From five years ago (originally published 4th February 2005) – a repost seemed appropriate as someone asked about my views on European Identity just the other day, soon after a user purporting to be Jurgen Habermas cropped up on Twitter. Despite being five years old, much still stands (update: except the links, which have now been updated where appropriate). Depressingly, the debate has barely shifted:

An interesting short article on the lack of any real sense of European identity gives a nice overview of some of the problems facing the EU, and of the possible outcomes of the proposed constitution, and follows on nicely from some of my recent musings:

In Spain, there is much controversy over whether the Basque people should remain Spanish citizens or whether they should have their own state. In the UK a recent survey of teenagers found that many saw themselves as English, Scottish or Welsh rather than British. An Italian from Milan might find more in common with a Parisian than with a Sicilian compatriot. Yet despite this, a core set of European cultural, political and social values can be divined.

The article also points to another which highlights the take of Jurgen Habermas (he of “public sphere” fame) on the European project – a take which can easily provoke both sides of the argument:

Germany’s thinker de rigueur wrote that Europe’s core states could put an end to Europe’s stagnancy, sooner or later drawing in the remaining states which would be unable to resist. Separatism, however, had to be avoided. The avant-garde core Europe cannot consolidate into a miniature Europe but, as so often, must be the locomotive.

This reminded me of an article Habermas wrote a few years back on why Europe needs a constitution, which is well nigh essential reading for anyone interested in current debates about what the EU is, was, and should be in the future. I may return to some of the points it raises again, as even though lots has changed since it first appeared (it was written just pre-September 11th 2001), it still raises many valuable points. From the introduction:

There is a remarkable contrast between the expectations and demands of those who pushed for European unification immediately after World War II, and those who contemplate the continuation of this project today – at the very least, a striking difference in rhetoric and ostensible aim.

While the first-generation advocates of European integration did not hesitate to speak of the project they had in mind as a “United States of Europe”, evoking the example of the USA, current discussion has moved away from the model of a federal state, avoiding even the term “federation”.

Larry Siedentop’s recent book Democracy in Europe expresses a more cautious mood: as he puts it, “a great constitutional debate need not involve a prior commitment to federalism as the most desirable outcome in Europe. It may reveal that Europe is in the process of inventing a new political form, something more than a confederation but less than a federation” an association of sovereign states which pool their sovereignty only in very restricted areas to varying degrees, an association which does not seek to have the coercive power to act directly on individuals in the fashion of nation states.

Does this shift in climate reflect a sound realism, born of a learning-process of over four decades, or is it rather the sign of a mood of hesitancy, if not outright defeatism?

The contemporary substantification of law means that constitutional debates over the future of Europe are now increasingly the province of highly specialized discourses among economists, sociologists and political scientists, rather than the domain of constitutional lawyers and political philosophers. On the other hand, we should not underestimate the symbolic weight of the sheer fact that a constitutional debate is now publicly under way.

As a political collectivity, Europe cannot take hold in the consciousness of its citizens simply in the shape of a common currency. The intergovernmental arrangement at Maastricht lacks that power of symbolic crystallization which only a political act of foundation can give.

Forgot all about this, as the interview was originally conducted back in October, but it’s in the latest issue of Shift Mag, which focusses on Euroscepticism. Have a gander at the whole lot here or, below the fold, check out my responses to the following:

1. In the blog nosemonkey, you explain your political views. How have you passed from being a small -“C” conservative and entirely anti-EU to a small -“L” liberal and largely pro-EU?

2.According to you, what are the main shortcomings of the eurosceptic group?

3. Do you think eurosceptics could weigh up in EU decisions if people took them more seriously?

4. Five good reasons to be Eurosceptic and Five good reasons to be Pro- European in Europe today?

5. With the adhesion request of Island, with the “NO-YES” referendum in Ireland, a new phenomenon seems to emerge: “EUR-OPPORTUNISM”. Will it be the strongest cement of European Union for the future? And maybe the sworn enemy of Europe as identity ? What’s your opinion?

6. In your blog, you say you are more in favour of the idea of the EU than the current reality. Can you explain?

7. How can the EU get more legitimacy amongst EU citizens?

Please note, these answers were given a few months ago now, so my views may well have changed… I’ve highlighted a few key points in bold on a quick skim through, though – it’s a long one. The last bit in particular, though, is worth a read, if I do say so myself…
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As such, a letter just sent to Private Eye (aimed at that publication’s always entertaining Pedantry Corner):

In Eye 1254, Brussels Sprouts begins with “The new EU Spanish presidency (not to be confused with the EU’s first actual president, Herman Van Rompuy)”. Dull grey Herman is not “actually” the EU’s first president, for such a position does not exist. He is instead the first permanent president of the European Council – assuming you can call a two-and-a-half year posting with a two term limit permanent – a pretty much powerless post whose duties primarily lie in chairing the (roughly) quarterly EU summits between the heads of government of the EU member states.

The President of the European Council is not the only post in the EU to be styled “president” (heard of José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission? Jerzy Buzek, president of the European Parliament? the rotating six-monthly national presidencies that the Brussels Sprouts piece was actually about?). Indeed it’s arguably the least powerful of the four EU presidencies, as he doesn’t get to initiate legislation (like the Commission president), nor vote upon it (like the EP president), nor does he technically have any power to outline policy plans (like the rotating national presidencies).

Hell, Van Rompuy isn’t even the first President of the European Council – the position used to be filled by the head of government of the member state which held the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union (also known as the Council of Ministers, the Consilium, or just the Council – related to but separate from the European Council, and not, of course, to be confused with the Council of Europe), and so the first President of the European Council was another Belgian, Achille Van Acker, from January to June 1958.

I know that the EU’s mind-numbingly boring and complicated (see above), and that “EU president” has become a convenient shorthand in the British press ever since the kerfuffle over Tony Blair possibly getting the post, but it is not “actually” accurate to refer to Van Rompuy in that way.

(Cue even more pedantic people than me to point out that the first European Council meeting took place in 1961, making its first president *yet another* Belgian, Gaston Eyskens. But that’s always the way of these things…)

A new year, and we should be looking to the future. I’ve also (appropriately) been looking to the past, though, and pondering how little has changed.

Five years ago: Complaining about the nature of the EU debate and lengthy attempts to explain why the EU is not becoming a superstate (perennial and never-ending discussions, these – the latter covered in five lengthy parts last year: one, two, three, four, five)

Four years ago: Boredom with the EU constitution – which has since, of course, morphed into boredom with the Lisbon Treaty (over which we’re still having arguments, even though it’s now been passed…)

Three years ago: An attempt to explain my political outlook, having caused yet more confusion by not seeming to fall neatly into any of the usual categories, and not being overly consistent in approach. (Something that cropped up yet again just the other day.)

Two years ago: A decision to blog less often, in more depth (which I’ve stuck to more or less, more from laziness and boredom than concerted effort). A possible hint of the growing boredom.

One year ago: Some advice for new bloggers, which all still stands. Trying to pass the baton on to a new breed? Another expression of boredom with the whole thing? Quite possibly.

We now have a new decade, and a slightly reshaped EU – though so little has changed, I have no doubts that all the same arguments will continue. Because the same concerns that faced the EU at the start of the last decade continue to worry at the start of this one: How to reshape the Common Agricultural and Common Fisheries Policies? Which of the near neighbours are going to be allowed to join the EU club, and when? How to deal with Russia? What is the EU’s role in the world? And – most importantly – what is the EU for?

I have a strange feeling I’ll be discussing the same old stuff in another five, ten years, and that we’ll hardly have moved on at all. And in any case, as I noted last year, I’m interested in politics, but I don’t CARE about politics. At the moment, there’s very little to interest me.

So, is there *anything* interesting to look forward to, or is this going to be the third January in a row (and the fifth out of the last six) where I enter the new year largely disillusioned with the principle subject of this blog?

Just to be provocative, like (I obviously don’t entirely believe this headline – I’m a big fan of the subsidiarity principle, after all, and am an advocate of greater localism in politics – but still)… This taken from a reply to a comment on my last post.

First point, worth repeating constantly:

“The EU” doesn’t tell ANY member state what to do. Because “the EU” IS those member states.

If “the EU” introduces new legislation, and the UK has to adopt that legislation, this is ONLY because the UK has already agreed that this legislation is a good idea.

On every substantive issue – even after Lisbon – member states retain vetoes. All major decisions are confirmed either in the European Council or the Council of the European Union – which are made up by the heads and ministers of the governments of the member states.

So instead of “the EU tells”, a more honest phrase would be “the governments of the EU member states agree”.

And then, on to why EU-level legislation and regulation is a good thing.

EU legislation and regulations do affect a sizable chunk of everyday life. And a good thing too – for wherever you have one bit of EU legislation or one EU regulation, that means that you are saving millions of pounds/euros/dollars across the continent – which no matter how much you think the UK economy is reliant on the EU can only be a good thing, because all savings mean the European economy will be healthier.

Why does EU legislation = savings? Because for ANY regulation or legislation to come into force at EU level necessarily implies that ALL 27 member states have agreed that this legislation/regulation is necessary.

It’s not an immense leap of logic to therefore suggest that all 27 member states may well have introduced such legislation/regulations at a national level. And this would cost money in each member state, as each government works out what it wants to do entirely independently, each civil service checks the practicalities and costs entirley independently, and each country implements the legislation/regulation entirely independently. And this would necessarily lead to subtle variations between the legislation/regulations member state to member state.

By doing it at an EU level, the member states can pool their resources to cut down on research costs prior to passing the legislation/regulation, and also ensure harmonisation – increasing ease of trade between member states (as manufacturers don’t have to produce 27 subtly different versions of the same product to comply with 27 different national rulebooks).

All of this leads to savings – both in terms of bureaucratic costs at a national level, and in terms of economic efficiency.

So EU legislation/regulation is, as a general rule, a good thing.

There are of course examples of bad EU legislation and bad EU regulations, but as member states are generally given a good deal of flexibility on the implementation – while still having to stick to the general principle that they’ve all agreed at EU level – there are normally ways to get around it. This flexibility also allows member states to adapt EU rules to fit their own local needs, while still maintaining pan-EU harmony and the consequent efficiency savings – that’s the whole point.

We’ve seen all the intra-European arguments about Lisbon (now in force for a full fortnight) – what we really need is some expert extra-European opinion. So ta very much to Philip H Gordon, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the US State Department, for his handy overview.

Key points?

- “the role of Member States in decision-making is undiminished”

- “The treaty… allows for some EU states which are at the forefront of defense cooperation to pursue greater harmonization of their defense apparatus without the limitations of those states who do not wish to participate”

- “the Lisbon Treaty represents a serious effort by our EU partners to streamline their policymaking process. We understand that, as with all efforts to reform complex institutions, this is a work in progress, and that it may take time for the new institutions to demonstrate their impact. Nevertheless, we hope that the changes brought by Lisbon will make the EU a stronger partner for the United States, and increase the role of Europe on the world’s stage. We want the EU to be that stronger partner and we certainly intend to do our part to engage closely with the new institutions, but in the end their ultimate effectiveness will be determined by the will of EU Member States to invest in them.”

Well would you look at that? The United States doesn’t seem to think that Lisbon has brought about a superstate (as some of our more hysterical anti-EU friends seem to believe), but rather that it continues to allow EU member states a great deal of individual power and flexibility. And the United States also seems to believe that – as its supporters have consistently maintained – the Lisbon Treaty is primarily aimed at streamlining the union’s working methods.

Oh, and just to add to what anyone with half a brain and the ability to read has been saying about the thing, Assistant Secretary Gordon also notes the increased powers that are going to the European Parliament – that’d be the increased democracy bit that we’ve been going on about for the last few years.

So, what’s the conspiracy that explains the US State Department echoing the EU’s own line on Lisbon – a line that’s supposedly dishonest propaganda designed to hide the true sinister intent of the treaty? Anyone?

(Sorry for the blogging silence here of late, by the way – very, very busy for the last few weeks…)

UKIP, love them or hate them, have been fairly consistent in one thing over the years – arguing against the EU because it is run by unelected bureaucrats. Just one of their arguments, perhaps – but the democratic deficit claim (though certainly disputable) has long been one of their most popular and successful.

Now, however, on the same day that the new (unelected) European Commissioners have been unveiled, they have chosen as their new leader a man who has never been elected to any public office. In one move, they’ve lost the moral high ground. What’s more, they have often in the past attacked “EU elites” – and to good effect. But now they are being led by an Old Etonian peer of the realm with one of the plummiest accents I’ve ever heard – and I went to a rather snobby public school… You simply do not get a better symbol of “elitism” than an Old Etonian peer.

At the same time as being unelected, Pearson’s obsessions are rather out of kilter with a large chunk of what I had previously taken to be British eurosceptic concerns.

UKIP has long been accused by some of its critics of being a BNP-lite, or a middle-class version of the BNP. I’m not one of them – or, at least, I haven’t been until now. I see most British eurosceptics as being misguided, certainly – but (despite the occasional mockery) I generally respect their concerns about the nature of the EU (and even agree with some of them). I can see why people are worried about decisions being taken in Brussels rather than London, even while disagreeing about it being a problem. I also don’t believe that most eurosceptics are xenophobes, as they are so often accused of being by some.

But with Lord Pearson taking the leadership, I’m not so sure. He was, after all, the person who caused a brief scandal by inviting right-wing, anti-Islam Dutch politician Geert Wilders to the UK to show his polemical anti-Muslim film Fitna. (Which I’ve seen and thought was rubbish. Relatively offensive, for sure, but not enough to be worth banning.)

What’s more, Pearson’s obsession seems not so much to be the EU – as you’d surely expect from the leader of a party set up to oppose the EU and advocate British withdrawal – as to be immigration. Take a recent interview with the BBC, broadcast on The Politics Show on BBC1 last Sunday. Transcript:

Pearson: “Immigration is probably the biggest issue outside the south east of England, and the people have been treated incredibly badly by their political class.”

Interviewer: “So is there a danger that you could be confused – UKIP and the BNP?”

Pearson: “We’ve got to be very careful, erm, especially in this area of immigration, erm, that we cannot be confused with the.. the BNP – I… I accept that. There’s a fine line to be drawn here, erm… But I would also want to bring up…”

Interviewer: “I’m sorry, but are you saying that there’s a fine line between UKIP and the BNP?”

Pearson: “Well, I don’t actually know, erm, the intimate detail of… of the BNP policy. What we would be aiming for is zero net increase, erm, in immigration. So obviously we’re… we welcom asylum seekers, we welcome people of all colours and everything, and in that we’re completely different, erm… t-to the BNP. But we think the prospect of the population moving towards 70 million, erm… you know, within 20 years or so is very worrying. Sharia Law, erm… Islamic law is running in this country in fact, erm, in many areas, which is completely unacceptable if it becomes superior to British law.”

Hardly anything there that doesn’t sound like a paraphrase of the BNP. A point that’s made even clearer by Pearson’s acceptance speech:

Please note again his obsessions:

“Of course we will be majoring on leaving the European Union – we can’t control our borders without that, we can’t control immigration… And we must get around the stranglehold of the political class.”

“The political class” is a favourite phrase of a certain other anti-immigration party leader…

In that clip of Pearson’s acceptance speech – uploaded to YouTube by UKIP itself, so surely what the party want the public to see – Pearson spends little more than 15 seconds discussing the EU. The rest is given over to immigration.

So, is UKIP no longer an anti-EU party, but an anti-immigration party? And if it’s both, then what’s the major emphasis – the EU or immigration? And what exactly *is* the “fine line” between UKIP and the BNP?

More importantly, who do British eurosceptics who are opposed to the EU but dislike such hardline anti-immigration rhetoric supposed to turn to now? There are innumerable reasons to oppose the EU that have nothing to do with immigration – yet Pearson seems determined to make this the party’s primary concern. In the process, he is confirming everything nasty that has ever been said about British eurosceptics. And, what’s more, he may well be about to split the party in two. Again. Witness fellow UKIP leadership candidate, Cllr Alan Wood (transcript from BBC Politics Show last Sunday):

Interviewer: “Do you respect Lord Pearson?”

Wood: “No I don’t. I think he’s totally off the wall with his remarks about Muslims and Sharia Law, and for that I can’t respect him”

Inteviewer: “Are you saying that if he’s elected people will think that you’re too close to the BNP?”

Wood: “Yes, yes. People already think we are the BNP. Erm… It’s tragic. It’s tragic that we’ve been painted into this corner.”

Interviewer: “And so if he’s elected, you’re leaving, you’re off?”

Wood: “I cannot stay with Lord Pearson, with those views, and I don’t think he’s the right man.”

Wood will not be alone in this. Members of my family have been known to vote UKIP – some of them as recently as last summer. None of them will approve of the party shifting towards an anti-immigration position – certainly not if that becomes the party’s primary focus, as Pearson seems determined to make it.

There is a place – indeed a need – for a strong, anti-EU voice in British politics. Poll after poll shows the public’s concern on this issue. UKIP – especially after the fall-out from Cameron’s decision about a Lisbon Treaty referendum – was the obvious choice to be that voice. By picking Lord Pearson as leader, I’m afraid that British eurosceptics are being very poorly served by the party. This is bad not just for eurosceptics, but for politics as a whole.

So, it’s looking like it’s lightweight, little-known Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy for the President of the European Council, and lightweight, little-known Baroness Ashton (current UK European Commissioner, Peter Mandelson’s almost invisible replacement) for the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Two no-marks, for two jobs that many have claimed are among the most powerful in the world.

Does anyone seriously believe that Van Rompuy has what it takes to impose his will over the likes of Sarkozy, Merkel and Berlusconi in Council meetings?

Does anyone seriously believe that *anyone* is going to take Baroness Ashton seriously, a woman who’s been at the Commission for only a year, and was unqualified even for that? (See also…)

The Presidency of the European Council has been described by many as “President of the EU”, with many imagining that because of this its holder will have powers akin to that of the US President.

The High Representative for Foreign Affairs has likewise been talked up as “EU Foreign Minister”, meaning many take it to be akin to the US Secretary of State.

But where America gets Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, we get Andy Pandy and Looby Loo.

Yet more proof of where the real power lies in the EU: Not in EU institutions or the corridors of Brussels, but with the governments of the member states. For it is the heads of the member state governments who have agreed this pair of no-marks – and the only explanation I can think of is that the governments of the member states want these two new roles to be as powerless and unimportant as possible, so as to maintain their own power.

So much for the Lisbon Treaty ushering in the end of national sovereignty and the dawn of an EU superstate. With these two appointments, the EU has been effectively neutered as a state-like world power. Eurosceptics can rest easy in their beds.

Update: See also initial reactions from Julien Frisch (”a massive disgrace”) and Jon Worth (”I am astounded”)

Apropos of not a lot, now that the Treaty of Lisbon’s all over, what was being said when the similarly disputed and unsatisfactory Treaty of Nice was finally passed back in 2001?

From The Economist, Vol. 360, Issue 8232 (28th July 2001):

Nice is complex and difficult to understand; in future, the EU must do better in explaining its workings to a European public that seems to be simultaneously bored and irritated by the Union.

Sound familiar?

So runs the argument of increasingly prominent anti-EU Tory, Daniel Hannan MEP – still advocating a UK referendum despite the final ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.

This is, of course, very true. Since the 1975 referendum on EEC membership, the British people haven’t had their chance to vote on being part of the EU system.

But when was the vote on constitutional monarchy, an established Church, Cabinet government, a two-chamber parliament, parliamentary sovereignty, a supreme court, the first past the post voting system, our membership of NATO, the UN, the WTO, etc. etc. etc.?

Why the insistence on a public say in one (really rather small) part of the UK’s governance, but not all the rest?

Why the complaints about the unelected European Commission, but no murmurs of dissent about how no one in the Cabinet is elected to that post? (Not to mention the UK civil service…)

Why the complaints about lack of democracy in the EU when the House of Lords remains unelected?

Why the complaints about EU law when most domestic legislation is passed via statutory instruments without so much as a glance from an elected official?

Why the hysteria over the largely powerless Presidency of the European Council, when Her Majesty the Queen retains the right to dissolve parliament and veto any legislation, whenever she likes?

How about, in other words, we put our own house in order before preaching about governmental perfection – and how about we stop with the double-standards? Want the people to have a say in how they’re governed? Fine. Let’s give them a say in all the other areas as well.

But don’t abuse referenda – generally reserved purely for extraordinary constitutional changes – for party political purposes. That way lies the destruction of the very system of government that the EU’s British opponents profess to hold so dear.