plan for Europe”

EU Referendum‘s claim that “NATO has thrown Ukraine and Georgia to the bear. President Bush’s attempts to put them on track to future and very distant membership of NATO has failed” is then contradicted by Radio Free Europe‘s report that “pro-NATO forces in Ukraine and Georgia celebrated the announcement, which offered stronger-than-expected support for their entry bids”

Repeat for pretty much every issue under discussion at the summit (for which, see this very handy round-up).

People always like to look for tangible, obvious outcomes from these things. But this is international diplomacy. Worse than that, it’s strategic military international diplomacy where all but one of the permanent members of the UN’s Security Council are involved (and we know how infrequently that lot manage to get along). Making compromises left, right and centre – leading to a stalemate in which, well, the status quo has largely been maintained – was the only sensible course of action. The thing was always going to end up a waste of time and money.

NATO flagBut the real fun is that despite the fact that NATO is now overseeing operations in Afghanistan (that well-known North Atlantic power) and looking to a more global role, this summit has made one thing increasingly apparent: the Cold War may have ended, but NATO’s principal opponent remains Russia.

Pretty much every compromise on the European front, every bit of backing down, appears to have been done to placate the Kremlin – because the principle areas to which NATO is looking to expand its influence (largely under the prompting of the US) lie in former communist countries, be it Ukraine and Georgia or Croatia and Albania.

As you’ve no doubt noticed, there’s been a growing tension between Russia and the West in recent years – from ex-FSB men assassinated in London to the resumption of patrols by Russian nuclear bombers through the vendetta against the British Council in Moscow. Then there’s the war of words with Belarus, Europe’s oft-forgotten fanatically pro-Moscow wildcard (a country that misses the USSR so much its secret police are still called the KGB and there are constant rumours that it is planning to formally merge with Russia), cyber-warfare against Estonia, and the ongoing standoff over Kosovo’s independence. Even the EU’s (and NATO’s) difficult relationship with Turkey is getting caught up with the Russian situation thanks to the Russo-Turkish partnership in the Bluestream and Nabucco pipelines, both of which are helping to make Europe increasingly reliant on Russian energy supplies.

The relationship with Russia, in other words, increasingly seems to dominate all European diplomacy. Where during the Cold War the presence of the USSR may have ensured that western Europe and the EU was operating under the constant fear of nuclear attack, Moscow’s then lack of engagement in western European affairs allowed everyone to get on much as they pleased. Since the end of the Cold War – and especially since Putin came to power – Moscow’s long-sought-after engagement with the West has if anything caused even more problems.

During the Cold War it was America who stood guard and kept watch, now Europe (both the EU and non-EU countries) has to be constantly on the alert for far more subtle Russian encroachments than columns of Red Army troops or falling H-bombs – encroachments largely economic, and mostly achieved through that strange form of diplomacy at which Putin so excels: smiling with fangs.

With such a large, unpredictable neighbour to the east – especially one with the ability to shut down a sizable chunk of the European economy on a whim (as has already happened to Ukraine) – little wonder there seem to have been few major advances at this latest NATO summit. In fact, I can barely see the point of holding these things until Russian attitudes to the West shift further in the direction of friendly cooperation (no signs of that any time soon) – because Russia’s never going to accept public humiliation, which is how the current regime seems to see any kind of outside involvement in what remains of the bear’s sphere of influence.

So the real points of interest after such standoffs between Russia and the West are never going to be the big issues. We’re not suddenly going to have a Kremlin change of heart on any of the major issues any time soon. And if and when such a change of heart comes, it’s certainly not going to come at one of these big public summits – far too humiliating. Where such shifts in Russian attitudes – either pro-engagement or heading towards hostility – are first going to be seen is in the details. The precise wording, the precise terms of any diplomatic agreement between Russia and the EU, US, NATO or individual European countries – the small print that the journalists rarely have time to scan in their rush to hit deadlines and get an angle that gives the subs a good shot at an interesting headline – that’s where we’ll first spot the changes when they come.

These summits are, in other words, little better than MacGuffins. The real diplomacy is going on off the radar, with lots of little standoffs in places like Armenia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

NATO may well be starting to look globally – but Europe needs to do the same to keep tabs on just what its unpredictable neighbour is up to, because Russia has more ability than any other state to screw Europe over. If Russia’s got its fingers in a lot of pies, we need to be keeping an eye on all of them, and not get distracted by the occasional fuss over the more obvious ones like Ukraine and Georgia (both of which have had high-profile popular pro-democracy uprisings in recent years, which are always of appeal to the press). To do so would be to fall for the oldest trick in the book.

On a common EU foreign policy

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“Oh noes!” Say the eurosceptics. “Teh Lisbon tweety dat am weely teh constitootion am gonna make teh EU a state and stuff! Got foreign minister! Oh noes! Dat mean common foreign policy! Our sovereignty gone bye-byes! Waaah!”

I really can’t ever hope to summarise the likelihood of this particular bogeyman coming into being any time soon better than Nanne at DJ Nozem, so instead I’ll just reproduce it in full. :

EU Foreign Ministers fail to agree on the most basic issues about the status of a small breakaway Yugoslav province (population: 2 million est.) that declared its independence over the weekend.

An issue that had been on the horizon for about, oh, nine years.

How’s that common foreign policy coming along?

He he he!

I do like how many intriguing questions the Kosovo situation is helping to raise. And how many answers it’s providing to boot…

And so it begins…

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After the little-reported grenade attack on a UN court on Sunday afternoon, it seems that Kosovo’s Serbs aren’t going to accept independence without a fight.

Reuters: U.N. police pulled out from a Kosovo border post that was destroyed on Tuesday by Serbs who vowed never to submit to the authority of Kosovo’s Albanian government and its Western backers.

It was one of two border posts, between Kosovo and Serbia, attacked and set on fire by Kosovo Serbs earlier in the day in the Serb-dominated northwest corner of Kosovo.

Sofia Echo: Serbs also attacked a check point near Zubin Potok. The police officers hid in a tunnel while about 1000 protesters tried to tear it down…

hundreds of Serbs set fire to the temporary passport control premises in Banja.

Of course, with any luck this is just a small-scale bit of initial frustration from local ethnic Serbs and it won’t escalate any further. Fingers crossed, eh?

But considering UN troops so far don’t seem to have clear instructions about what to do (abandoning the border posts of a territory they’re meant to be protecting? What’s all that about?), how long is it going to be before Serbia – or perhaps Russia? – steps in with its own “peacekeeping” troops to “protect” Kosovo’s Serbian minority from the ethnic Albanian majority?

Five years after the Iraq protests, a question

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Spotted in a decent French article on Kosovo’s independence, a throwaway line that made me ponder:

L’indépendance du Kosovo se fera sous supervision internationale. Malgré ces divisions, l’Union européenne a décidé, sans l’aval de l’ONU, de déployer au Kosovo une mission de quelque 2 000 policiers et juristes pour « accompagner » les débuts de l’indépendance du Kosovo.

Or, in other words:

The independence of Kosovo will be under international supervision. Despite this, the European Union has decided, without UN approval, to deploy in Kosovo, a mission of some 2000 policemen and lawyers to “accompany” the beginnings of the independence of Kosovo. [emphasis mine]

Of course, a significant reason why the anti-war protests back in 2003 felt so justified to so many was the lack of a UN resolution supporting military action against Saddam Hussein in Iraq. There are no such protests about unilateral military action in Kosovo – nor have there really ever been during the last decade of NATO deployments there.

Is this because Kosovo is too low-profile for anyone to really care – or is there a more significant, wider-ranging reason?

Kosovo has declared independence. Many western countries – including the UK and US – are likely to declare their official recognition. Russia has explicitly stated the declaration to be illegal – and China has also made disapproving noises.

With two members of the UN Security Council opposed to Kosovo’s independence, it cannot be recognised by the UN – and so will not legally be a state, despite thinking it is. Likewise, the situation in Darfur is officially not a genocide (despite all the evidence) thanks to the UN having failed to declare it as such – partially thanks to pressure from China, keen to preserve her arms trade.

In situations such as these, is it acceptable to bypass the UN? If so, why here and not five years ago in Iraq? And, if bypassing the UN is sometimes acceptable, what useful purpose does this supposed final arbiter of international law actually serve any more? And does the lack of protests over military action in Kosovo indicate an acknowledgement of this?

Kosovo – some more causes for concern

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As you may have noticed, I’ve been pondering the EU’s proposed mission to Kosovo quite a lot over the last day or two, and getting increasingly concerned that the province’s impending independence hasn’t been quite thought through. Overnight, a rather succinct comment was left that neatly summarises much of what I’ve been coming to think – as well as noting a few things I’d missed (criticising, I’ll add for my ego’s sake, an article I’d linked to, rather than anything I’ve written so far – though it also applies to my stuff to an extent):

No mention is made of the 55% of Kosovo albanians who did not vote in the recent elections, surely a sign of no-confidence in the politicians that claim to present them?

No comment on Kosovo’s economic situation or other critical problems either, nor how long the patience of the average Kosovo albanian will last if things don’t improve fast after ‘independence’

No comment on how much it will cost the EU. The EU itself quotes EUR 250m over approximately 3 years. If tens of billions of IMF dollars spend on the region by Tito hasn’t helped, then what makes the ‘EU’ thinks its paltry sums will succeed? Most of all, what about the cost of this indeterminate subsidy to the EU tax payer?

The EU’s policy can be summed up as ‘Independence and Pray’.

Neither does the ‘analysis’ really address the matter that Serbia’s stability as critical to the EU’s ’stabilization’ of the Balkans. Sure, Serbia under Nikolic may be made a ‘Pariah’ by the EU, but that will also damage neighboring states such as Bulgaria and Romania, much as the economic damage that sanctions caused in the 1990s, something that very few commentators care to address nor comment upon.

More on this, no doubt, over the next couple of weeks. I’m working on a theory about what’s going to happen when the EU gets more closely involved in the Balkans, but it’s going to take a bit more work…

“No alternative to Europe”

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The EU’s lack of action over the Yugoslav Civil War is surely the Union’s biggest embarrassment. “The EU has brought 50 years of peace to the continent”, they claim, always looking a bit shifty lest anyone remind them that they allowed a genocide to kick off on their doorstep, and then had to rely on America to help sort out the ongoing mess. Ever since, the drive for an EU rapid-reaction force has been stepping up. Now, with Kosovo on the brink of declaring independence from Serbia, the EU is on the brink of committing to a common military policy – a significant step, and one that could well have major implications.

Serbia’s recent elections may well have seen the less nutty option chosen, but it’s still not looking too promising. Because those elections were for the president, not the more powerful parliament – and so current Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica remains the real power in Serbia. (If the name sounds familiar, that’s because he’s the guy who succeeded Milosevic as Yugoslav president after 2000′s peaceful revolution.)

Kostunica is sorely opposed to the independence of Kosovo – so much so that last week he blocked a cabinet meeting that was to set Serbia well and truly on the road towards European Union membership, a step Kostunica sees as all but guaranteeing that Kosovo goes its own way. EU aspirations may well exist, but not at the expense of what Kostunica and co see as Serbian territorial integrity. Nationalism trumps internationalism, it would seem.

Kostunica has the support of the ultra-nationalist Radical Party (the one whose leader is currently on trial for crimes against humanity in The Hague) and Milosevic’s old Socialist Party, so doesn’t really need the more moderate Democrats on board, even though he’s still their leader. Yesterday, however, he kissed and made up with his party, before making his intentions over Kosovo crystal clear:

“We have made a decision that the Serbian government will on Thursday, in advance, annul all acts that are against the law which concern a unilateral proclamation of the independence of this fictitious state on Serbian territory…

“We shall not allow such a creation to exist for a minute. It has to be legally annulled the moment it is illegally proclaimed by a leadership of convicted terrorists.”

So, what does this mean for Serbia’s EU hopes, now that every Serbian party is so explicitly opposed?

Well, the general consensus is that in uniting against Kosovo’s independence, Serbia has now decisively chosen to stay out of the EU – Serbia’s territorial integrity trumping its long-term economic development. Hence Monday’s “No alternative to Europe” pro-EU protests in Belgrade, led by precisely the same sort of people who started the anti-Milosevic movement back in the 90s, but – with no Serbian party prepared to accept the loss of Kosovo in exchange for EU integration – with rather less chance of success.

Kosovo’s independence is coming, of that there can be no doubt. But with Serbia refusing to acknowledge such a move and Kosovo itself potentially unable to survive on its own, the Balkans could well turn into another major flashpoint – and another massive challenge for the EU. What to do? Back Kosovo, and risk a return to civil war, or back Serbia, and risk a return to guerilla attacks?

So far, it’s all been Kosovo. Pretty much every EU member state has declared an intention to recognise the wannabe country’s independence when it comes, and has been working towards building up Kosovo’s economy and legal system in preparation. Now, it seems, the EU is even preparing to offer military support.

As well as being a significant symbolic moment for EU integration (an EU army long having been central to political integration among federalists – ever since it was first proposed by Winston Churchill – and a key fear of anti-EU types), this potentially could see another ongoing spat escalate yet further. Because Serbia has the support of Russia, which is on the record promising to block any United Nations recognition of Kosovo’s independence.

With Russia throwing her weight around to get Ukraine to do what she wants, and increasingly setting herself up in opposition to the EU, could the protesting Belgrade students have got it wrong?

For ex-communist countries with struggling economies trying to get over the problems of the Cold War years, Brussels has long seemed the obvious point of aspiration. The carrot of European Union membership has helped many in the drive towards democracy – and continues to help in many states, like Bosnia, Croatia, Moldova and Ukraine. The EU was seen as the best – perhaps only – hope for a speedy route to prosperity.

Now, however, Russia’s control of so much of Europe’s energy supplies, healthy arms industry and willingness to trade with even the dodgiest of dodgy regimes has given an alternative. Europe’s last dictatorship, Belarus, has happily survived for nearly two decades thanks to Russian support. If Belarus can do it, why not Serbia?

It may not seem like much of a choice to sensible Westerners – the EU route seems sure to offer a far better standard of living, as well as all the benefits of human rights and democracy. But Serbia is, lest we forget, a country filled with people who were happily murdering each other in their thousands only a decade ago…

Anything could happen – and whatever does, the EU is going to be right at the heart, trying to mediate and, at the same time, prove that it is truly a world power. Failure is not an option, for that would be the final nail in the coffin of an EU working as one, the final proof – after failure to act in the 90s and failure to agree a common stance on Iraq and Afghanistan – that when action is needed, the EU can only dither.

And you thought Haliburton was bad?

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Rather than wait until after the elections, Serbia’s already signed that gas pipeline deal with Russia, effectively scuppering the EU-backed alternative.

Now we’re going to end up with a president of Russia, Medvedev, who’ll not only be the former head of Gazprom (the company that controls 97% of Russia’s vast gas reserves, and has shown no compunction about using threats of supply cut-offs to gain political advantage – or to act on them) but also have complete dominance of the supply chain through to continental Europe.

Time for Europe to say bye bye to independence.

Serbian elections: why you should care

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Monday sees the first round of the Serbian presidential elections – and they could well prove vital for the future of Europe. If power shifts we could all, to coin a phrase, end up exponentially screwed.

But surely, you might think, pro-Western sitting President Boris Tadić is going to keep his job? After all, since he got the gig in 2004 he’s been working hard to ensure that Serbia acts a little more civilised, helped to oversee Montenegran independence with little apparent ill-humour, hosted the Council of Europe’s meeting of ministers, last summer was awarded the European Prize for Political Culture (sweetly donating the prize money to a hospital in Kosovo), and has repeatedly declared his hope that one day Serbia will be able to join the EU. Yes, he may be against Kosovan independence, which has miffed some international observers, but that’s because he hopes for reconciliation with that much put-upon province, not to finish the job started by Slobodan MiloÅ¡ević. At the same time, Serbia’s economy’s been growing by around 6% a year under his tenure, and its GDP has doubled since 2003 – unemployment may still be high at around 20%, but it’s an improving situation.

Sounds like he’s doing pretty well, right? After seeing his country devastated by nationalist and religious violence, what better route than democratic liberal internationalism, encouraging economic growth, and increasing ties to the country’s biggest trading partner (the EU)? What Serb could possibly contemplate voting for anyone else – especially anyone tainted by association with the violence of the recent past – when that way lies a return to violence, hatred and economic disaster?

But the thing is, the Balkans seem to have a high proportion of idiots.

What else can explain the fact that Tomislav Nikolić – a former Vice President under MiloÅ¡ević, a man who’s only running for President because his party’s proper leader is currently on trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Hague – looks to have a very good chance of winning? (And this isn’t the first time – in the 2004 elections, Nikolić beat Tadić in the first round…)

To add to all that, some suspect Nikolić of being involved in the assassination of pro-Western Serbian Prime Minister Zoran ĐinÄ‘ić (Tadić’s predecessor as leader of the Democratic Party) in March 2003, and there have been several calls for him to be prosecuted for war crimes due to suspected involvement in the massacre of villagers in Antin, Croatia, in August 1991 (a massacre Nikolić himself claims never happened).

Oh, and Nikolić’s preferred option for Serbia’s future? To join with those bastions of human rights Russia and Belarus to form a post-communist superpower. (Not as mad an idea as you might think: over the last decade or so Russia and Belarus – Europe’s last dictatorship, and a country so fond of Soviet times that its secret police are still called the KGB – have held numerous largely unreported discussions about just such a move.)

With the Kosovo situation as uncertain as it’s been since the crisis of 1999 with the victory of former ethnic Albanian guerrilla leader Hashim Thaçi in the elections there two months ago, a tight election result in Serbia on Monday could – if the second round fails to provide a clear winner – very easily spark more of the protests and violence for which the region has become known.

While 2000′s pro-democracy anti-MiloÅ¡ević protests were both non-violent and successful (and in turn inspired similar movements in places like Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus), the popularity of Nikolić amongst Serbia’s fascists could easily lead to serious trouble.

If Nikolić wins, of course, the situation would naturally be infinitely worse. With Thaçi elected in Kosovo and Nikolić in Serbia, we’d have the most obvious indication yet that the Kosovo question is boiling down to a clash between the perpetrators of the late-90s genocide and its victims. (A couple of days ago, Thaçi addressed the UN (despite Serbian protests) declaring Kosovo’s readiness for statehood; the same day, Tadić (desperately trying to prove his nationalist credentials ahead of the elections) warned that Serbia was prepared to “act” to protect Kosovo’s Serbian minority.)

A clash over Kosovan independence would present the EU with one of its toughest challenges yet.

First, there’s the memory of how the EU singularly failed to act to prevent the Yugoslavian civil wars (so much for the EU bringing peace and stability to Europe…) – and then, of course, the even worse crime of dithering during the Kosovo crisis of 1999, leading to a delay in intervention that enabled MiloÅ¡ević and his cohorts to slaughter thousands of ethnic Albanians and Muslims throughout the region.

And then, of course, there’s the real problem – as so often these days – Russia.

Yep, Putin (who has repeatedly expressed his disapproval of Kosovan independence and promised that Russia will block such a move in the UN – probably thanks to the precedent Kosovo’s independence could set) is backing Nikolić – all part of a fresh Balkan power play that, surprise surprise, revolves not just around sticking two fingers up at the US and EU (both of whom support Kosovo’s right to self-determination), but also energy supplies.

On Friday, a new pipeline deal between Russia and Bulgaria was announced – a gas pipeline planned to pass through Serbia on its way to the EU. A pipeline due to be run by Russian energy giant Gazprom. Who’s boss just happens to be, erm… Putin’s designated heir and (almost certainly) Russia’s next President, Dmitry Medvedev. To secure the pipeline deal (potentially worth a lot to Serbia’s energy-poor economy) Russia is insisting that the country sell a 51% stake in its state-owned energy company NIS for a knock-down price – to a Gazprom subsidiary…

This pipeline deal – if a more pro-Russian Serbian President happened to take charge to usher it through – would in turn effectively ruin the chances of the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline ever taking off.

Designed as a way to break Russia’s ever-tightening grip on EU energy supplies, Nabucco is planned to open up access to gas from Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Egypt and Syria – all via a route that avoids Russian territories, and thus the threat of supplies being cut off on a whim, as happened to Ukraine two years ago (and as was threatened again in the run-up to the Ukrainian elections back in October). With the Russian-backed pipeline running on a similar route via Turkey, people who know more about this than I seem to think that, like the Highlander, there can be only one.

So, even ignoring the possible instability and potential renewed violence that a nationalist/Nikolić victory could bring to the Balkans; even ignoring the possible ramifications that could in turn have for the stability of the Caucasus; even ignoring the inevitable clash between the US, EU and Russia over Kosovo in the UN as and when moves towards independence become more concrete… the outcome of these Serbian presidential elections could well decide whether Russia manages to tighten its hold on Europe’s energy supplies, and thus its whole economy. Even, potentially, whether Russia is able to hold the EU to ransom in precisely the way it has Ukraine, using its near-monopoly to affect everything from trade agreements and foreign policy to elections.

And don’t think Britain’s safe from this thanks to North Sea gas. Yields there are not only falling rapidly (by 10% in 2004 and a further 12% in 2005), meaning we are increasingly having to look abroad for supplies (Britain has already become a net importer of oil in the last couple of years), but also Russia and Gazprom – the holders of the world’s largest natural gas reserves – are already targeting the UK market.

This is a situation that, if the Nabucco pipeline is scuppered by a Russo-Serbian deal, can only get worse. As I say, depending on the outcome of the Serbian elections, we could end up exponentially screwed.

Swiss and Polish elections

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Good work, Polish types! The nutty twins have been separated, and a more pro-EU Prime Minister finally in place. About time – as one of the largest of the new EU member states, getting Poland to fully participate in and contribute to EU affairs is essential. For the last two years, however, it’s been far more trouble than it’s worth.

The Beatroot has more – including a live-blog of the results. (And it’s well worth flicking back through the archives for lots of electoral goodness there over the last few weeks.)

Meanwhile, boo Switzerland! We don’t like to see far right parties getting the largest share of the vote, ta very much. Then again, the leftie loons who decided to start fights with the police were hardly much better. I mean, you live in Switzerland, for Christ’s sake… It’s hardly worth getting that het up about things, is it now? (This result does, of course, also mean increased Swiss isolationism, and even less chance of another referendum on EU entry being proposed any time soon. Ho hum…)

Come on, Poland…

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Get rid of at least one of the psycho twins now that you’ve got a general election two years early. Poland should always have been at the forefront of the 2004 EU intake’s push for serious reform – but thanks to the Kaczynski brothers it has instead ended up both isolated and one of the EU’s biggest internal problems.

For more on the run-up to the Polish parliamentary vote that decided on a snap general election, check out always tip-top Poland blog The Beatroot from a few days back (and again), and on the vote to dissolve parliament itself.

More from the Financial Times, Washington Post and International Herald Tribune.