The EU’s Caucasion lessons

So, despite the apparent truce following Moscow’s insanely over-the-top response to Georgia’s silly South Ossetian venture, it sounds like Russia’s still “peacekeeping” in Georgian territory. This is otherwise known as “invading a sovereign nation just for the hell of it”.

Here’s a handy solution to all our problems: Georgia – stop playing the victim, you brought it on yourself; Russia – stop acting like a dick.

Meanwhile, the possibility of a common EU foreign policy becomes more remote by the hour. Which idiot was it who thought that an EU Foreign Minister and diplomatic service was a good idea again? If we can’t agree among ourselves, how the hell are we going to convince other world powers?

Eastern Europe used to be the Soviet Union’s buffer zone against the West; it’s now become the West’s buffer-zone against Russia. Unsurprisingly, those countries that make up said buffer-zone aren’t best pleased – especially when they see so little constructive action from the West when a country they consider one of their own is being bullied by the Russians. Because now the ex-Warsaw Pact EU member states are firmly supporting Georgia while many Western European states, keen not to piss off Moscow, are treading more carefully. The fault-lines within the EU – that have been there ever since 2004′s expansion thanks to the continued failure to come up with new post-enlargement rules and regulations – are becoming painfully apparent.

I’ve long been saying that EU relations with Russia are one of the Union’s most pressing concerns. They seem to be becoming more so. If the EU can’t agree a solution to this – or at least a unified approach – then the potential for disaster is immense. Russia will be pissed off. Georgia will be pissed off. The former Warsaw Pact EU member states will be pissed off. Europe’s only non-Russian energy supply route will be jeopardised. And the EU’s impotence on the world stage will be painfully apparent to all.

And, while the EU dithers on the sidelines, the people of Georgia and South Ossetia are still hiding from tanks, ducking from jets, and picking through the rubble to recover their shattered belongings and their dead. A situation that requires quick action has been allowed to continue unchecked in part thanks to the wasted time of trying to find a common European solution. Nice one, guys.

This is why the EU needs to decide – collectively and decisively – what it is for. Episodes like this one – following so closely on the heels of the disunited front put up over Kosovo’s independence – show that one thing the EU is definitely not for is collective foreign diplomacy. So let’s give up on the idea already. It’s getting embarrassing.

Update: Yup. This pretty much sums it up:

“at every level, Europe appears to be in the thick of events, doing its best to stop the bloodshed. But, on closer inspection, this is the traditional sort of European activity: grand proposals, the clocking of plenty of frequent flyer air miles, yet little of substance.”

10 thoughts on “The EU’s Caucasion lessons

  1. Because now the ex-Warsaw Pact EU member states are firmly supporting Georgia while many Western European states, keen not to piss off Moscow, are treading more carefully.

    I blame the Germans: they used to be far too warlike, now they’re far too pacifist. Can’t they steer a middle course?

  2. Pingback: “The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power” by George Friedman « The 8th Circle

  3. Cabalamat: It seems unfair to single out one country when the whole EU has made a mess of this crisis, but based on past performances I have to agree. The UK is probably ‘New Europe’s’ biggest friend in Western Europe. Other countries have shown varying amounts of flexibility, but when there’s been a dispute between Russia and EU countries in recent years, time and again Germany’s government is an asset to the former and a liability to the latter.

    Seriously, why is Berlin always so generous to Moscow? Schroeder was particularly craven, but even Merkel, who grew up under the same kind of Soviet-controlled dictatorship as leaders further east, doesn’t seem to show much solidarity with Poland or the Baltics.

  4. Which idiot was it who thought that an EU Foreign Minister and diplomatic service was a good idea again? If we can’t agree among ourselves, how the hell are we going to convince other world powers?

    Sorry, I disagree completely.

    Consider that if you had 50 foreign ministers in the US (one for each state) then you wouldn’t have a common response to situations like these either. The fact that the states pooled together and have just one foreign minister (secretary of state) makes it possible to speak with just one voice.
    That would be the same for the EU: just one FM would at least streamline what comes out of Europe’s mouth.

    Of course, even in that case the statement wouldn’t be very strong. Just look at the US’s reaction. Do you believe that was a strong one?

    The reason that the US and the EU are not reacting strongly, is that this is all very complicated. Yes, the eastern EU countries have a right to be very wary of Russia, but the other states are certainly right to presume that Georgia tried to force the West’s hand, and did so in a pretty stupid manner. Are we supposed to just walk in and support such idiotic behavior, even from a democratically elected president? World War I comes to mind if we do so. It would be very similar in idiocy.

    The best we can do is as what France is doing now. Cool it down and then try to mediate. Surely that is what the US wants as well, and what would also be the response of a truly united EU.

  5. Colin Reid: “Seriously, why is Berlin always so generous to Moscow?”

    What? Can you give a specific example where Angela Merkel was to generous to Moscow? My intention is not to attack your statement, maybe I really missed something, but so far I had the impression that the behavior of the German Government was all in all very reasonable.

  6. – “This is why the EU needs to decide – collectively and decisively – what it is for.” —

    Good point. To me this crisis has really brought the OSCE out of the EU’s shadow as a much broader, more decisive and consequently more productive actor for peace and stability on our continent.

    They were in there trying to find a solution while the EU dithered, finally only having their foreign ministers meeting yesterday when the (initial) crisis seemed to be blowing over.

    Yes, Sarkozy has been active but he has not been speaking on the EU’s collective behalf and Russia knows that.

    It increasingly seems to me that for every purpose the EU claims to serve there is in fact an alternative, non-integrationist, truly co-operative organisation that could serve Europe better.

    Then we could hand the billions spent annually on the EU’s glass palaces in Brussels, populated by legions of lavishly-perked staff, on those who need it most.

    SD commenting above says: “just one FM would at least streamline what comes out of Europe’s mouth.” – which is all very well in principle, but in reality Europe does not have as much in common as USA states and clearly cannot agree on what that ‘one FM’ would say.

    A starting point towards something more productive emerging for European co-operation than today’s EU is for EUtopians to recognise Europe’s wonderful diversity and moderate their grand designs accordingly.

  7. This debacle has only exposed what informed Euro observers already know; that the concept of a common EU approach to anything on the Foreign Policy front remains a convenient fiction wheeled out periodically, usually about the same time as a summit meeting photocall of EU leaders or when Javier Solana has something (relatively) important to say.

    The reality (as SD alludes to in his/her post) is that without some form of common institutional mechanism through which this concept can be channelled and made accountable directly to a European electorate, the entire idea is a farcem, which routinely descends into acrimonious bickering at the first sign of stress/pressure – i.e. current events unfolding in the Caucases.

    In a way the fracturing of the EU’s facade of unity and subsequent fudged responses (you can almost predict them beforehand), with one National foreign minister saying one thing, which is then contradicted by a statement from another, usually followed quickly by a hurriedly convened press conference on behalf of Javier Solana to clarify matters, signify the EU’s continuing intergovernmental foundations – you could almost make up a soap opera based on these events, hey – that’s not such a daft idea for a script!

  8. I don’t see here where the US and Europe’s views are the same. Much to my shame as an American, “my country” appears to be inviting a return to the Cold War, which no one should want. This is, in part, American neoconservative foreign policy that seeks to expand American influence under the banner of “democracy” and put down “rival challengers” including the European Union. Also, since American foreign policy is realist (international relations theory), there are many American foreign policy crafts that feel comfortable relieving the Cold War.

    Europe, the European Union, appears to want to seek a peaceful solution to the fight and — it is very good that the majority of European diplomats want to avoid blame, especially blaming Russia. The European Union should not only press ahead with efforts at a privileged partnership with Russia, it should use this crisis to further its relationship with Russia. There should be no talk of sanctions and the like, as this could be counter productive. There should also be some Europeanization of Georgia and a recognition of South Ossetia as separate from Georgia.

    The European Union’s reaction here can help us avoid another Cold War, which American leaders, especially Bush, appear to want. Already, the hypocrites in Washington are “demanding an end to the occupation by Russia” (Now – how about ending America’s occupation of Iraq?), but how can there be reassurances that Saakashvili’s thugs won’t send the military back into South Ossetia? Now – how about ending America’s occupation of Iraq?

  9. Pingback: Strong words from the US, but it’s up to the EU - for now | Nosemonkey’s EUtopia

  10. ESLaPorte – yeah, also McCain’s rhetoric towards Russia has been a little scary (not to mention ill-considered and unworkable) over recent weeks and months…

    Surely this crisis (as with so many others in Europe during the 1990s) demonstrates a need for *greater* coordination between EU member states on foreign policy – apart from clarifying matters (that member states themselves have to, you know, react), I don’t see how dropping attempts to develop a CFSP will help?

    But as you alluded to, this may be emblematic of a deeper flaw of the EU – that there is little agreement or even thought about what it is for, thus making it difficult to develop a sense of legitimacy among European citizens for its existence and the exercise of such powerful functions as foreign policy. Then I guess there’s yet another question as to whether the different member states could actually agree to a common vision, rather than the clumsy fudge we’ve got at the moment…

    btw- your coverage of this has been great, Nosemonkey. It’s so difficult to get considered analysis of the situation, especially with historical context. So much of the media coverage has been very one-dimensional, although Newsnight has been pretty good. The one thing I don’t understand is why did Georgia go for South Ossetia rather than Abkhazia? There’s 250,000 internally displaced Georgians following that conflict in 1992, far, far more than the numbers from South Ossetia.