From five years ago (originally published 4th February 2005) – a repost seemed appropriate as someone asked about my views on European Identity just the other day, soon after a user purporting to be Jurgen Habermas cropped up on Twitter. Despite being five years old, much still stands (update: except the links, which have now been updated where appropriate). Depressingly, the debate has barely shifted:

An interesting short article on the lack of any real sense of European identity gives a nice overview of some of the problems facing the EU, and of the possible outcomes of the proposed constitution, and follows on nicely from some of my recent musings:

In Spain, there is much controversy over whether the Basque people should remain Spanish citizens or whether they should have their own state. In the UK a recent survey of teenagers found that many saw themselves as English, Scottish or Welsh rather than British. An Italian from Milan might find more in common with a Parisian than with a Sicilian compatriot. Yet despite this, a core set of European cultural, political and social values can be divined.

The article also points to another which highlights the take of Jurgen Habermas (he of “public sphere” fame) on the European project – a take which can easily provoke both sides of the argument:

Germany’s thinker de rigueur wrote that Europe’s core states could put an end to Europe’s stagnancy, sooner or later drawing in the remaining states which would be unable to resist. Separatism, however, had to be avoided. The avant-garde core Europe cannot consolidate into a miniature Europe but, as so often, must be the locomotive.

This reminded me of an article Habermas wrote a few years back on why Europe needs a constitution, which is well nigh essential reading for anyone interested in current debates about what the EU is, was, and should be in the future. I may return to some of the points it raises again, as even though lots has changed since it first appeared (it was written just pre-September 11th 2001), it still raises many valuable points. From the introduction:

There is a remarkable contrast between the expectations and demands of those who pushed for European unification immediately after World War II, and those who contemplate the continuation of this project today – at the very least, a striking difference in rhetoric and ostensible aim.

While the first-generation advocates of European integration did not hesitate to speak of the project they had in mind as a “United States of Europe”, evoking the example of the USA, current discussion has moved away from the model of a federal state, avoiding even the term “federation”.

Larry Siedentop’s recent book Democracy in Europe expresses a more cautious mood: as he puts it, “a great constitutional debate need not involve a prior commitment to federalism as the most desirable outcome in Europe. It may reveal that Europe is in the process of inventing a new political form, something more than a confederation but less than a federation” an association of sovereign states which pool their sovereignty only in very restricted areas to varying degrees, an association which does not seek to have the coercive power to act directly on individuals in the fashion of nation states.

Does this shift in climate reflect a sound realism, born of a learning-process of over four decades, or is it rather the sign of a mood of hesitancy, if not outright defeatism?

The contemporary substantification of law means that constitutional debates over the future of Europe are now increasingly the province of highly specialized discourses among economists, sociologists and political scientists, rather than the domain of constitutional lawyers and political philosophers. On the other hand, we should not underestimate the symbolic weight of the sheer fact that a constitutional debate is now publicly under way.

As a political collectivity, Europe cannot take hold in the consciousness of its citizens simply in the shape of a common currency. The intergovernmental arrangement at Maastricht lacks that power of symbolic crystallization which only a political act of foundation can give.

In last year’s Irish Lisbon Treaty referendum, turnout was 53.1%, with 53.4% voting No and 46.6% voting yes.

That’s 862,415 No voters – 28.3% of the Irish electorate, and just 0.17% of the EU’s population – holding up the ratification of a complex document that was the result of the best part of seven years’ worth of detailed negotiations between the governments of 27 states.

And yet, the opponents of the re-run referendum have been telling us for much of the last year, to ask the people of Ireland to vote again would be undemocratic.

Because, of course, allowing people *more* chances to express their views through the ballot box is precisely the opposite of democracy, right? And that’s before we even note that many of the people *opposing* a second referendum in Ireland have long been arguing that the UK’s 1975 referendum on EEC membership should have been re-run…

In other words, democracy is only democracy when you get the result you want. (The advocates of a No vote, on this point at least, are of entirely the same opinion as the pro-Lisbon EU elites who pushed the Irish government into asking its people to vote again.)

Although there are some good arguments to be made for voting No to Lisbon (it is, after all, a fairly shoddy compromise that no one’s really happy with), the debates in the run-up to last year’s referendum were characterised by seemingly deliberate propagation of lies and distortions by many on the No side.

Lisbon is easily the most confusing and impenetrable EU treaty ever tabled (and that’s saying something) – and the No campaigns understandably took full advantage of this fact. If you have any sense, you wouldn’t sign a legal document without having read and understood the small print – and yet that’s effectively what the Irish people were being asked to do (which is a large part of the reason why I still reckon that referenda on such complicated international treaties are a very silly idea).

But not satisfied with making just this sensible point, the No campaigns went a bit mental, pulling out a disparate series of outlandish claims – Lisbon will force strongly Catholic Ireland to introduce abortion clinics, to abandon its neutrality, to drop its minimum wage to just a euro eight-four an hour, etc. etc. etc.

Pretty much all of these claims were unfounded, stemming mostly from the vague nature of the treaty itself – it’s so very vague that in places it *could* be interpreted to be saying just about anything. Compromises – especially ones of international diplomacy – tend to be made in as vague language as possible to keep all parties happy, and to allow maximum leeway to those parties who are slightly less happy with the end result than others. Lisbon being in addition a legal compromise, the intention has always been that the details will be interpreted by the governments of the member states (and at last resort the judges) as and when disputes of interpretation crop up – just the same as pretty much any new law.

All of these unfounded No-camp claims also clouded the real issues at the heart of the treaty – important, significant issues that really did deserve to be looked at in detail by the Irish people before they cast their votes.

This time around, the No camp distortions having mostly been shown to be just that, debates have been rather more rational – instead of focussing on invented bogeymen (although some attempt has been made to resuscitate the same discredited claims as last time), much more discussion has centred around the key issue: is Lisbon good for Ireland; and would *not* ratifying the treaty have negative effects?

A far more sensible situation all round – even if the key issue of Lisbon’s impenetrability hasn’t been solved, and so most Irish voters were still little the wiser about what precisely it is they were voting for or against yesterday, at least the arguments have mostly been over things it *actually* contains rather than things that its opponents *claim* it contains.

Though results are as yet to be finalised – it looks as if turnout is down only a little, to around 50%.

And yet the extra year that the Irish people have been given to think about the implications of Lisbon – and to see that many of the claims of the No camp were unjustified – has seen a significant change in the Yes vote, with early indications suggesting c.60% voting in favour this time (according to the BBC).

Last time, based upon mostly false claims, the No camp managed to convince 862,000 Irish voters to back them.

This time – based on those vague initial results above – the Yes camp appears to have convinced around 915,000 to approve the treaty.

Democracy works based upon debate, discussion and deliberation of the issues, with the option with majority support after this process carrying the day. Democracy works by returning periodically to the people to allow them to re-think and to change their minds. For a healthy democracy, the more debate, discussion and deliberation the better – and the more chances for the people to change their minds, the better.

Last year, the genuine issues surrounding Lisbon were not really discussed in Ireland in the run-up to the referendum – only the distortions. The result was a No. This year, the debate has been based more in reality. The result is a Yes – and not only a yes, but a rather more convincing Yes than last year’s No.

So what now for the No-supporters’ claims that this whole process has been undemocratic? Are the people of Ireland wrong now, after being right last time? Were the No voters that secured the Treaty’s defeat last year – after a far shorter period to make up their minds – better-informed than the larger number of Yes voters this time, who had been given far more time to weigh up the pros and cons?

The people have spoken. Again. And they will speak again in the future, quite possibly changing their minds again and again and again and again. That’s how democracy works. You’re not happy with the result of a vote? Fine – make sure that next time your campaign is more convincing.

Short version? In any democratic society, politics is not a battle, it’s a war. Win some, lose some, but the fight always goes on.

(Of course, the Yes voters are still only 30% of the Irish electorate, and still only 0.18% of the EU’s population. They are still not a majority by any means. But they are, at least, a larger proportion than the No voters – in both referenda. That’s how democracy works. The majority? Well, it would seem that the majority of Irish voters simply don’t care one way or the other.)

8pm update: I was being too cautious. Final tally? 67% Yes on a turnout of 58% – turnout up, Yes vote more than two-thirds. Approximate calculations put that as about 1,180,000 Yes voters to just 584,000 Nos – last time it was 752,000 Yes, 862,000 No. That’s a pretty insane swing.

A comment I left over at The Devil’s Kitchen a couple of months back that I recently stumbled upon bears resuscitating as a quick post in its own right, as debates about the EU resurface ahead of the re-run Irish Lisbon Treaty referendum:

It’s impossible to do a cost/benefit analysis of *all* EU laws – that doesn’t mean you can’t do a cost/benefit analysis of individual new laws before passing them.

You can, after all, work out the likely impact of a law liberalising the market for product category x on related industries a, b, c, (etc.) and even make an educated guess about the overall impact that this law may have on the economy as a whole.

But when it comes to the economy you can never understand everything – if we’ve learned nothing else in the last 12 months, we’ve learned that. Hell, with something as complex as a continent-wide economic system, there are so many other factors at play, though it may be possible to make an educated guess about the impact of a piece of legislation (enough to judge if it’s going to be beneficial, at any rate), you’ll never be able to track *all* of its effects – countless other things will be affecting individual parts of the economy in countless different ways, from other bits of EU and national legislation (which still often overlap) through local levels of trades unionism, consumer spending patterns, passing fashions, local infrastructure, and so on and so on.

In other words, to be able to put an actual monetary figure on the costs/benefits of EU legislation *as a whole*, you’d first need to work out a system for tracking all the workings of the entire European economy (or, at the very least, the entire economy of the individual member state you want to study). Because without complete understanding how an economy works both at macro- and micro- levels, it is impossible to judge how introducing variable x might affect it – because who’s to say it’s not actually variable b, h or z instead if you haven’t also studied their influence?.

So *any* claims about the costs OR benefits of the EU must be nonsense. Because the only way we could actually tell is if a) we understood the economy of Europe inside-out (which we don’t), and b) we had a control sample of a Europe in which the EU never came into being to which we could compare our findings.

So although I feel that the EU has done more good than harm to both the British economy and the economy of Europe as a whole, there is no way that I can prove that. There’s also no way that anyone of a more eurosceptic bent can prove that the opposite is true. I could point to individual benefits, they could point to individual costs – we could add up more and more of each until we have a wealth of evidence and can start chucking around figures like 200 or 600 billion. But we’d still have only scratched the surface.

This is not a flaw in the way the EU works, it is just a consequence of the EU’s continent-spanning economy (which exists in a world that has become increasingly globalised, and so increasingly economically complex and volatile over the last fifty years) being an incredibly, vastly, inconceivably complicated system that no one can ever fully understand.

The Lisbon Treaty, of course, is not one single new bit of legislation (unlike its predecessor, the Constitution a sprawling mess of a document, but at least a relatively coherent one) – it is instead a vast number of often tiny, minor amendments to a whole array of earlier treaties and bits of legislation, affecting almost all areas in which the EU currently functions.

This makes doing a cost-benefit analysis of the Lisbon Treaty (both economic and social costs/benefits) just about as impossible as it is to do one of the EU as a whole. And as so much of what Lisbon does is kept in deliberately vague terms (it is a compromise document drawn up by 27 governments, after all), and as parts of it are arguably self-contradictory, the task is made even harder.

In other words, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Lisbon’s effect on the EU and on individual EU member states will be determined by how it is interpreted by the Commission, Council, Parliament and member states after it comes into force far more than it will be by what it actually says. Unlike the Constitution, which attempted to lay down hard and fast rules, the Lisbon Treaty (foolishly, in my books) pretends to be laying down rules, but is actually more like a series of guidelines, to be solidified or modified over the coming years.

However, one major shift is the greater emphasis on the power of the European Parliament and of the parliaments of the member states to have a say in future EU legislation. Pass the Lisbon Treaty, and this ongoing process of interpretation and modification will have far more input from elected representatives than the alternative – which is not to make do and carry on, as some have suggested, but yet *another* round of negotiations for new EU frameworks. Another round of negotiations that will, once again, be dominated by input from the unelected bureaucrats, government officials and pressure-groups that have so dominated all previous such processes.

Is it undemocratic to force Ireland to vote again on a Treaty that they’ve already rejected? Well, yes. But through this bit of undemocratic second-chancing, the people of Europe as a whole may end up with far more ability to have a say in the inevitable future rounds of EU reform and, just perhaps, begin to shift the thing closer towards what they actually want.

So, is the Lisbon Treaty a bit rubbish? Yes. But it’s better than what we’ve got, and better than the likely alternative. Hard to be enthusiastic about, hard to actively support – but necessary if you want an EU that more closely matches the wishes of the people, even if it might come into force by forcing the people of Ireland to think again.

Another small hurdle for the much-beleaguered treaty to overcome:

the Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in European Union Matters (Gesetz über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union) infringes Article 38.1 in conjunction with Article 23.1 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG) insofar as the Bundestag and the Bundesrat have not been accorded sufficient rights of participation in European lawmaking procedures and treaty amendment procedures. The Federal Republic of Germany’s instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon may not be deposited as long as the constitutionally required legal elaboration of the parliamentary rights of participation has not entered into force.

And so the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is to be yet further delayed while Germany rejigs a few bits and pieces of its own constitution to accommodate it. Which, depending on how long Germany takes to sort this out, could mean that the treaty is delayed long enough for there to be a Conservative government in the UK before Lisbon has been fully ratified, which would mean a UK referendum, which would mean Lisbon’s rejection by Britain and yet another crisis for the EU. Fun fun fun.

There’s lots more in this genuinely fascinating ruling that is pretty much guaranteed to be seized upon by those of an anti-EU persuasion – even though the real issue here is as much Germany’s strict constitution as any problems with the expansion of EU powers. The ruling also helps clarify a number of issues, as well as point to more issues of the EU’s structure and identity that really need to be clarified by the EU itself.

First up, the EU’s crisis of identity and purpose – as I’ve noted many times, the EU itself doesn’t know what it is for, so little wonder it’s got a rather confused structure:

The structural problem of the European Union is at the centre of the review of constitutionality. The extent of the Union’s freedom of action has steadily and considerably increased, not least by the Treaty of Lisbon, so that meanwhile in some fields of policy, the European Union has a shape that corresponds to that of a federal state, i.e. is analogous to that of a state. In contrast, the internal decision-making and appointment procedures remain predominantly committed to the pattern of an international organisation, i.e. are analogous to international law; as before, the structure of the European Union essentially follows the principle of the equality of states.

Note, dear eurosceptic friends, that “analogous to a state” does not mean “is a state” – and note also that “a shape that corresponds to that of a federal state” does also not mean “is a state” (and also that federal states can take many forms – their defining characteristic being the importance placed on devolved, state/regional levels of governance over that of a central authority).

Indeed, this ruling seems to utterly preclude the creation of a European superstate – at least, not without a fundamental change to the German constitution, ratified by referendum (that’s how I read this, anyway):

As long as, consequently, no uniform European people, as the subject of legitimisation, can express its majority will in a politically effective manner that takes due account of equality in the context of the foundation of a European federal state, the peoples of the European Union, which are constituted in their Member States, remain the decisive holders of public authority, including Union authority. In Germany, accession to a European federal state would require the creation of a new constitution, which would go along with the declared waiver of the sovereign statehood safeguarded by the Basic Law.

…The peoples of the Member States are the holders of the constituent power. The Basic Law does not permit the special bodies of the legislative, executive and judicial power to dispose of the essential elements of the constitution.

…The authorisation to transfer sovereign powers to the European Union pursuant to Article 23.1 GG is, however, granted under the condition that the sovereign statehood of a constitutional state is maintained on the basis of a responsible integration programme according to the principle of conferral and respecting the Member States’ constitutional identity, and that at the same time the Federal Republic of Germany does not lose its ability to politically and socially shape the living conditions on its own responsibility.

That, to me, pretty much categorically rules out any EU superstate – while allowing for further integration, up to an indeterminate level (yet to be defined, but before the stage at which Germany’s ability to “politically and socially shape the living conditions” of its people is lost) at which a popular vote and alteration of the German Constitution would become necessary. Later, the EU’s current nature is more clearly defined:

With the present status of integration, the European Union does, even upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, not yet attain a shape that corresponds to the level of legitimisation of a democracy constituted as a state. It is not a federal state but remains an association of sovereign states to which the principle of conferral applies…

With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Federal Republic of Germany will remain a sovereign state. In particular, the substance of German state authority is protected.

There we have it – fairly categorical, that. And if anti-EU types are happy to use German politicians to claim that 84% of laws stem from the EU, I think it’s only fair for those of us of a less vehemently anti-EU persuasion be allowed to quote these German judges repeatedly when countering claims that the EU is becoming a superstate.

Moving on, the European Parliament also comes in for some stick, largely for still being ineffective, under-developed, and uninfluential – though this is seen as a good thing, as too powerful a European Parliament, runs the logic, could claim greater democratic legitimacy within the EU decision-making process than the governments of the member states working together behind the scenes via the Council and Commission, and thus reduce their freedom of action (the EU’s “democratic deficit”, in other words, is actually preserving the sovereignty of the member states…):

Neither as regards its composition nor its position in the European competence structure is the European Parliament sufficiently prepared to take representative and assignable majority decisions as uniform decisions on political direction. Measured against requirements placed on democracy in states, its election does not take due account of equality, and it is not competent to take authoritative decisions on political direction in the context of the supranational balancing of interest between the states. It therefore cannot support a parliamentary government and organise itself with regard to party politics in the system of government and opposition in such a way that a decision on political direction taken by the European electorate could have a politically decisive effect. Due to this structural democratic deficit, which cannot be resolved in a Staatenverbund, further steps of integration that go beyond the status quo may undermine neither the States’ political power of action nor the principle of conferral.

And, just to underline yet further how an EU superstate is not on the cards:

The European Union must comply with democratic principles as regards its nature and extent and also as regards its own organisational and procedural elaboration (Article 23.1, Article 20.1 and 20.2 in conjunction with Article 79.3 of the Basic Law). This means firstly that European integration may not result in the system of democratic rule in Germany being undermined. This does not mean that a number of sovereign powers which can be determined from the outset or specific types of sovereign powers must remain in the hands of the state. European unification on the basis of a union of sovereign states under the Treaties may, however, not be realised in such a way that the Member States do not retain sufficient room for the political formation of the economic, cultural and social circumstances of life. This applies in particular to areas which shape the citizens’ circumstances of life, in particular the private space of their own responsibility and of political and social security, which is protected by the fundamental rights, and to political decisions that particularly depend on previous understanding as regards culture, history and language and which unfold in discourses in the space of a political public that is organised by party politics and Parliament. To the extent
that in these areas, which are of particular importance for democracy, a transfer of sovereign powers is permitted at all, a narrow interpretation is required. This concerns in particular the administration of criminal law, the civil and the military monopoly on the use of force, fundamental fiscal decisions on revenue and expenditure, the shaping of the circumstances of life by social policy and important decisions on cultural issues such as the school and education system, the provisions governing the media, and dealing with religious communities.

Oh, and we’ve also got a categorical rejection of that myth that the Lisbon Treaty has the potential to become a self-amending enabling act – for this would be against German constitutional law:

The Basic Law does not grant the German state bodies powers to transfer sovereign powers in such a way that their exercise can independently establish other competences for the European Union. It prohibits the transfer of competence to decide on its own competence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz). The act approving a treaty amending a European Treaty and the national accompanying laws must therefore be such that European integration continues to take place according to the principle of conferral without the possibility for the European Union of taking possession of Kompetenz-Kompetenz or to violate the Member States’ constitutional identity.

There’s lots more of interest there – though precise interpretations of the significance of many of the details are a tad tricky for me to provide with my, *ahem*, less than perfect knowledge of German constitutional law. Nonetheless, it’s a bit of EU geek heaven – and, I’m sure you’ll agree, a lot of those definitions of what the EU’s competences are and should be (as well as the implicit restrictions made on certain aspects of future European integration) are likely to prove invaluable in the years to come as the EU continues to try and work out its purpose and direction.

Because, lest we forget, Lisbon actually is really little more than the tidying-up exercise that it has been claimed as. Yes, it introduces a few new aspects that some may see as worrying – but it still hasn’t solved the fundamental problems of EU governance and the relationships between the member states that have arisen since the expansion to 25 (now 27 – and soon likely to be 29). Almost as soon as Lisbon is ratified, work will have to begin on its successor – and these rulings by the German Constituional Court will, with any luck, provide useful guidelines for the next batch of EU reformers.

The European Union emerged, as we all know, as a response to the Second World War. One of the earliest aims of the founding fathers was to prevent France and Germany from ever going to war again by integrating their economies so closely that to do so would become impossible.

As a result – as well as, arguably, thanks to prolonged feelings of guilt about what the country got up to during the 30s and 40s – Germany has long been at the forefront of European integration. Germany remains one of the most enthusiastic EU member states – despite also having the strongest economy in the EU, formerly having one of the strongest currencies, paying the most into the EU budget, getting the least back, and being by far the most under-represented (by population) in the European Parliament.

It’s long been the case – albeit usually unacknowledged – that if Germany got fed up with the EU the entire project would be in danger of tumbling down. The EU could survive largely unchanged if almost any other member state decided that enough was enough (hell, if France pulled out it would arguably be improved, as the vast chunk of Common Agricultural Policy money that gets syphoned off by Paris could be redirected to more needy countries – and many more enthusiastic europhiles argue that if Britain jumped ship then the brakes the UK keeps putting on closer integration would finally be lifted, and the EU could reach new heights). If Germany gives up on the EU, all kinds of problems would kick off – not least because the European Central Bank runs out of Frankfurt.

Well, Germany hasn’t yet got the hump, and doesn’t show any signs of doing so just yet – but it could still throw a spanner in the works. Because oddly for a country in which nationalism and national self-interest have been so deliberately, systematically repressed (unsurprisingly, considering…), its constitutional court could yet rule that the Lisbon Treaty – and, by extension, many of the principles of the way the EU currently works – is illegal for providing ways for the German national parliament to be overruled.

And so it is one of the few remaining areas of German law that looks to the German national interest could end up being the brake on the current mode of EU integration, which itself originally started to prevent Germans looking too much to their own national interest.* Whoops!

As much as the anti-Lisbon Treaty crowd have got a bad reputation in certain quarters of the Brussels beltway – not helped by the lunatic fringes to right and left (as so often) being the ones who have shouted the loudest, and the recent announcement of anti-Lisbon party Libertas’ proposed candidates for the EU elections (mostly hard-right and nationalists, making a mockery of the “broad coalition for democratic reform” claims) – the German politicians who have brought this case before the constitutional court do have a point.

After all, if a national parliament (especially one from a country with a population the size of Germany’s) – elected by the people based on long-standing principles of representative democracy – can be overruled by the EU, an organisation whose democratic legitimacy is disputed to say the least, then what place for democracy in Europe?

And so, where the last time German nationalism reared its head to threaten the peace of mind of European states it was in the form of fascist dictatorship, this time German nationalism could well be rising up in the name of democracy. Democracy based around the principle of the nation state (something I can’t profess to be overly happy with), but democracy nonetheless.

The very fact that such a case merits the constitutional court’s attention shows that the legitimacy of EU decisions and powers has not yet been universally – or even legally – acknowledged. The argument that the EU is a method of overruling democracy, meanwhile, will continue to be made as long as the European Parliament remains the weakest of the EU’s principle institutions. (Will the upcoming EU elections reverse the trend for successively declining turnouts and so strengthen the case for the EP to be given more powers? I very much doubt it. It’s a catch-22 – the EP is perceived as being weak, so people don’t bother voting, so its claims to be the people’s voice diminishes along with its ability to assert influence. Such is the joy of EU democracy.)

So I ask yet again – when is the EU going to go for the kind of radical, democratic reform that is so vital for it to maintain support, and stop tinkering about with unsatisfactory compromises like Lisbon and Nice? Without the people behind it, the EU is doomed to fail. If the people were behind it – and had a sufficiently large voice in its decisions – then cases like this German one could never be brought, and complaints about the EU’s democratic deficit would become the preserve of nutters alone.

I don’t even have to check the usual eurosceptic sources to know how the Irish government’s research into the reasons for the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty is likely to be interpreted. Because, you see, they’ve found that the reason for the No vote was that the Irish people didn’t know enough about the treaty.

Cue screams of outrage from the eurosceptic hoardes: “You see! They’re going to tell us we don’t know what’s good for us! The people are stupid! They’ll press ahead with it anyway because they can use this to show we can’t be trusted! The elitist bastards!”

Well, perhaps. There are, after all, already rumours circulating of a second referendum being planned for next year – though it’s unlikely to be before the European Parliament elections or the arrival of the new Commission. But despite the torrent of frustrated voices from across the Channel calling for a fresh vote, read between the lines and it’s quite clear that the Irish government itself has made no such plans. Yet. Hell, even the latest suggestions of a fresh vote stem merely from a briefing paper prepared for the French EU presidency – and we all know that Sarkozy’s in favour of forcing the thing through (why else would he deny the people of France a vote on a treaty so heavily based on the constitution. Briefing papers – despite the spin – are not official EU policy.

But the thing is, this new research tells us nothing new. We knew ages ago from exit polls and countless surveys before the vote that one of the major reasons for the Irish No was that the treaty (and the constitution before that) was simply too complex, vague and self-contradictory for its own good. In trying to be everything to all people during the tortuous negotiations between the various EU member states, it ended up having all the usual characteristics of a bad compromise worked out in umpteen languages – wording that could be interpreted pretty much any way you like. Not much good for a legal document – and a disaster for its advocates, as every pressure group with a grudge was able to find something to worry about.

In other words, the reason that the Irish people didn’t understand the Lisbon Treaty is because it was rubbish.

Does this mean it shouldn’t be ratified anyway? Well, that’s up to the Irish government. The EU certainly shouldn’t (and under the present rules can’t) progress without unanimity on the treaty. And if one thing is certain to bolster the anti-treaty vote, it’s a bunch of Johnny Foreigners telling the Irish that they’re stupid. Ireland’s had enough of a bunch of foreigners painting them as idiots and telling them what to do – and look how well that turned out for the foreigners in question…

This started off as a reply to comments on this post, but got a bit lengthy…

The Convention on the Future of Europe (which drew up the failed EU Constitution) was, in its early stages, a step in the right direction. But – vitally – the public were never fully brought on board despite this being one of the key aims mentioned in the inaugural meeting (and despite the website being quite good, I don’t recall much press coverage or wider debate at the time, nor much effort being made to canvas the views of the peoples of Europe). It ended up being a grand talking-shop for a bunch of lobbyists and politicians (if a slightly wider group of politicians than usual in EU treaty-writing), and coming up with something so vast and complex that it could never be understood by the people it was supposed to sell itself to (though at least it was better on this front than the Lisbon Treaty, I suppose).

It also, as far as I can tell, went far beyond its initial remit – to simplify and clarify the meaning of previous treaties, define the limits of the EU’s power in line with the subsidiarity concept, and push for greater democracy, efficiency and transparency – while not going far enough on any of those main points. It certainly failed dismally in clarifying what the old treaties meant, at any rate – and hell, even the Charter of Fundamental Rights ended up being something countries – i.e. the UK – could opt out of, despite that being another key issue highlighted in the wake of Nice… (Here’s probably not the place to have a moan about what that document includes as fundamental rights, many of which are not so much “rights” as “privileges”…)

What I’d like to see happen (though I have no illusions that it will) now that the Lisbon Treaty also seems to be dying is the birth of a genuine, Europe-wide discussion of the kind Peter mentioned in his first comment – hell, even debates conducted within each state (like that in France in the run-up to their 2005 referendum) would be a start. The Commission’s been making some decent efforts over the last few years, and Margot Wallstrom‘s convinced me that she truly would like a genuine debate while making some good first steps in the right direction – but so far none of these have really taken off, or gone anywhere near far enough.

But this is vital – fundamental. Get the people thinking about the EU, rather than just ignoring it. Get them talking about it. Get them to say what they think it is and what it should be for. Because I’m pretty certain that currently no one knows – and if our representatives at these meetings are starting from a position of ignorance about what the people they are representing actually want, little wonder that they end up with something that the people then reject.

Bruno‘s definitely right about the split between the political establishment and the people. Only the real problem, I’d say, is not at EU level – I’d again agree with Peter (in his second comment), and say it’s the national politicians who are the problem. They don’t know what their people want from the EU, because the people themselves don’t know. But rather than try to get their people thinking and talking about it so they can then, y’know, represent their people, they take the “father knows best” line and forge ahead regardless – in the process constructing an EU without any real guiding principles or final goals, and that the people who have to live with it have had no say in creating.

You wouldn’t start constructing a building with no plans, no idea of the number of floors, rooms, windows and doors, and no idea what the people who are going to be using it are going to be using it for. Yet that’s precisely what’s been happening with the EU for decades. It’s no longer (if it ever was) just a trading block. It’s no longer (if it ever was) heading towards a federal superstate. It’s something altogether new and altogether misunderstood – because the EU itself doesn’t know what it is or what it’s for.

Until the EU works out what it’s for – a purpose that really must be set by the peoples of Europe if it’s going to have any chance at long-term survival – the same unproductive nonsense is going to continue ad infinitum.

(For more along these lines, check out What is the EU for? (Part 1) and the dLiberation blog I did for openDemocracy last year, focussing pretty much exclusively on the problems of getting the people to participate meaningfully in EU reform…)

But considering it was largely the unconvincing zombie resurrection of the old Constitution anyway, it probably won’t be fully dead until someone’s cut its head off, put a stake through its heart, shot it repeatedly with silver bullets, smothered it in garlic-infused holy water, and tricked it into saying its name backwards three times.

Note to the EU: for Christ’s sake, can we please actually THINK about the next step this time? In detail? Preferably without the assumption that the people are too stupid to notice what you’re trying to pull on them (thus alienating them yet further from a project which seems increasingly separated from the needs of the European people) – and ideally with the people in full, genuine consultation at every stage.

The continent of Europe is far, far too diverse for such idealistic “one size fits all” projects to have any place in future EU planning – unless it’s the most basic statement of shared ideals and principles, along the lines of the American declaration of independence or the US constitution. Surely that much is obvious? Just like the American colonies – only far, far more so – Europe is not made up of one united people; we are many peoples with much shared history and culture, but with plenty that also divides us in terms of hopes, dreams and aspirations. The old Constitution, the Lisbon Treaty – hell, pretty much every EU and EEC treaty ever ratified – failed sufficiently to acknowledge this, and so failed to allay concerns. The longer this went on – especially as the EU’s power and presence seemed to continue to grow without so much as a by your leave from a democratic vote – the more annoyed, the more distrustful the people of Europe were bound to become.

The European project was started by political elites as a trade association with delusions of grandeur. It is now much, much more than that, with competence creep after competence creep. It is too unwieldy and unaccountable for the people of a continent with more than its fair experience of despotism and dictatorship not to start taking offence if it continues down the route of “what we say goes, and there’s not much you can do about it”.

I believe in the principles behind the European Union. I believe that the European Union has done far, far more good than harm both in Europe itself and worldwide. I believe that the European Union should continue. But not in the direction it is currently heading. Not with the attitude it has currently got.

The Lisbon Treaty is dead – don’t make the same mistake as last time of trying to dress up the corpse to make it look a bit different. Accept the fundamental failure of the treaty (and constitution), and accept that a far more radical solution is vital. A complete rethink. A deep, serious analysis of what the EU is and what it is for – and, most importantly, what the European people think it is for. This is something that hasn’t happened in decades, but that is absolutely essential if the EU is to avoid the further alienation of its citzens – citizens who, it should be noted, have not all been asked if they want such citizenship in the first place.

The EU has evolved gradually over the years based on vague dreams. It’s time for a reality check.

(BBC story on initial reports of the lost Irish referendum here)

Update: As the count’s not final yet (this post was written at around 15:30 UK time), keep an eye on the Irish Times’ Lisbon Treaty site, with real-time updates. The current tally is 46.3% yes, 53.7% no. Elsewhere I’ve seen turnouts estimated at 40-45% – not huge, but not bad for EU-related elections, and more than the last Irish rejection of a European treaty back in 2001, even if the margin of rejection seems to be smaller this time…

Is the Lisbon Treaty finished? Well, if you have a gander at the latest poll of voting intentions in the Irish referendum on the thing, then yes. Because it can’t be passed without unanimous support from all 27 member states, and if the Irish people vote no, it has to be rethought and redrawn. Again.

Only 30% for the yes camp, with 35% in the no – and rapidly rising. Doesn’t look good for the pro-treaty brigade, does it? And all this from the Celtic tiger – one of the poorest European countries before joining what is now the EU, now one of the wealthiest. There’s gratitude for you!*

But the real revelation of this poll? It confirms something I’ve always maintained about a referendum for such a complex international treaty:

The reason most often cited by No voters is that they don’t know what they are voting for or they don’t understand the treaty – with 30 per cent of No voters listing this as the main reason for their decision

If you don’t understand something, don’t vote for it strikes me as an eminently sensible policy.

And herein lies the EU’s biggest flaw – as I’ve repeatedly stated here and elsewhere for years, the EU is far too complex to understand. Simplification is the key – and a constitution of sorts was the perfect opportunity to simplify. A few basic principles – nothing horrific. And what did they do? Churn out an incomprehensibly thick document full of meaningless subclauses and vague platitudes in an attempt to minimise dissent, ensuring that no one – not even those involved in drafting the thing – could agree on what it was actually setting out to do.

But even drawing up a simple, US-style constitution of a minimal number of first principles isn’t as simple as it sounds. An EU promoting free trade? You’ll be opposed by those wanting a “Social Europe”. Human rights sound like a nice thing to get behind, right? Well, it depends whose human rights – and whether you can agree to lump the basics of “don’t torture people” in with the more contentious “right” to taxpayer-funded benefits.

The Irish people don’t know what the Lisbon Treaty is all about? Little wonder when even the member states can’t agree what the EU itself is about.

This is the central problem with which the EU has been trying to come to terms since the end of the Cold War. It is the problem the Treaty of Nice was supposed to address, then the Constitution, and now Lisbon. And they still haven’t got an answer to the fundamental questions: what is the EU for?

* Note: Yes, I am fully aware that the Irish economic miracle cannot be put solely down to its membership of the EEC/EU – but you’d surely have to be somewhat ideologically blinkered to deny that membership had any part to play in Ireland’s success.

First up, a lovely interview with me and openDemocracy‘s Editor-in-Chief Tony Curzon Price, explaining what we’re trying to do, is up now at the Tomorrow’s Europe site.

And now, a handy round-up of dLiberation posts over the last few days:

How to reform Europe without asking the French – an intriguing proposal from reader Alex Burr, and not one that I’d heard before. Well worth a look.

Turkey and democratic majorities – a quick look at the perennial problem of democracy: to what extent should the majority view be followed?

The EU’s democracy problem – an interesting take on voter apathy and disillusionment in the EU, from reader “mcconeb”

The democratic risk – pondering why, despite an EU-wide desire for a referendum on the new reform treaty, most EU member states are not going to give the people a vote

The EU: More democratic than the US? – an argument I’ve made before, comparing the European Commission to the US presidency and cabinet

The problems of deliberative polls: Outcomes – Professor Arthur Lupia of the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research launches an attack on the Fishkin model of deliberative polling at the heart of the Tomorrow’s Europe poll. Part 1 of 4.

Reforming the European Parliament – EU blogger and former President of the Young European Federalists Jon Worth has a proposal to make the European Parliament more representative

The problem of public ignorance, part 1 – the first in a four-part series from me, looking at the difficulty of the public reaching informed decisions about the EU

Coming soon, Fishkin responds to Lupia as verbal fisticuffs break out in the world of academia, and Richard Corbett MEP weighs in with a sterling defence of EU democracy.

The graphic above appears on the Sun’s website today as part of their “Oi, Gordon – give us a referendum on the EU reform treaty or else” campaign.

That it’s full of distortions is unsurprising, but some of these key points appear to be outright lies.

I mean, I’ve read the old constitution, upon which the new treaty is heavily based, and am fairly well up on the contents of the new reform treaty. By my reckoning:

LIES: At no point is the EU given powers to oversee the UK economy. At no point is an EU army (Churchill’s idea, that…) founded. There is no mention of the EU gaining control of health and education. Britain has maintained its opt-out over human rights clauses, as well as over immigration and asylum. Oh, and – even if it may be very similar to the old constitution – it’s no longer a constitution.

DISTORTIONS: Under the terms of the new text, there will be no EU Foreign Minister (merely a powerless foreign affairs spokesman). Even the lost vetoes and diplomatic service thing are, in context, overblown and not as drastic as they are made out.

In other words, out of the ten attention-grabbing items listed in that graphic (the only part of the story most Sun readers are likely to bother reading), no fewer than nine are more or less nonsense.

Ah… Informed debate, eh? Dontcha just love it?

Oh, and please also note that in their report on their MORI poll on the EU treaty and proposed referendum, their figures are different between the pie charts and the text.

In the pie charts, 32% are for, 38% against – a significant six point difference. In the text, 44% are for, 46% against – within the margin of error.

And, as blogging poll expert Anthony Wells notes, those figures could also – rather than suggest, as the Sun does, that a referendum is both essential and going to provide an inevitable win for the “No” camp – show that the “Yes” camp has a far stronger chance of winning than anyone ever expected.

Another from me over at dLiberation, looking at the decidedly unrepresentative position of the mastermind of the constitution, and discovering that his attitude seems to have shifted in the last year or so

A couple of new posts from me over at dLiberation:

Jens-Peter Bonde and EU referenda, looking at the reformist take of the leading EU-sceptic Member of the European Parliament

and

Giuliano Amato and democratic EU reform, giving a handy overview of the unusual approach of the Italian Interior Minister (and former Vice-President of the Convention on the Future of Europe, which drafted the controversial constitution)

A delightful time was had by all at last night’s launch debate/party for Tomorrow’s Europe in Brussels – except my feet, which got pounded by the picturesque Brussels cobbles (thanks to be being too cheap to get a taxi) and then soaked by the decidedly less picturesque Brussels rain (for the self-same reason).

An array of intriguing people also met, from high-profile politicos through to the chap behind tip-top French superblog Euros du Village, and in my absence the new project that took me to Belgium has gone live, so go have a look-see:

dLiberation – a Nosemonkey-edited look at deliberative democracy, EU participation, and the future of the European Union, brought to you by openDemocracy.

I’ve got two vaguely introductory posts up so far, which should give you an idea of what we’re hoping to achieve, with many more to follow – from me and a range of experts from academics to MEPs through a few choice Brussels bureaucrats, bloggers and more. Go have a gander: